Psychiatric abuse and the concept of mental illness. by Marwan S, Al-Mutawa
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
Psychiatric abuse and the concept of mental illness.
   
Al-Mutawa, Marwan S




 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  





 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 




 A THESIS ENTITLED
PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE AND THE COMCEPT 
OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Submitted to 
The University of Wales 







INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10821267
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a critical analysis of the limitation 
and weakness of the concept of mental illness and proposes the 
Reactive Functional Disorder (RFD) approach as an alternative 
moral perspective on mental illness.
Chapter one highlights, through an analysis of the 
problems of psychiatric treatment in Kuwait, the vulnerability 
of the concept of mental illness to abuse. In Chapter two, it is 
argued that the current definitional systems used in psychiatry 
have contributed to the vulnerability of the concept of mental 
illness to abuse by employing definitions which are terminologically, 
clinically, and morally weak.
In Chapter three, the RFD approach is presented in the 
hope that this account might provide a deeper understanding of 
the moral and conceptual implications of the concept of mental 
illness.
Chapter four provides an analysis of some of the writings 
of Thomas Szasz, the controversial American psychiatrist, who argues 
consistently that mental illness is a myth and psychiatry is unlike 
other well-established medical disciplines. It is argued that 
Dr. Szasz, in reality, is less against psychiatry than against 
psychiatric coercion and involuntary hospitalisation.
In Chapter five, the current limitations of the concept 
of mental illness are discussed with special reference to political 
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. The RFD approach is 
applied theoretically to cases in the Soviet context in order to 
see whether this model might provide some way towards alleviating 
the problem of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union.
The final chapter argues that it is very difficult to 
establish a value-free model of mental illness due to the 
uniqueness and complexity of human personal suffering. It is 
concluded that what should be generalized is a definition of 
personal suffering that is based on a mutual patient-psychiatrist 
agreement on the content and frame of psychiatric interpretation.
The fundamental argument in this thesis is directed 
towards placing the patient’s values and his personal definition 
of his suffering above the values of society or ’significant’ others.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of mental illness is the focus of a deeply 
controversial debate concerning the validity and reliability of 
studying or specifying mental phenomena and the clinical reality of 
psychiatric labels. Philosophers, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists 
social workers, sociologists, and other related professions such as 
lawyers, etc., have reacted differently to the concept of mental 
illness and psychiatry in general. Some argue for a radical departure 
from the current definitions of mental illness. Others raise doubts 
as to the applicability and usefulness of the study of mental phenomena 
and doubts as to psychiatry as a medical discipline. Such writers 
usually end with the conclusion that mental illness is no more than 
a myth or that mental illness is the expected result of being labelled 
as mentally ill. Such concern is centred on the moral and ethical 
outcome of psychiatric diagnosis and the need to promote and understand 
the mental patient’s right to autonomy and self-government. Others, 
however (mainly traditional and organic psychiatrists), would take 
the opposite view that diagnosis and treatment in psychiatry have 
proved to be highly effective and reliable in many countries in the 
world. They claim that recent advances in genetic and neurological 
research will lead to a demonstration, in due course, that human 
suffering is predetermined by genetic factors. Such writers argue 
that the effectiveness of psychiatric treatment in severe psychotic 
conditions is a clear evidence of the chemical or organic basis of 
mental phenomena.
This thesis is an attempt at a moral and conceptual analysis 
of the moral limitations of the concept of mental illness. Moreover, 
the present writer hopes that such analysis is relevant to the problem 
of psychiatric abuse by showing how, in practice, the concept of 
mental illness is vulnerable to abuse. The vulnerability to abuse 
of the concept of mental illness will be analysed in Chapter One,
MThe problem of psychiatric treatments in Kuwait". This chapter 
will show that the concept of mental illness has contributed 
significantly to the problem of psychiatric abuse in Kuwait.
Different forms of abuse are discussed with the support of case 
illustrations such as: involuntary hospitalisation, the use of ECT
and other forms of medication, informed consent, and justice in the 
allocation of psychiatric resources.
Chapter two attempts to highlight the conceptual, clinical, 
and moral weakness of the concept of mental illness. It is argued 
that although many definition systems in psychiatry (such as DSM-III 
and ICD-9, etc.) provide us with a single definition of mental 
illness, clinicians in different countries are affected by their 
cultural norms of adjustment in the diagnosis of mental illness.
Thus, a subjective rather than a clinical or observational set of 
symptoms is the central determining criterion in the diagnosis of 
mental illness. It is further argued that the morally negative 
outcome of psychiatric labelling is so significant and long-lasting 
that it will lead to an invalidation and dehumanization of those who 
are so labelled. Case illustrations and a review of clinical research 
will be discussed in order to show how the concept of mental illness 
can be vulnerable to abuse in psychiatric practice.
Chapter three argues that the RFD model (Reactive Functional 
Disorder) represents an approach which is morally advanced over the 
DSM-III. It will also be argued that such a model places the patient's 
values and his personal claims over socially accepted values. According 
to the RFD, the most important criterion for considering a person 
as suitable for psychiatric care should be the presence of clear 
indications of total functional failure in all his major psycho-physio- 
social functions as perceived by the patient himself. Furthermore, 
such a total failure is perceived to be the result of a reactive 
or external rather than an internal causal process. Throughout this 
chapter, case illustrations will be discussed in order to show the 
applicability of the RFD model in resolving problems of psychiatric 
abuse.
In Chapter four, we shall discuss the contribution of the 
American psychiatrist, Thomas Szasz, who argues consistently that 
mental illness is a myth and psychiatry cannot be defined as a medical 
discipline. For Szasz, mental illness is no more than 'problems 
of living'. Although Szasz expresses an extreme view of the concept 
of mental illness and psychiatry as completely governed by moral 
values, nevertheless his philosophical analysis has raised an awareness 
of the need to respect mental patients and the need for a psychiatrist- 
patient relationship based on consenting principles. It is further 
argued that in reality Szasz is not against psychiatry but psychiatric 
coercion and involuntary hospitalisation.
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In Chapter five, we shall try to analyse the problem of 
political psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union and to show how the 
RFD model can be applied to highlight political abuse in that country.
In the final chapter, it is argued that it is difficult, 
if not altogether impossible, to establish a value-free model of 
mental illness. It is further argued that current attempts to establish 
a value-free model of mental dysfunctions would not necessarily do 
away with the pejorative connotations of being mentally ill which 
are inherent in the concept itself. It is further argued that the 
'biological* or 'disease* model cannot provide a satisfactory answer 
to many subjective elements in the interpretation of psychological 
phenomena, such as whether the patient's psycho-social functioning 
is reasonable or unreasonable or appropriate or inappropriate, etc. 
Throughout this chapter the importance of the shared interpretative 
agreement between the patient and the psychiatrist is emphasized.
Both patient and psychiatrist should come to a mutual acceptance 
of the definition of the problem of functional failure. Thus, the 
agreement reached is likely to reflect more appropriately the shared 
perspective of patient and psychiatrist. Then it would seem possible 
to argue for an 'all-context' application of the above interpretative 
agreement.
CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENTS
IN KUWAIT
THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENTS IN KUWAIT
Introduct ion
MAs people seek answers to current problems, they 
turn increasingly to the professional knowledge and 
insight of psychiatry. In turn, psychiatry inter­
acts ever more with the political process, for 
without legislation, financing, and the concern of 
political leaders to nurture its services, psychiatry 
can achieve little."
(Brown, 1975, p.2474)
In order to understand the interaction between psychiatry and society, 
and the problems posed by psychiatry in general, we need to analyse 
the hidden forces that determine the efficiency of mental health services 
and how psychiatry should deal with such forces.
This chapter will focus on the nature and character of 
problems specific to psychiatric treatment encountered during the 
writer's professional experience in Kuwait and will analyse historical 
development as well as contemporary practice.
When considering contemporary features of psychiatric 
problems in Kuwait, it is also necessary, however, not only to consider 
past and present conditions, but also to provide an account of psychiatric 
practice from ethical as well as psychiatric perspectives. A further 
aim of this chapter will be to evaluate from a moral standpoint the 
impact that psychiatric practice appears to have on mental patients 
in Kuwait.
The Concept of Health Care and Psychiatric Services in Kuwait
Kuwait's transition from a pearl-diving Bedouin society 
to a modern urban one has taken about forty years. Today, very few 
people depend on livestock or the sea for their living, most Kuwaitis 
are engaged in commerce or the service industries. At present Kuwait 
is one of the wealthiest countries in the world due to its rich oil 
resources. Another feature of the country is its rapid population 
growth. In 1957, only 200,000 people lived in Kuwait, whereas today 
there are 1.7 million, of whom just under half are Kuwaitis.
The State provides a comprehensive medical system, with 
access to a full range of free medical and psychiatric services.
The country is divided into health districts containing about 25,000 
people. Each district has a primary care clinic which provides general 
practitioner services. In Kuwait, there are six general hospitals 
with a total of 2,780 beds. In addition, there are specialist maternity, 
dental, orthopaedic, cancer, infectious diseases hospitals, and a 
psychiatric hospital (with psychiatric units in general hospitals 
and some primary care clinics). The line of referral to the Psychiatric 
Hospital is from the primary care clinics.
A. Philosophy of Health Care in Kuwait
In Kuwait, the legitimacy of the health care delivery system 
stems from the constitution which contains four articles providing 
the foundations of the State's philosophy of health care. These 
articles are as follows:
Article 1 The family is the cornerstone of the community. Religion
(Islam), morality and patriotism for the homeland form
the foundation for the family. Its existence is preserved 
by law which strengthens its ties and consequently protects 
the mother and child.
Article 2 The State provides care for the young and protects them 
from exploitation and from moral, physical and spiritual 
neglect.
Article 3 The State ensures aid to citizens in old age, or citizens
who suffer from illness or inability to work, and provides
them with social security and health care services.
Article 4 The State is responsible for public health and the means 
of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics.
A review of these four articles reveals that the philosophy 
governing the health care system in Kuwait is not restricted to the 
"conventional" preventive and curative services only. It goes far 
beyond those by making the State responsible for the social, moral 
and ethical development of its population. The salient elements 
of such philosophy are:
1. The type and level of health care to be provided to the population 
is to be compatible with the socio-cultural and religious values 
of Kuwaiti society. The needs of each individual are to be met 
in such a way that he or she can lead a socially, economically, 
and emotionally productive life. In fact, one could make a useful 
comparison with the WHO definition of health. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in 1946 (Callahan, 1976) defined Health
as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity1’ (p. 160). 
Clearly, the WHO definition emphasized the importance of the 
interconnection between physical and social and psychological 
well-being (see Harron et al, 1983). Moreover, the WHO definition 
of health "encompasses everything that could be included under 
the heading of human welfare and happiness" (Callahan, 1976, 
p. 160). It is indeed a very broad definition that conceptualises 
many aspects of human problems can be solved within medicine.
Many developing countries, including Kuwait, adhere almost exclus­
ively to the WHO definition of health. However, as Callahan 
(1976) argues, such a definition is, by the virtue of its broadness 
open to abuse. The WHO definition, in addition, has led many 
clinicians throughout the world to conceptualise moral and ethical 
spheres of activities such as political or criminal behaviour 
as an indication of ’sickness’, rather than "just wrong, stupid, 
or immoral" (Callahan, Ibid., p . 160) which indicate to the WHO's 
definitional power of Health.
"Moreover, it is patently the case that the combination 
of an all-encompassing concept of health together with 
biomedical advances has created a situation in which 
nearly anything that anyone wants from medicine can 
find legitimation as a health need. The abortion 
reform movement, culminating in the Supreme Court 
decision to allow abortion on request for the first two 
trimesters of pregnancy, drew heavily on health and 
well-being arguments, and the wording of the court's 
decision made much of putting the final choice jointly 
in the hands of women and their physicians, as if it 
were simply a medical matter. The emergence of genetic 
counselling as a major medical profession has drawn 
much of its force not only by concentrating on the 
genetic health of fetuses and neonates but also and
usimultaneously by concentrating on the mental health 
of parents faced with the possibility of producing a 
defective child. The word "suffering" is a common 
one in the literature of genetic counseling, but it 
is rarely clear whether the suffering referred to is 
that of the child, the parents and family, or the 
society as a whole; they are usually mixed together 
in ways that make them almost indistinguishable.
"Health", now seen as the alleviation of all suffering, 
provides a very handy basket into which can be thrown 
both physiological considerations and emotional responses."
Clbid., p . 160)
Thus, "any desire can be seen as a health need; and any need 
can be legitimated in the name of the right to health" (Ibid., 
p. 161). In our following discussion of the problematic nature 
of psychiatric services in Kuwait, we shall see how in the name 
of the right to mental health, many patients have been deprived 
from their basic rights and humanity and some psychiatrists have 
abused their professional power.
2. The special health needs of specific sub-populations such as
the under-privileged, the handicapped, children, mothers, and the
elderly are to be given a higher priority.
3. Community participation is viewed as an essential element of
health and of health care.
4. The Ministry of Public Health will devise, test and implement 
standards in all spheres of health activities.
5. Health manpower is to be trained to meet the highest professional 
standards, while the dependency on ex-patriate health manpower
is progressively reduced.
B . The Psychiatric Hospital and Psychiatric Patients:
A Moral and Historical Perspective
Before 1940, psychiatric patients in Kuwait were neglected, 
left wandering in the streets and the market centres. In 1940, the 
Kuwaiti Municipality recommended an institution for the "insane" 
be established. The patients were "collected" and put under the 
full care of "guards" who fed them, chained and unchained them, and 
generally supervised their lives.
In 1949, a small hospital for psychiatric cases was built. 
The hospital was originally known as the "Lunatic Asylum" and here 
the mentally ill were handled in the manner associated with the word 
"lunatic". That is to say, they were locked up, not with any idea 
of treatment, but to prevent them from harming other people. The 
hospital's rooms were narrow, barred cells where the patients could 
be chained, and in each courtyard stood a large cage where they could 
be incarcerated in the day-time.
By 1955 the old ways had been partially abandoned. Since 
then conditions have steadily improved in the following areas:
- provision of decent accommodation;
- introduction of medical treatment (e.g. insulin therapy, 
medication, etc.);
- employing doctors and nurses;
- improvement of the administrative regulations of 
admittance and discharge of patients.
8A general view of the first psychiatric hospital in 
Kuwait which was built in 1949 and was originally known 
as the "Lunatic Asylum".
(Source: Al-Mutawa, 1986, p.54).
In the 1970s, there was no clear definition of what mental 
disorder was, and certainly no recognition of the mentally ill as 
a category requiring a special form of treatment. Only a small prop­
ortion of the total number of disturbed people were recognised as 
being "insane". A person who was labelled as "insane" was a person 
whose actions were obviously a danger to himself or to others, and
such an individual had no protection at all in law. He might be
sent to the "Lunatic Asylum", the only place which dealt with such
problems.
Many Kuwaiti families, however, preferred to keep their 
mentally disturbed members at home and lock the door on them.
"Patients" were almost certain to be confined most of the day, neglected 
and intimidated.
Many families refused to send their patients to the hospital 
because of the following reasons:
(1) the stigma and shame which society attached to such disorders;
(2) sending a family member to the "Lunatic Asylum" would be seen
as a sign of failure to cope with the problem;
(3) sending the patient to the "asylum" might be taken to mean that 
the family wanted to get rid of their relative because they did 
not care enough about him/her;
(4) many Kuwaiti families viewed mental patients as victims of 
evil forces, evil spirits, or as possessed by demons.
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"Al Tanbora" - a traditional Kuwaiti dance, which many families 
believed was effective in curing mental illness by exorcising the 
patient from the evil spirits.
A Talisman (charm) which was thought to be an effective 
protection from the "evil eye" or spirits.
(Source: Hussain, 1984, p. 140).
The general resistance on the part of the family to send their 
patients to the psychiatric hospital moved some psychiatrists in 1957 to 
make special arrangements with some families to accept patients whose 
family had failed to cure by using traditional methods. The politics of this 
practice are very clear. The hospital wanted to encourage people to use its 
services and to support its legitimacy as a medical psychiatric institution, 
and not a "lunatic asylum".
This policy, unfortunately, made the psychiatrists and physicians 
who worked in the "Lunatic Asylum" over-emphasise their professional links 
with colleagues in general physical medicine. The result was that the 
hospital policy seemed to rely quite heavily on physical methods of treat­
ment, such as anti-depressant, anti-psychotic drugs and, latterly, ECT.
Psychotherapy was and still is considered to be an ineffective method of
treatment and a waste of time.
A hospital ward in the old "Lunatic Asylum" which was built in 1949. 
(Source: Al-Mutawa, 1986, p.20).
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A completely new Psychiatric Hospital was eventually built 
in 1958. Initially it had beds for 136 patients, and dealt mainly 
with patients suffering the early stages of mental disorder, alcoholics 
and psychological cases. The old "asylum" was still reserved for the 
seriously mentally ill. However, this was closed in 1963.
Today, the only Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait is the one 
which was built in 1958. Since 1958, the hospital capacity has grown 
steadily, and the buildings are under constant construction and extension. 
At present, the hospital accommodates 500 patients within nineteen watds.
Development in psychiatric services in Kuwait of recent years 
indicates that mental health professionals have travelled far beyond 
the walls of the old "asylum" (their original place of work). Today 
their functions have been extended to the military services, schools, 
child and family guidance clinics, prisons, and several psychiatric 
out-patient clinics in general hospitals.
The new "Psychiatric Hospital" in Kuwait which was built in 
1958. This is the only psychiatric hospital in Kuwait.
(Source: Al-Mutawa, 1987, p.3).
13
The admission and discharge office in Kuwait Psychiatric Hospital
Patients' medical records to which every person working in the 
hospital has access
(Source: Al-Mutawa, 1986, p.25).
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ECT (electro-convulsive therapy) equipment which 
is currently in use in the Psychiatric Hospital.
(Source: Al-Mutawa, 1986, p.32).
The Problem of Psychiatric Treatment in Kuwait 
1 . Involuntary Hospitalisation and the Principle of Liberty
M.M. is a highly intelligent 37-year old married man with 
a secondary level of education who used to be employed in his father's 
trade company. When he was 22, he suddenly began to feel highly 
suspicious of his older brother because he thought that his brother 
(who was the managing director of the family trade company) was 
mishandling the company money. The case told his father that he 
wanted to be on the board of the company. However, his application 
was refused. The case then became very angry, agitated, suspicious 
and aggressive toward employees in the company. His older brother 
was annoyed by the case's continuous interference in his work, so 
he called the police who arrested the case while he was on his way 
to his house. The case was diagnosed as paranoid psychotic. On 
examination, the patient appeared confused and disoriented. Although 
he is an Arabic speaker, he preferred to speak in English (which 
was taken by the psychiatrists as an indication of thorough mental 
disturbance). He was then admitted to a closed ward and was treated 
with anti-psychotic medication and ECT, which produced the following 
side-effeets: dry mouth, constipation, drowsiness and memory disturbance.
After he was discharged, he stopped taking the medication.
After a while, he began to interfere again with his family 
company and asked his father to give him a new house (the father 
had already given all his sons new houses). The father refused to 
comply with his wish, upon which the case accused him of not being 
fair to all his sons.
Eventually, the patient suspected that his older brother 
would arrange for him to be re-admitted to the hospital, so he escaped 
to his older sister, who was very fond of him, and stayed there for 
two weeks. When he felt that he was probably safe, he went back 
to his own house. At 10.00 p.m. one night soon after, while he was 
sitting with his wife and three of his children, two ununiformed 
males knocked on the door. His wife opened the door and they asked 
to speak with the case, claiming that they were old friends. When 
the case came to the door, they jumped on him, held him down, and 
gave him an intravenous sedative injection. Then they took him to 
the hospital. Some two months after the re-admission, the patient 
began to suspect that he had been deprived of his freedom, not so 
much because he was really sick, but because he had annoyed his older 
brother.
The Ethical Dilemmas of Involuntary Hospitalisation in Kuwait
In any attempt to analyse the moral and psychiatric dimension 
of involuntary hospitalisation, one needs to affirm several assumptions 
which are central in any discussion of this subject. First of all, 
the individual's autonomy and liberty should be given a high priority 
in psychiatric practice. Secondly, certain values such as justice, 
equality, autonomy, improving the quality of life, and other humanistic 
principles, should also be promoted in psychiatric practice (see 
Torrey, 1985). Thirdly, the patient's right for self-definition 
must also be respected.
However, the above principles often come into conflict 
in actual practice, as we will see in the following pages. That is 
to say, the 'patient's' right to have a free or autonomous choice 
could be put in jeopardy if he is perceived by the psychiatrists as 
lacking the basic attributes for rational calculation or sufficient 
understanding, or reasonable estimation of the consequences of his 
condition or the medication being offered (Ibid., 1985).
The patient in the case illustrated above highlights some 
of the above dilemmas of involuntary hospitalisation. The problem of 
compulsory admission has been the subject of a continuous debate 
between psychiatrists, philosophers, sociologists, and many other groups 
(such as ex-patriate groups). A careful examination of this debate 
would reveal that there are two kinds of attitudes towards the problem. 
First, there are the opponents of compulsory hospitalisation, represented 
by psychiatrists such as Thomas Szasz, R.D.Laing, Russell Barton, 
sociologists such as Goffman, Thomas Scheff, and philosophers such as 
John Stuart Mill. Mill argues throughout his many books that there
is a moral obligation on societies to respect the individual's autonomous
choice and to eliminate any form of coercion against the individual.
For Mill:
"The proper object of sanitary laws is not to
compel people to take care of their own health,
but to prevent them from endangering the health 
of others. To prescribe by law what they should 
do for their own health alone, would by most 
people be regarded as something very like tyranny."
(Mill in Rayan, 1987, p.251)
Clearly, Mill's position is that any society is free from 
this moral obligation towards the individual if the individual's acts 
become evidently dangerous to the well-being of others. Mill's views 
on the individual's freedom, ethics, utility and liberty have inspired 
many mental health professionals and philosophers to promote the 
individual's right for freedom and autonomous choice (see Mill 1910, 
reprinted in 1983). However, what are the grounds which permit us to 
accept the general notion that being a danger to oneself or others is a 
sufficient condition for depriving the patient op his basic human 
rights, i.e. freedom of choice and self-definition of his suffering?
Some researchers have correctly shown that the concept of 
dangerousness to oneself or others is imprecise, loose, and a relative 
one (see Levinson and Ramsay, 1979; Callahan, 1984; Humber, 1981; 
Cocozza and Steadman, 1985; see also Steadman, 1983; Harding and 
Adserballe, 1983). The problem with the concept of dangerousness 
"... is not that the patient will be dangerous or that he falls within 
a class of patients some members of which frequently exhibit dangerous­
ness. A more valid criticism of psychiatrists in my mind is that they 
have not been diligent enough in following the patient and stating when 
the possibility of dangerousness has passed and when it is time for the 
patient to be released" (Robitscher, 1977, p.381).
Another justification for abolishing involuntary hospital­
isation for those writers who argue against such procedures is the 
problem of long-lasting stigma and the diminishment of civil rights
and moral status which are associated with the mental patient’s 
career in the hospital (see Torrey, 1986).
Robitscher (1977a) has summarized in his article "Psychiatric 
Labelling, Predicting, and Stigmatizing", the various reasons according 
to which the psychiatrists can interfere with the individual's right 
to have an autonomous choice. They, the psychiatrists, can:
1. determine the financial competency;
2. control the marriage and divorce of the labelled individuals;
3. deprive the labelled individuals from their children;
4. "negate the intention of a dead testator by stating that he 
lacked testamentary capacity" (p.350);
5. recommend sterilization for mentally ill women;
6. decide who goes to prison and who goes to hospital and who is 
incompetent to stand trial;
7. determine the competency of individuals with terminal disease 
to end their life (see also, Lemert, 1951; Schrag, 1980).
Robitscher cited 22 examples of how psychiatrists can impose 
their 'clinical expertise' on every aspect of the individual's life. 
However, it would be beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss them 
in detail.
Another major argument against compulsory admission to mental 
hospital is the vulnerability of such procedure to abuse. If any 
given country has the right to hospitalise people against their true 
desires and best interests, then it will create subjective and arbitrary
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criteria for such hospitalisation and therefore use it to oppress 
political dissenters as in the Soviet Union, for example, or trouble­
some individuals, etc. (see Robitscher, 1977a and 1977b).
Thus, the central argument against involuntary hospitalisation 
is best illustrated when considering the fact that the criteria on 
which people are admitted compulsorily are not always objective. What 
often happens is that the labelled individuals are committed for ten 
to thirty years for non-conformity rather than on the basis of objective 
symptoms as experienced by the individual himself.
The problem of many mental health professionals is that
II # , § ,
they disregard the fact that some religious and political beliefs can 
convert almost any seemingly irrational act into a rational one"
(Culver and Gert in Brown, 1985, p.559), which means that not all 
irrational behavioural frames must necessarily be based on unintelligible 
content. The problem is that psychiatry has traditionally viewed the 
'insane's’ content and frame of beliefs as "... unconscious distortions 
of reality, as food for the interpretive grind, and are not taken at 
face value" (Weinstein, 1981, p.303).
On the other hand, advocates of involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalisation present the view that the mentally ill are not fully 
aware of the side-effects of their 'underlying disease*. For those 
who argue for compulsory admission, being mentally ill will surely 
lead the person to lose his insight of how to care for himself or to 
act in his best interest. In such cases, the state has an obligation
to protect the individuals from themselves and to protect others.
That is to say, that the concept of dangerousness to oneself or 
another is a crucial determining criterion for psychiatric involuntary 
hospitalisation.
However, as was pointed out earlier, the concept of danger­
ousness is not always accurate and one of the central problems facing 
psychiatrists in their daily practice is how to draw a line or to 
differentiate between a persistent form of dangerousness and an occasional 
one? Or how to make a precise decision on how much the patient is 
dangerous to himself or others? Thus it seems very difficult to attain 
an effective balance "between the patient's right of self-expression 
and society's obligation to protect other citizens from the consequences 
of that self-expression" (Torrey, 1985, p . 186).
In conclusion, it could be argued that the psychiatric 
'medical' approach is influenced mainly by utilitarian or consequent- 
ialist ground, whereas the anti-psychiatry movement or those who argue 
against the medical model in psychiatry adhere to the deontological 
or absolutist position by maintaining that certain principles (e.g. 
liberty, justice, autonomy, etc.) should be the central element in 
our judgment and the only criteria of appropriate psychiatric judgment.
On the whole, the question of involuntary hospitalisation is a moral 
concern and, as such, very difficult to resolve convincingly. The 
right of the 'patient' to have control over his total life might 
conflict with the state's responsibility for preventing or treating 
any forms of illness that might cause distress to the patient himself 
or others (see Hare, 1981).
Now let us consider the current problem of involuntary 
hospitalisation in Kuwait. We can begin by stating that the psychiatric 
service in Kuwait is in a state of moral and ethical crisis which is 
continuously deteriorating. To begin with, patients are admitted 
straight from the emergency room with minimal, if any, psychiatric 
history or proper assessment. Now, it is a well-known fact that the 
emergency room is one of the most vital areas in any psychiatric hospital.
Emergency work should be characterised by prompt decision making and
sound clinical judgment. Therefore, there should be a holding area 
attached to the emergency room where patients are observed for a few 
hours before deciding on the appropriate action to be taken (Al-Ansari, 
1985).
The absence of a holding area has resulted in admitting
almost all cases that come to the emergency room after 1.00 p.m. (the
end of morning shift). This often results in the admission of cases 
which do not really require psychiatric commitment (Ibid., 1985).
This kind of practice has changed the hospital from a 
therapeutic environment to a detention centre for people considered to 
be "mentally ill" by non-professionals such as the public, the police, 
the family, etc., and even for people with personality disorders for 
whom psychiatrists have no adequate treatment. Unfortunately, psychiatrists 
tend to regard long periods of hospitalisation as effective treatment 
in itself.
In Kuwait, almost all mental patients including schizophrenics 
are involuntarily admitted, as a matter of practice. For many psychia­
trists, compulsory hospitalisation is more important than the patient’s 
right to liberty and autonomy. According to the 1982 study conducted 
by the Faculty of Medicine in Kuwait (Mekkawi et al) on 165 chronic 
mental patients, mental patients were brought to the hospital compulsori 
by the following agents (see Table 1).
TABLE 1: Source of Admission in Relation to Sex
Source of 
Admission
Police Relatives Both Unknown
Sex
Male 23 (25.3%) 53 (58.2%) 6 (6.6%) 9 (9.8%)
Female 7 (7.4%) 48 (64.8%) 2 (2.7%) 17 (22.9%)
Total 30* (18.2%) 101 (61.2%) 8 (4.8%) 26 (15.7%)
*(In 1986, the number of cases brought in by the police was 997.)
(Source: Mekkawi, 1982, p.5)
The study also shows that schizophrenia was the most common mental 
disorder among the patients. The next most common disturbance was 
combined mental disorder in which the patient suffers from more than 
one mental abnormality. However, one of the most crucial results of 
this study is that 50% of the university staff were shown to believe 
that the mental patients admitted had not been correctly diagnosed.
In fact, many mental patients are admitted to the Psychiatric 
Hospital in Kuwait for a variety of non-clinical reasons (see Mendele 
Rapport, 1969). It may be that the psychiatrists feel that the patients
do not have any place to go (many Kuwaiti families think that the 
hospital is a refuge for mad persons), some patients are referred 
from the general hospital because they have been disturbing others, 
another group of patients have social problems which make it impossible 
for them to stay at home so the only refuge for them is the hospital. 
Still another group of patients is readmitted to the hospital after 
being discharged, on the basis of a telephone call from their families. 
The last group is the mentally retarded patients who are not accepted 
by the appropriate institution and so they are admitted to the 
Psychiatric Hospital instead (Makkawi, 1982). (For a detailed analysis 
of the role of non-clinical or subjective factors in psychiatric 
admission, see Townsend, 1980; Holmes and Solomon, 1981; Perrucci 
and Targ, 1982.)
In reality, the decision for involuntary confinement is 
usually taken late at night, and the individual is often accompanied 
by the police or a relative. This means that admission to the Psychiatr 
Hospital in Kuwait is largely governed by the attitudes and wishes 
of the patient’s family or relatives rather than by the actual symptoms 
and complaints of the patient as perceived by himself (see Greentey, 
1975). The relatives may be emotionally stressed and may reflect 
their worries and upset by insisting that the patient must be admitted 
to the hospital. The patient, in many instances, may react to the 
family or police attitudes in an angry or confused way or he might 
refuse to communicate which reinforces the view that he is really 
'mentally ill'.
The psychiatrist in charge may lack the counselling 
facilities or sufficient time to seek a second opinion or consultation. 
Thus, "if there is pressure to admit a person to the hospital, the 
psychiatrist will look for behaviors that are symptomatic and permit 
the statement that a particular syndrome exists. Once this has been 
accomplished, he can make a medical decision, a diagnosis, and hospital­
ise the individual. The patient is shaped into giving the physician 
what is wanted and expected" (Ullman and Krasner, 1973, p.299).
If the psychiatrist in charge failed, for example, to 
respond to the family desire to commit one of its members, it would 
be interpreted as a sign of incompetency on the part of the psychiatrist 
and may place the psychiatrist under legal and administrative risk.
In the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait, the vulnerability of the 
involuntary commitment procedures to abuse is due to the following 
factors:
(1) "The power and authority of junior staff in the hospital 
which is accorded as a reward for their increased respons­
ibilities. In reality there are no junior physicians in 
the hospital. An assistant registrar assesses, admits, 
treats and discharges a patient on his own with minimal if 
any senior physician’s supervision. This responsibility 
was granted to junior staff gradually and progressively 
over the years to become an established rule which is not 
questioned." (Al-Ansari, 1985, p.7).
(2) There are a few psychologists in the Psychiatric Hospital in 
Kuwait, most of whom lack clinical knowledge and training.
They administer psychological tests that are unreliable and 
poorly standardised. Some psychologists conduct psychotherapy 
without any clinical training or supervision. Psychologists
are usually looked down upon and are isolated and undermined 
by different staff of the hospital. The same is applicable 
to the social workers who work there.
(3) There is a significant lack of adequate communication between 
the mental health professionals (psychiatrists, psychologists, 
social workers, and nurses), and the administrative staff.
Such lack of communication has contributed in isolating those 
two sides which consequently has led to the inadequacy of the 
general psychiatric services presented to patients.
(4) The major criteria for involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation 
in Kuwait are:
- the patient might cause harm to himself or others;
- the patient's previous history of hospitalisation; (see Mendel 
and Rapport, 1969);
- the source of referral, i.e. if the 'patient' is accompanied
by the police or family member, his 'illness' would achieve 
a greater validity and could bring pressure to the admission 
psychiatrist;
- the time of referral: the patient is likely to be admitted
involuntarily if the application is made at night-shift. (For 
more details on the factors that influence psychiatric admissions, 
see Holmes and Solomon, 1981.)
The processes and factors affecting involuntary hospital­
isation could be summarised in the following figure (see Figure 1) 
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Now, cases like that of M.M. which we mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, are common in the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait.
They raise many moral and ethical questions which need to be resolved. 
One of these central questions is: do mental health professionals
have the right to promote M . M ’s mental health at the expense of his 
right for self-determination?
In cases like M.M., concern for the individual's mental 
health might conflict with his right to have an autonomous decision 
(on the assumption that psychiatric hospitalisation can be of benefit 
to his mental health. Without this assumption there is no real 
dilemma - hospitalisation would be straightforwardly unjustifiable.) 
So, there is a basic conflict between two moral principles: the
principle of beneficence, and the principle of respecting people's 
liberty to define their own interests.
In actual psychiatric practice, there will be many border­
line cases where one cannot predict confidently whether the patient 
should be allowed to live outside the boundaries of mental hospital 
or be committed to the hospital against his will.
What mental health professionals need is to conduct 
a careful estimation of the moral and practical use of the principles 
of beneficence and liberty in relation to the mentally ill indiv­
idual. In this context the psychiatrist has to accept a moral 
obligation to provide an autonomous therapeutic help to a patient 
who lacks (maybe temporarily) the capacity but not the basic
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will and self-determination (Edwards, 1967, and Wear, 1982), to be 
capable of voluntarily accepting or rejecting the psychiatric help.
(For more details on the concept of autonomy as it is related to 
the patient’s self-definition in psychiatric practice, see Perry,
1985. See also, Chodoff, 1984, for the moral dilemma centred around 
involuntary hospitalisation.)
2. The Use of ECT and Medication in the Psychiatric Hospital 
in Kuwait
Case illustration:
Mr. A. is a 38-years old single male patient with a past 
history of violent sexual behaviour. Mr. A's problem was that he 
would not resist his sexual impulses when confronted with a woman 
in the street. Often he would follow women to their houses, attack 
their husbands (if married) and rape the wives. Eventually, Mr. A. 
was arrested and jailed for rape.
At the end of his prison sentence, he visited the Psychiatric 
Hospital to see a psychiatrist who diagnosed him as schizophrenic 
due to the presence of aggressive sexual behaviour, emotional ambivalence, 
and thought disturbance (concerning the motives for his sexual attacks 
on women). On the first occasion of psychiatric treatment in the 
Kuwait Hospital, the case received ECT and anti-psychotic medication.
After his discharge his family noticed that the patient manifested 
certain side-effects of the treatment such as dry mouth, drowsiness, 
which caused him to have a car accident, restlessness and blurring 
of vision. During the patient's second visit to the hospital, his
family refused to consent to any form of psychiatric treatment due 
to the side-effects of the psychiatric medication.
Now, a philosophical question arises from these two cases, 
namely: Can a family reasonably refuse specific treatments for the
patient? If so, could reasonable grounds include doubts about 
professionals practice, or doubts (held by the family who are laymen) 
about efficacy, or about balance of good over harm?
To bring the subject of the ethical and professional problems 
of psychiatric practice in Kuwait into focus, it may be helpful to 
consider some more facts illustrating psychiatric treatment in Kuwait.
Psychiatric Treatment Methods in Kuwait
A. Psychopharmacology
The practice of psychopharmacology in the Psychiatric 
Hospital in Kuwait lacks sound clinical judgement and is potentially 
hazardous.
"Often drugs are combined without proper scientific 
research. Polypharmacy tends to be the rule rather 
than the exception in the management of most patients 
in the hospital, and many patients are treated and 
maintained on five to six different medications. 
Moreover, there is a strong temptation for the 
psychiatrists to resort to continuous "drugging", the 
so-called "maintenance therapy" and that is because 
medication does not remove the source of the disorder." 
(Al-Ansari, 1985, p . 13)
What is remarkable is that such treatment is prescribed 
and practised by senior as well as junior staff. This practice 
indirectly contributes to non-compliance with treatment and increases 
the possibilities of adverse drug effects and re-admission.
B . Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)
In North America, ECT is used in 3-6% of all patients 
admitted to psychiatric hospitals. European studies have shown a 
slightly higher rate. In Kuwait, the frequency of ECT use is 33%
- this means that one in every three patients admitted to the hospital 
receives ECT (Al-Ansari, 1985). It is obvious that the above figure 
is unusually high and suggests overuse of ECT. In January 1985,
54% of the total number of admissions and out-patients in both male 
and female (which was 264) received ECT.
In addition, patients are poorly prepared for ECT - 50% 
or more of them are not even physically examined. Most patients' 
charts reflect the following:
(1) the absence of psychiatric diagnosis or any criteria for 
reaching a diagnosis;
(2) absence of basic physical examination and routine laboratory 
test ing;
(3) absence of a proper detailed psychaitric history, mental state 
examination (psychological tests, reports) and follow-up notes;
(4) lack of senior psychiatrists' notes and direct involvement in 
the patient's care and management.
Therefore, it appears that the indications for ECT use 
are ill-defined. In many cases the application of ECT is unjustified 
and not indicated. In view of the percentage of patients routinely 
undergoing what is elsewhere generally a controversial and less-used 
therapy, and in view of the lack of indications for its use, it would 
not be an exaggeration to state that ECT is definitely abused in 
the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait. Some of the factors responsible 
for this are:
1. poor training and supervision of junior staff;
2. indifference and apathy on the part of senior staff;
3. the increasing number of patients that have to be managed;
4. superficiality of assessment procedures with no regard at all 
to the physical, medical, and psychological factors that could 
be responsible for the patient's symptoms. A few incoherent 
statements are written down in the file and the patient is guided 
to the ward. In fact, some psychiatrists and psychologists have 
pride in their ability to reach a diagnosis within a few minutes 
without conducting any psychological or physical tests.




(iii) given anti-psychotic medication and EGT; and 
(iv) certified as mentally and legally incompetent.
(Townsend, 1980)
Little, if any, consideration is given to the moral dimension of 
psychiatric responsibility, labelling, and practice.
The Availability of Alternatives: Psychological Treatment Methods
in the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait
A . Psychotherapy, Behaviour and Occupational Therapy
Psychotherapy is indicated for many psychiatric disorders.
It can modify and improve psychological symptoms when drugs are not 
indicated and can contribute to the proper psychological adjustment 
of many patients.
It is not our objective in this chapter to discuss the 
suitability of psychotherapy for psychiatric patients in Kuwait. 
Instead, the focus here is on the general picture of psychotherapeutic 
practice in the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait. Unfortunately, 
psychotherapy, whetherib be behaviour therapy or occupational therapy, 
is rarely offered or performed as a treatment modality.
B . Rehabilitat ion
Psychiatric rehabilitation is crucial for the achievement 
of maximal functioning of the patient and better adjustment in society. 
Different studies have demonstrated that adequate psychiatric rehabil­
itation programmes have two major advantages (see Birchwood et al, 
1988):
(i) to decrease the rate of relapse and re-admission to 
hospital;
(ii) to improve the psychological and occupational
adjustment of psychiatric patients (see Rosie, 1987 
and Dorwart, 1988).
Unfortunately, this essential procedure does not exist 
in the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait. In 1983, there were 4,270 
admissions to the hospital. Of these, 1,130 (26.4%) were new cases, 
while 3,140 (73.5%) were re-admissions. Many of the re-admissions 
were the fourth or fifth in that year above. One of the most crucial 
factors responsible for this is the absence of a comprehensive rehab­
ilitation programme and scientific psychotherapeutic treatment 
(Al-Mutawa, 1986, and 1987).
Schizophrenic or depressed patients are usually discharged 
prematurely, maintained on several drugs with next follow-up out­
patient appointment lasting between 7-13 minutes after one or two 
months. How can we expect such procedures to help the patient to 
function adequately in society?
In summary, the treatment modalities offered in the 
Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait lack a total approach for the individual 
patient and are severely deficient. The consequences are that the 
re-admission rate is very high and the "revolving door" phenomenon 
is very common.
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The following pictures show the present writer's personal project 
in 1982 on applying a social skills rehabilitation programme on 
the chronic mental patient in the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait. 
(This programme was basically dependent on limited private funds, 
lor that reason, the project did not attain a significant success 
due to its termination after a period of three months.)
Patients at lunch in a public restaurant.
Patients shopping.
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Mental patients taking their lunch 
in the countryside.
Dancing and eating on the beach.
3. Informed Consent and Psychiatric Practice in Kuwait: The
Problem of Decision-Making in the Psychiatric Hospital
The central ethical principle of informed consent is based
on what Szasz (1984b) calls a "consenting adults" base relationship
between the psychiatrist and patient.
The ethical basis of informed consent can be established
on either one of two ethical principles. It can be grounded in the
"deontological" or absolute principle, by arguing that informed consent 
is intrinsically "good" because it represents the growth of the general 
obligation of one human being bo another. Alternatively, it can 
be based on consequentialist or utilitarian principles by arguing 
that the morally significant issue of informed consent depends on 
the benefit or ultimate 'good' to clinicians, patients, and the public 
in general (Faulder, 1985; Lidz et al, 1984; Chodoff, 1984).
The basic premise of informed consent in psychiatry is 
that the patient is a self-determining person who is prima facie 
capable of making treatment decisions based on sufficient information 
provided by the clinicians involved. Moreover, the patient (especially 
the psychotic) may temporarily lack the capacity but not the will 
and motives to be a rational agent (see Wear, 1980 and Edwards, 1982 
and Kanter, 1984). Thus the concept of informed consent has two 
goals:
(1) to promote and to restore the individual's autonomy; and
(2) to help the patient to understand alternative courses of treatment 
in order to make an informed decision.
In order to promote the individual’s autonomy, treatment decisions 
must prima facie belong to the patient and not the physician and 
the patient must have both the right to accept and the right to refuse 
the treatment plan. Second: the patient is an autonomous individual,
therefore the patient's decision must be voluntary and free from 
any sort of compulsion or coercion (see Lidz et al, 1984).
To help the patient to understand the proposed treatment, 
the clinician must help him to have sufficient access to any relevant 
information in order to make a reasonable judgement about the suggested 
treatment. Moreover, the patient must sufficiently understand the 
presented information. The problem arises when the patient is con­
sidered by the psychiatrist as ’incompetent' to understand the 
information when in a certain psychiatric condition. At this stage, 
the patient's right to choose between different courses of treatment 
could be, in very specific cases, shifted and after examining the 
total function of the patient, to another party (proxy consent).
So far, the above discussion reveals the central elements of informed 
consent. They are as follows:
1. "disclosure of information " (I)




(Lidz et a l , 1984, p.22)
summarise, these components could be understood as follows:
"c + i  = u
U + V = D M (Ibid., p.23)
Let us now consider the current problem of informed consent in the
Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait by illustrating the following two cases:
Case 1: A Psychotic Patient
K.A., a forty-one year old single stock dealer, was hospital­
ised following complaints by his family that he was overactive and 
aggressive, talked irrationally, acted peculiarly, and was trying 
to commit sexual acts with his younger sister. His psychotic behaviour 
had developed during the previous year after a breakdown in the stock 
exchange market in 1982 in Kuwait. His mother called the police 
because he refused to attend the hospital. The police arrested him 
while he was driving his car and brought him to the Psychiatric Hospital 
at 9.00 p.m. The physician in charge decided without the patient's 
consent or his family's consent to administer largactil 100 mg. intra­
venously. It required the combined efforts of two nurses to hold 
the patient down because he refused to be committed.
Although the patient spent two months in the hospital and 
was subjected to heavy psychiatric treatment (ECT and anti-psychotic 
medication), the hospital staff did not make any effort to obtain 
his informed consent to such procedure.
Case 2 : A Neurotic Patient
N.K. is a single young woman in her twenties. Her mother 
called the psychiatrist in charge in the out-patient clinic to send
a car with two nurses to take her daughter into hospital. The 
psychiatrist sent the hospital car at her mother's request and the 
patient was admitted to an open ward. During the clinical interview, 
the patient refused to be admitted claiming that she was in perfect 
mental health. Her mother, on the other hand, claimed that her 
daughter was suffering from the following problems: the patient
had a history of sexual behaviour with strangers. She used to smoke 
cigarettes in public. Her last marriage was unsuccessful because 
her husband discovered that she was not a virgin. Eventually, the 
family honour was at stake (since her 'immoral' act would consequently 
affect her sister's future too). The patient was admitted for one 
month and diagnosed as having a "character disorder". She was given 
anti-depressant medication and brief psychotherapy. These processes 
of admission and therapy were conducted without the patient's verbal 
or non-verbal consent.
It was a common practice for mental health professionals 
in Kuwait to view psychotic and neurotic patients as irrational and 
incompetent to give informed consent.
There are certain factors which contribute to the poor 
conditions of the practice of informed consent in the Psychiatric 
Hospital. These are as follows:
( 1) Out-patient Clinic
The average daily number of out-patients is about 110-115. 
The way it works is that each unit (5-6 physicians in each unit with
total number of physicians and psychiatrists working in the hospital 
numbering 39) cover the out-patient clinic for one day a week. That 
means that each physician will see twenty-three patients a day, each 
for thirteen minutes. However, the thirteen minutes for each patient 
have become a luxury and in reality the interview lasts for from 
7 to 13 minutes only.
Clearly, there is an absence of the "duty of beneficence" 
which requires from the physician at least to discover what the patient 
needs. Moreover, the present services in the out-patient clinic 
offer no privacy and no respect for the patient. Patients are crowded 
in a hallway with no decent waiting rooms. The physician cannot 
arrange to have even minimal privacy with the patient.
What is crucial however, is that it is the junior staff 
who see the case, reach a diagnosis, prescribe treatment and arrange 
a follow-up with minimal if any supervision from the senior psychiatrists.
The quantity of work is outweighing the quality. Every 
patient that comes to the hospital, with or without a previous appoint­
ment, has to be seen and nobody is sent back. Therefore, the quality 
of care offered in the out-patient clinic of the Psychiatric Hospital 
is inadequate and cannot reflect full regard for the patient's 
interests and wishes.
(2) For many years psychiatrists in the Psychiatric Hospital
in Kuwait have tended to regard the rich and influential psychiccfcric
42
patients as fully autonomous, reliable and trustworthy client, and 
free to decide whether or not to be a patient. In the author's 
experience, the poor and the disadvantaged, however, are regarded 
as too dull or too disturbed to know what is best for them.
(3) The Consent Form
The content of the form which is currently in use in the 
Psychiatric Hospital is very limited and provides no protection for 




(c) involuntary hospitalisation procedures;
(d) applying different psychiatric treatments.
This is the original text of informed consent which is currently 
in use in the Psychiatric Hospital:
Consent for Psychiatric Treatment
______________________________________ Hospital
I ______________________________________________________________
fully consent to undergo any therapeutic procedures which 
may be prescribed by the Hospital doctors including ECT and 
any related medication. The risks of these procedures have 
been explained to me.
Signed
(Pat ient)
According to this open and unspecified form of consent, "there is no 
limit to what the psychiatrist or physician in general can do with 
the patient if it is considered to be therapeutic" (Back, 1973, p.835) 
In other words, the patient has no legal protection. Moreover, the 
law is usually on the side of the doctors.
The consent form is originally proposed in a psychiatric
setting in order to provide procedural and legal safeguards against 
any forms of therapeutic abuse. But in actual psychiatric practice 
this form has become a meaningless formality with no legislation to 
enforce the application of the form.
For example, any person could give consent on behalf of 
the patient. Moreover, in many cases the physician conducts the treat 
ment without the consent form having been signed at all. The fact is 
that psychiatrists tend to view neurotic and psychotic patients as:
(1) dull and lacking in insight;
(2) ignorant and lacking in status and power. Thus, he must
"... remain docile and agree to treatment, or it
will be forced. He must not question what is being
done on his behalf. If he does query this, or 
attempts to resume personal responsibilities ... or 
asks to be released before the staff are ready to 
release him, then his behaviour tends to be seen as 
further sign of illness, justifying continued con­
finement" (Berke, 1977, p.23);
(3) incompetent unless this is refuted by his behaviour.
Such presumptions have reinforced the doctors' resistance to the 
application of the fundamental ethical principles to their psychiatric 
patients. In addition, such presumptions reflect negatively on the
way patients' records (files) are kept. If we examine patients' 
files, we will discover that many informative data are missing. Many 
files contain incomplete history and personal details of the patient, 
for example, no name, age, address, etc. Medical history is not 
described in detail, particularly for patients admitted in the early 
1950s.
It can also be seen from some of these records that the 
number of diagnoses made for particular patients could be matched with 
the number of doctors who have been treating the patient. If the 
patient has been referred from another hospital, the letter of reference 
is usually missing and the reason for the referral cannot be found.
For patients who were referred by the police, there is nothing documented 
explaining the reasons (Makkawi, 1982).
The significance of poor record-keeping in the Psychiatric 
Hospital in Kuwait is very clear. It indicates that most psychiatrists 
do not appreciate the scientific value of good record-keeping. Good 
record-keeping, however, is the basis of good clinical care. It is 
necessary for evaluating the significance of change in a patient's 
clinical course for judging the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
different treatment methods, for continuity of care, for anticipating 
what crises may stress patients, and for peer review of quality of 
care.
The disregard of doctors in the Psychiatric Hospital in 
Kuwait for appropriate and methodical record-keeping suggests a more
general disregard for the basic humanity and dignity of the patients 
as well as for appropriate professional clinical practice.
4. Justice and the Allocation of Psychiatric Resources
In clinical practice, economics and psychiatric decisions 
are closely related. In the implementation of any health plans, 
clinicians are almost always restricted by the availability of community 
resources (such as professionals, property, and government public funds) 
(see Drummond, 1980). In Kuwait, mental illness is a minor concern of 
the Ministry of Public Health, in spite of its prevalence and its 
frequently long duration. In Kuwait, the government spends only an 
insignificant proportion of its health service budget on the needs of 
the mentally ill people. In 1984, 6.3% of the Kuwait total national 
budget was allocated to public health. This represents 167 million KD. 
Of the above, 4.5 million KD or 3% was directed to the psychiatric 
and mental health services in Kuwait (Al-Ansari, 1985).
In most European and North American countries, psychiatric
care costs 10-15% of the total expenditure on public health. This 
represents 3-5 times of what is available and spent on psychiatry in 
Kuwait (Ibid., 1985).
In the past ten years or so, the population of Kuwait has
increased by 50%. In correspondence with this there was only a 10%
increase in beds available for psychiatric care and, what is more 
serious, a zero increase in the number of physicians practising 
psychiatry. The hospital wards which were designed to accommodate
24-28 patients are presently packed with 30-32 patients, many of 
whom sleep on mattresses stretched on the bare floor. An average 
size room is occupied now by eight and sometimes more patients who 
could be extremely hostile, combative and seriously disturbed. This 
has resulted in the trend to discharge patients prematurely.
But perhaps the most shocking practice is the way and proces 
in which people with mental illness are labelled. The resulting 
stigma and shame of such labelling might lead society to deal with 
the labelled individual as not valid human and to treat them as second 
class citizens (Siegler, Osmond and Mann, 1972).
Moreover, the Psychiatric Hospital in Kuwait is considered 
to be a morally justified method that releases the patient's family 
from the social shame and guilt induced by incarcerating its members 
for many years. It is for such reasons that some families refuse to 
give their address to the hospital’s authorities or just bring the 
patient to the hospital and disappear. This is because the patients' 
families are anxious about mental illness and feel guilty about their 
involvement.
TABLE 2: Comparison of Characteristics of Long-stay Patients in Mental
















U.K. 40.0 70.0 46.0 54.0 69.0 57.0 50.0
Sri Lanka 18.0 67.0 53.0 47.0 60.0 26.0 79.0
Kuwait 28.7 55.6 49.7 30.9 27.0 54.9 77.4
(Source: Mackkawi, 1982, p.5)
Unfortunately, the attitudes of the families towards mental 
illness are supported by those of the professionals who view mental 
disorders as something permanent with a long-lasting personality defect 
rather than a passing problem. For that reason, many mental patients 
(approximately 70%) stay for very long periods of time in the hospital 
even though the services for the mentally ill are underfunded and in 
the very worst of conditions. The politics of such beliefs are very 
clear. If the mental disorder is a long-lasting or permanent tendency, 
and if the problem is viewed as residing inside the individual, then 
there is little point in increasing health funds or developing psychiatric 
facilities.
According to Szasz (1973a), "... Psychiatry has accepted the 
job of warehousing society’s undesirables ..." (p.83) rather than 
providing them with an effective short-term psychiatric intervention or 
real medical treatment. On the comparison between medical hospitals 
and psychiatric hospitals, he states (1984b) that:
"Real hospitals, that is medical hospitals, 
especially the good ones, often have more doctors 
than patients! But mental hospitals are fake 
hospitals, hence they do not need any doctors 
at all (except perhaps a few consultants to come 
for the medical needs of the otherwise medically 
healthy population." (p.77)
Although Szasz is a pessimist, he is partially right in his claims.
The problem is that Kuwait is seriously short of psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, psychiatric social workers and psychiatric nurses. In 
the author’s experience, only 15 qualified psychiatrists and about 20 
general physicians (not qualified psychiatrists) are currently working 
in the Psychiatric Hospital. The general physicians are allowed to 
administer psychiatric medication, practise psychotherapeutic sessions 
without any previous training in psychotherapy. Moreover, they can 
apply certain forms of psychological tests and make decisions on the 
basis of these tests, also without any adequate training.
In addition, there is a serious lack of different treatment 
modalities. That is to say, psychotherapy, behaviour therapy, and 
rehabilitation programmes are still regarded just as "myths". In brief, 
the present structure, space and arrangements in the Psychiatric 
Hospital in Kuwait are totally inadequate.
Conclusions
Development in the psychiatric services in recent years 
in Kuwait shows that mental health professionals have not travelled 
far beyond the walls of the old "asylum". Many psychiatrists tend
to regard hospitalisation as a treatment in itself, and have accepted 
the job of "warehousing society’s undesirables". For that reason, 
most psychiatrists in Kuwait think that compulsory treatment is more 
important for a patient than his freedom. As a result, a variety of 
moral and ethical problems arise.
In summary, the quality of care, the diagnostic processes 
and the management of psychiatric patients in Kuwait should be 
seriously questioned. The Kuwaiti public and media, especially news­
papers, have consistently raised questions regarding the moral 
justification of many forms of professional malpractice and incompetence. 
Such practices, however, have received little official investigation.
For example, there have been a certain number of psychiatric 
patients in Kuwait who have died under ECT therapy. The author's 
personal experience with such incidents is that these patients died 
because in some cases the 'psychiatrist' in charge was not qualified 
sufficiently or did not have enough time to read the patient's ECG.
Other common stories that have appeared in the press in 
Kuwait are about nurses or doctors who beat patients or commit sexual 
intercourse with some female patients. Unfortunately such cases have 
received very little attention.
What will be our concern in the next few chapters will be 
to provide a more global analysis of the concept ot mental illness
in order to see how such a concept is open to abuse from the 
psychiatric profession and what the moral consequences of such abu 
are on people described as mentally ill.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS
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Introduction
If one tries to analyse the current definitions of mental 
illness in textbooks in clinical or abnormal psychology, one would 
easily discover an apparent disagreement between the authors on how 
to define the concept of mental illness. That is due to the fact that 
the definition of mental illness is closely tied to the different 
models of mental illness adhered to by psychiatrists or psychologists. 
The psychoanalyst would define mental illness in terms of a defective 
development of the ego or fixation or repression or other psycho­
analytical terms. The behaviourist, on the other hand, would define 
mental illness in terms of negative learning habits. Clinicians who 
adhere to the social school would define mental illness as the result 
of environmental factors such as: labelling the individual, the
societal and familial pressures placed on the individual, or the general 
disturbance in the individual’s social role, or social stereotyping 
of the concept of ’insanity’ which helps to maintain the status quo 
of being mentally ill (Goffman, Scheff, Rosenhan).
Finally, the medical model would define mental illness as 
a significant ’clinical’ abnormality which is due to organic defect 
in the individual patient and although such a defect has not yet been 
established in most mental disorders, the adherent to this model works 
on the assumption that such a defect will be discovered in due time.
However, the belief that psychiatrists have infallible 
scientifically and medically proven methods of definition and
classification of mental phenomena has given way to the unsettling 
knowledge that judging a person is a delicate process which entails 
conflicting perceptions, individual feelings as well as social inter­
action and professionals' opinions that could be based on vague, ill- 
defined codes or criteria.
Of course, that is not to say that scientific certainty 
would solve the negative moral consquences which resulted from labelling 
people as mentally ill. The influence of psychosocial factors involved 
in the process of being mentally ill is often difficult to measure by 
using 'scientific* procedures. Moreover, we need to be aware of the 
psychological impact of such labels on the individual and his standing 
in society.
The dangers implicit in the labelling of people as 'mentally 
ill' can be appreciated when one considers the following consequences: 
Firstly, the general assumption that mental illness can diminish the 
patient's ability to think rationally and autonomously can lead to 
serious devaluation and diminution of the rights and responsibilities 
of the labelled individual (Wear, 1980; Edwards, 1982). Secondly, 
the very label 'mental illness' can cause the patient to develop 
negative feelings of 'helplessness* and 'hopelessness' and can also 
create pessimistic attitudes among the helping professionals, which, 
in turn, may hinder any therapeutic efforts in the future (Rimm and 
Somerville, 1977).
Moreover, definitions of the term 'mental illness' are 
in many cases, unclear and inaccurate, and social, political and 
institutional factors rather than clinical ones might be involved in 
the assessment of persons as mentally ill (Mechanic, 1967).
Rimm and Somerville (1977) consider that the label 
'mental illness' is 'socially stigmatising' and not a 'humanitarian 
a c t '. They state:
"In truth, it is kinder to label someone as mentally 
ill than to pronounce him guilty of witchcraft and 
deserving of torture. But in a culture that no 
longer believes in witchcraft, branding an already 
troubled person with an ill-defined label that provides 
little real information and is socially stigmatising 
is hardly a humanitarian act." (p.44)
It is the main purpose of this chapter to consider the 
following points:
(1) the value of professional and scientific approaches to mental 
illness as represented by the current diagnostic schemes in 
psychiatry;
(2) the limitations and weaknesses of the concept of mental illness.
It must be made clear at this point that the arguments developed 
in this chapter concern borderline cases which do not represent 
clear-cut text-book symptoms of mental illness;
(3) what a definition of mental illness should incorporate;
(4) the validity of the concept of mental illness and its limitations.
Throughout this chapter, the concept of ’illness’ rather 
than ’disease’ will be used. The problems with these terms have 
continued to pose many controversial questions regarding the validity 
and reality of cases described as in a state of 'disease' or 'illness'. 
From a careful examination of the current psychiatric writings, one 
would notice that there are no universally agreed definitions of the 
above concepts. Most 'naturalist' writers in this subject such as 
Moore (1981), Spitzer (1978), Kendell (1981), Taylor (1981), Freidson 
in Miles (1981), etc., believe that the concept of disease is basically 
comprehensible in terms of physiological defect - the so-called 
"medical model". 'Illness', however, has been viewed as a psychosocial 
condition that is related to a disturbance in the expected role- 
performance or disvalued conditions that have undesirable effects on 
the patient's behaviour and adaptation which render the conditions 
more observable. At this point, the individual's 'illness behaviour' 
(Mechanic, 1981) is considered to be not-responsible (socially excusing). 
Some writers such as Engle (1981) emphasize the importance of the 
individual experience of the organic failure (the disease condition) 
in determining the reality of 'illness' condition or feeling 'ill'. 
Accordingly, Engle maintains that it is difficult to separate 'illness' 
behaviour from 'disease' condition. However, both psychosomatic ill­
ness and a symptomatic disease, represent a significant separation 
of illness from disease and are arguably very common.
Another group of writers such as Margolis (1978) and Englhardt 
(1981) have argued that the concept of disease and illness are 
basically related to values. Thus, functioning is more culturally
determined (good or bad function). That is to say, these writers' 
approach is basically normativist in that the societal attitudes might 
value or disvalue the disturbed function.
Radical psychiatrists such as Thomas Szasz, R.D.Laing, 
etc., emphasize that observable physiological failure is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the presence of 'illness' or 'disease'. 
Fabrega (1981) on the contrary, believes that neither disease nor 
illness "logically entail an understanding of bodily function" (p.498). 
That is because both illness and disease refer to perception or 
evaluation of the disability in general medicine and disturbed social 
relationship or disturbed beliefs in psychiatric disease.
Now, before trying to see how the concept of 'illness' or 
'disease' fits psychiatric conditions, one must ask the following 
question: are the definitional problems of mental phenomena and
psychiatric abuse basically tied to either the 'disease' model or the 
'illness' model? Would adherence to either the naturalist approach 
or to the normative approach solve the problematic nature of 
psychiatric practice?
It will be argued throughout this thesis that the definitional 
problem of mental conditions and psychiatric abuse is not crucially 
related to which of these terms ('illness' or 'disease') mental health 
professionals adopt. The problem stems basically from the set of 
thoughts and beliefs which centre around the concept "mental", and the 
metaphysical background of many mentalistic vocabularies. Thus, by
arguing that the problems of psychiatric daily practice are basically 
related to the concept of 'illness*, one might think that adopting 
the concept of 'disease' will solve the problem. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case. Moral and practical problems in the management of 
schizophrenia, for example, may arise either from a conception of 
'disease' as a result of genetic factors, or from a conception of schizo­
phrenia as merely third party labelling. That is to say that it does 
not make much difference from the moral and practical point of view to 
say that schizophrenia is disease or illness. That is because the very 
use of the term schizophrenia can create a certain set of negative ideas 
such as diminished responsibility, irrationality, madness, not being 
fully human, etc. However, just because the connotations of the label 
'schizophrenia' are so negative, this does not mean that we can negate 
the very reality of schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the sort of explanation 
we choose (either genetic or social) makes, in the long run, little 
difference in terms of the negative moral consequences of the label 
'mental illness'.
The present writer's main argument is that there are certain 
unobservable factors that contribute to the continuity of the 
problems that surround the definitional and moral aspects of psychiatric 
practice. Such hidden factors (in the definition of mental illness), 
i.e. social, political, psychiatric, etc., will be discussed in detail 
throughout this chapter.
Despite our assumption that a choice of terms (either 
'disease' or illness) has little bearing on the moral and practical 
consequences of being labelled, one does need, for the sake of
clarity, to specify what is meant here by the concept of ’disease’ 
and 'illness1. Throughout this thesis, the concept of 'disease' will 
refer to agreed biological abnormalities that - in Moore’s (1978) 
terms - "lie behind the behaviour". The individual psychological 
reaction, his subjective experience of the 'diseased' condition and 
the societal reaction to such experience would, refer to the "illness 
condition" or "illness behaviour" (Mechanic, 1981).
Clearly, as many psychiatric conditions do not have an 
observable biological basis and the definition of an individual's 
suffering are basically related to his thoughts and behaviour, our 
discussion, accordingly, will be tied basically to the concept of 
illness rather than disease.
The definitional problem:
Consider the following two cases:
Case 1
On October 5th, 1960, Mrs. Anna Duzynski, a recent 
Polish emigrant who lived with her husband on the 
northwest side of Chicago, discovered that $380 in 
cash had been stolen from her apartment. Suspecting 
that the money had been taken by the building 
janitor, the only other person who had a key to the 
apartment, Mrs. Duzynski rushed to his flat and 
demanded that the money be returned. The janitor in 
turn called the police, and upon their arrival stated 
that both Mr. and Mrs. Duzynski were insane and should 
be committed to a mental institution. Without any 
further examination, the police seized both Anna and 
Michael Duzynski, neither of whom spoke English, and 
took them in handcuffs to the Cook County Mental Health 
Clinic. At the Mental Health Clinic, unable to answer 
questions in English and thereby defend themselves, the 
Duzynskis were duly pronounced mentally ill and 
committed to the Chicago State Hospital. Six weeks
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later, Michael Duzynski still had less idea why he 
had been imprisoned than he had when thrown into a 
Nazi concentration camp in World War II. Finally, 
in desperation, he hanged himself. The gross 
injustice of the entire affair thus vividly pointed 
out to them, hospital officials hurriedly released 
Anna Duzynski the next day. (p.41)
(The case cited in Rimm and Somerville, 1977)
Case 2 :
The case came to my notice over fifteen years ago 
when many of the methods of treatment we now have 
were not known. Mr. D was 67 years of age. A  
retired civil servant. A man of great piety who 
devoted his retirement to prayer and works of 
charity. His wife had no sympathy for what she 
regarded as a morbid religiousness. One morning 
at mass, he heard read the words of the Gospel ’go 
and sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, 
and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven, and come 
and follow M e ’. These words spoke to Mr. D like 
a command. And straightaway he left the church, 
putting all the money that was on him into the poor- 
box at the door. He set off to walk the 135 miles 
to Lough Derg, a famous place of pilgrimage in Ireland 
since earliest times. When he did not return for 
his breakfast and the morning passed without news of 
him his wife became alarmed and notified the guards. 
Eventually, that evening he was stopped by a police­
man of a small village about thirty miles from Dublin.
He was seen by a doctor and put on a temporary cert­
ificate for admission to a mental hospital. He made 
no protest at entering hospital, told his story clearly, 
and accepted what had happend as God's will. I 
informed the medical superintendent next morning that 
we had admitted a saint.
(Drury in Clark and Winch, 1970, p.91)
Drury was doubtful whether that particular man was in need of diagnosis 
at all, as his only wish had been to give his money away to the poor.
For the sake of argument, our analysis of Mr. D's case throughout 
this thesis would be based on the assumption that the psychiatrist 
in charge admitted him in the belief that the case is presumably 
suffering from a certain kind of psychosis, i.e. paranoid schizophrenia.
We shall shortly imagine a hypothetical situation where 
a psychiatrist from Kuwait (representing the third world) and Robert 
Spitzer (chief physician who chaired the task force of DSM-IIl) repre­
senting the Western world has to decide the normality of the above 
two cases. But before doing so, let us examine three systems of 
diagnosis and definition of mental illness which are widely accepted 
throughout the world.
Let us first consider the definition of "mental disorder" 
which was developed by the DSM-III-R (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, 1987):
"Mental disorder is conceptualised as a clinically 
significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or 
pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated 
with present distress (a painful symptom) or dis­
ability (impairment in one or more important areas of 
functioning), or a significantly increased risk of 
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss 
of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern 
must not be merely an expectable response to a partic­
ular event, e.g. the death of a loved one. Whatever 
its original cause, it must currently be considered a 
manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or bio­
logical dysfunction in the person. Neither deviant 
behaviour, e.g. political, religious, or sexual, nor 
conflicts that are primarily between the individual 
and society are mental disorders unless the deviance 
or conflict is a symptom of dysfunction in the 
person as described above."
(DSM-III, p.401)
The members of the task force of DSM-III are hoping to publish the 
new edition of DSM-IV by 1992 (Psychiatric News, April 15, 1988).
ICD-9 (International Classification of Disease) has 
developed the following definition of mental illness:
"Psychoses - mental disorder in which impairment 
of mental function has developed to a degree that 
interferes grossly with insight, ability to meet 
some ordinary demands of life or to maintain ade­
quate contact with reality. It is not an exact or 
well-defined term. Mental retardation is excluded."
The WHO has completed its preparation to launch the new edition of 
ICD-10 in 1991. The new ICD-10 will be much longer in order to cover 
a wide range of mental disorder (Jablensky and Cooper and Burke, 1988).
In a related attempt to define mental illness, the Department 
of Health and Social Security in England in Heginbotham (1982) 
suggested that mental illness means having one or more of the following 
characterist ics:
( 1) a more than temporary impairment of intellectual
functions shown by failure of memory, orientation, 
comprehension and learning capacity;
(2) a more than temporary alteration of mood to such 
degree as to give rise to the patient having a 
delusional appraisal of his situation, his past or 
his future, or that of others, or the lack of any 
appraisal;
(3) delusional beliefs, persecutory, jealous, or grandiose;
(4) abnormal perceptions associated with delusional 
misinterpretation of events;
(5) thinking so disordered as to prevent the patient 
making a reasonable appraisal of his situation or 
having reasonable communication with others. (p.4)
It can be seen that both the DSM-III and ICD-9 state necessary, 
but not in themselves sufficient, conditions on which the individual 
can justifiably receive the definition of mental illness or be deprived 
from his basic freedom throughout compulsory detention (Farrell,
1985). None of the above three systems of definition provides an 
operational definition for mental disorder. That is because they 
require systematic conceptual perspectives and highly reliable criteria 
for judging the abnormality of any given condition. Moreover, the 
"family resemblance" of each form of mental disorder in a "family 
grouping" cannot be identified or represented by a list of "defining 
properties" and the causal consequences of the disturbed condition 
are governed by vague and unspecific explanations (Farrell, 1985). 
Throughout this chapter, we will argue that this absence of 'defining 
properties' has contributed to the existence of continuous difficulties 
in terms of a lack of a clear and systematic method in relating symptoms 
to certain 'psychopathology'. As a result, the interpretative methods 
of the symptoms presented would depend mainly on the subjective impression 
of the psychiatrist rather than on the reality of the individual's 
actual symptoms of suffering. The DHSS definition, on the other 
hand, although more extensive in nature, incorporates in its view 
of mental disorder terms such as "delusion", "thinking disorders", 
or "hallucination", or "loss of contact with reality", which are 
open to an unlimited number of interpretations as we shall see later 
(Heginbotham, 1982).
Now let us imagine the hypothetical views of our represen­
tative psychiatrists. Mr. D, for example, would be defined by the
Kuwaiti psychiatrist as a normal good citizen because he didn’t violate 
any culturally defined norms (Scheff, 197 1). Helping the poor, even 
to this extreme degree, is a positive characteristic that is highly 
valued in Islamic countries.
Robert Spitzer would certainly view Mr. D as unintelligible 
and lacking a meaningful content to his life. Cases such as Mr. D 
are traditionally viewed by psychiatrists as irrational, irresponsible 
and unpredictable. A couple of hundred years ago, Dr. Spitzer would 
speak of Mr. D or Mr. Duzynski 'as if’ they had lost their mind; 
then the metaphor 'as if’ was projected on the body. But then, Spitzer 
drops the ’as if' and starts to believe that the act of spending 
behaviour or the inability to speak the English language is not 'as 
if' insanity, but something that can be treated and defined in the 
same class as fever, that is, a symptom (Sarbin, 1967). The metaphor 
'as if' seems to have become 'real'. Thus, Spitzer would not hesitate 
to state that the concept of mental illness must be viewed as a subset 
of medical disorders.
In psychiatric practice, there are many 'as if' metaphors.
In the DSM-III implicit definition of mental disorder, a person is 
considered to be mentally ill or vulnerable to mental illness if 
he shows certain signs of 'distress' to himself or to those around 
him. However, the application of the criteria of 'distress' can 
be rather loose and vague. As a result, the psychiatrist would be 
totally free to ascribe 'distress' to any form of behaviour he sees 
fit (Moore, 1984). Thus, Mr. D is in a distressed state because
his spending behaviour annoyed 'others' and was considered to be 
a serious breach of the general expectations or socially fixed norms 
or about the degree of acceptability of the act of helping the poor 
that is held in a given society and considered to be normal.
Another example would be the concept of 'disadvantage' 
as used by Spitzer in his definition of 'mental disorder' in the 
DSM-III. The use of the term 'disadvantage' was aimed to "allow 
the adverse reaction of society to count as placing the individual 
at disadvantage" (Moore, 1984, p.213). Thus, Mr. D's spending behaviour 
which incurred the anger of his family, could be viewed as placing 
him at a 'disadvantage' and thus as pertaining to the category of 
'mental disorder'. On the other hand, if the family or society in 
general shows little or no concern to such 'over-spending behavior' 
then no negative consequences would have occurred and Mr. D would 
not have been placed in the 'disadvantaged' category and would not 
have been defined as mentally ill. Mr. Duzynski, however, did not 
show any sign of distress or being in a disadvantaged state. For 
Spitzer, even an individual who fails to meet the three D's (distress, 
disability, and disadvantage) still may not be free from mental disorder, 
for he may be 'vulnerable' to the disease condition. That is to 
say that, although Mr. Duzynski's case represents an extreme form 
of psychiatric practice, it does indicate that factors which are 
central in the identification of mental illness are not always based 
on the individual's actual suffering or complaints (the role of non- 
clinical factors in the diagnosis of mental illness will be discussed 
in detail as the chapter progresses). The alternative is that the
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term 'mental illness' may be used in a 'demeaning fashion' and those 
who are so labelled may be treated as if they have a general trait 
of incompetence (Sarbin in Rimm and Somerville, 1977). The above 
discussion shows clearly the slippery nature of the concept of mental 
illness.
It could be argued that almost every aspect of human behaviour 
or human thought could be interpreted as evidence of 'mental illness' 
or a sign of incompetency or vulnerability or potentiality to illness. 
Thus, a decision to travel on foot for a few days could be taken 
as evidence of the 'Fugue' dissociation neurotic symptoms (Haas,
1979). 'Deep imagination' becomes 'withdrawal', which is considered 
to be "a violation of customary expectations about the degree of 
social and interpersonal distance that is held in the society ..." 
(Scheff, 1975, p. 18). Showing sympathy for the poor (as in Mr. D's 
example) becomes a sign of delusions. Not speaking the English language 
becomes a sign of confusion or bizarre thoughts or lack of insight. 
Having an active social life becomes a sign of 'manic disturbance'. 
Deciding to play cards in a casino three times a week might be taken 
as evidence of 'pathological gambling'. (For more examples, see 
Scheff in Shean, 1971, and Smith, 1982.)
The above examples show clearly that society or the family 
can cause the patient to be alienated from himself and others which 
helps them to shift the moral blame from themselves to the patient 
and to justify and rationalize all psychiatric procedures carried 
out on the patient (Laing in Smith, 1982) in the name of good mental 
health or the patient's best interest.
Laing's argument shows rather conclusively the confusion 
between the criteria on which psychiatrists should base their decisions, 
i.e. objective observable criteria, and the subjective factors or 
non-psychiatric influences (Cocozza and Steadman, 1985; Marson et 
al, 1988) which actually influence their decisions.
The above discussion suggests that it is very difficult 
if not altogether impossible in the mental health professions in 
general to draw an objective and unbiased line between the effects 
of social or non-clinical norms such as, the family, perceptions 
of the 'patient', previous history of hospitalisation, institutional 
norms of adjustment, or other factors such as the clinician's motivation 
to resore the patient's autonomy, or to protect the patient or others, 
future dangerousness, etc. (Mendel and Rapport, 1969; Marson et 
al, 1988) and those of clinical norms, i.e. actual complaint of the 
individual as expressed by independent organic indices.
Consider, for example, the kind of institution the psychiatrist 
works in. If he works in a public mental hospital, for example, 
where the general expectation is to diagnose and admit patients, 
the psychiatrist in such an environment is more likely to reaffirm 
the public or lay definition of what counts as a symptom of mental 
illness. If the setting is a court, however, the psychiatrist is 
likely to be motivated to prove or to disprove the reliability of 
the offender's claims of abnormality rather than to provide an effective 
treatment or 'helping' plans.
The above limitations of the psychiatric definitional system 
had led many writers such as Laing (1960), Szasz (1972, 1973, 1984, 
1987), and Leiffer (1969), to question the value-'neutrality' of 
psychiatric definition of mental illness.
Leiffer alongside with Szasz notably, puts great emphasis 
on the fact that the central function underlying the practice of 
psychiatry is social rather than medical. Both writers reject the 
definition of human psycho-social problems within the disease or 
medical model and believe it belongs within the structure of social 
or ethical life. The consequences of the medical mask of psycho­
social model, as Leiffer (1969) puts it, is that "it permits social 
authority to mask itself with scientific credentials and scientific 
credibility" (p.83).
As a result, it is not surprising to discover that many 
political principles, religious beliefs and personal values could 
be viewed as belonging to the category of the inappropriate, or as 
outside society's standard forms of thought or behaviour, and thus 
meriting the term 'mental illness' (Edwards, 1982). For that reason, 
psychiatrists today turned out to be "... the most powerful section 
of society which will be able successfully to define what is undesirable 
conduct and what is the less favoured life-style; and they will 
be able to control, in the name of good health, those who offend 
against their definition (Miles, 1987, p.209). For that purpose, 
the terms "adjustment or adaptation or fitness to society" which 
are derived basically from the Darwinian biological principles of
adaptation and maladaptation (Schwab and Schwab, 1978), have been 
used in current psychiatric manuals as central criteria for 'mental 
health*. Thus, when the individual's behaviour does not conform 
to a society's norms of adjustment, psychiatrists, representing the 
social system, interfere to 'reform' their behaviour so they can 
be made to fit or adjust to society's norms (Bloch and Reddaway,
1977; Scheff in Gove, 1982; Scheff, 1971). Thus, not being able 
to adjust to society's stereotypical values would imply or assume 
certain deviation from a standardised adaptive norm in the same way 
a deviation from biological norms would be believed to be. The only 
problem, however, with the diagnosis and classification of mental 
disorders is that it relies heavily on a vague and unspecified norm 
of adjustment, employed by the clinicians (Livermore et al, 1968).
The problem on a large scale stems from the fact that the concept 
of mental illness as applied in psychiatric daily practice is much 
more closely related to the individual's personal systems of values 
because it seeks mainly to define and make sense of that most intangible 
area, i.e. thoughts, social interpersonal relationship, systems of 
feeling, and emotions. The morally significant concern of the above 
point is that any attempt to define the individual's functional 
behaviour would provoke many problematic moral issues. Mental compet­
ency, a term which continues to pose many methodological and evaluative 
problems in psychiatric daily practice, is often assumed by the 
psychiatrists as a necessary qualification for maintaining the moral 
and social agency of the patient within the community. The problematic 
issue of the application of mental competency criteria in deciding 
the moral reliability of a given individual is the nature of methods
which the psychiatrist in general uses to define mental competency.
That is to say that the psychiatrist's definition of the individual's 
validity is a summary of his personal values, society's norms, 
institutional ideology and the general principles laid down in a 
given diagnostic manual. In other words, the psychiatrist when con­
fronted with a patient, is indirectly comparing himself with the 
patient's general attitudes or total functioning. The question he 
(the psychiatrist) (subconsciously ) asks himself before establishing 
his primary diagnosis is: What are the similarities and differences
between my attitudes and the patient's attitudes?
A simple answer to the above question, which most psychiatrists 
would undoubtedly reach, is that their own attitudes reflect the 
most acceptable norms of conduct and thinking which every individual 
in society is supposed to hold.
Any deviation from such rules would lead to the assumption 
that the deviating individual "... cannot be trusted- to live by the 
rules agreed on by the group. He is regarded as an outsider" (Becker, 
1973, p.l). However, one cannot readily accept the idea that psychiatrist 
in general have the right to determine what kind of values a reasonable 
patient should have, even when the individual "... lacks the capacity 
not the will" (Edwards, 1983, p.200) to be a full prima facie rational 
agent .
Thus Laing, among others, believes that to define the 
individual's attitudes and behaviour as irrational is to deny his
basic sense of responsibility and his moral agency. For Laing, what 
appears to us as bizarre or unintelligible, in reality has a meaning, 
motive, and content. It represents methods of adaptation to stressful 
situations. Such adaptation, for Laing, reflected the patient's 
experience and the characteristics of the situation he finds himself 
in. A crucial problem in psychiatry, Laing maintains, is basically 
related to the denial by most psychiatrists of the patient's thoughts, 
feelings and experience.
Clearly, Laing like many other radical psychiatrists gives 
the patient's values, his unique experience, and his ability to decide 
between different courses of alternative action, precedence over 
the psychiatrist's or society's values. For such psychiatrists, 
there is no specific standard that can be established for an accurate 
understanding of the patient's ability to make autonomous and sound 
choices. Many other writers such as Lavin (1985), Ingleby (1981), 
Livermore et al in Macklin in Chaplan et al (1981), Lazarus (1975), 
Slavney and Mchugh (1987), Leff (1986), Gove (1982), Light (1982), 
etc., have voiced similar doubt concerning the subjectivity of criteria 
in psychiatric judgement, especially in determining what is mental 
health or what should characterise a healthy attitude towards life, 
etc.
Our main emphasis in this chapter will be the effects of 
subjective factors on clinical decisions. Such concern emerges from 
the fact that the presence of arbitrary and non-clinical decisions 
have resulted in the creation of conflicting and multiple definitions
of what is the ideal or most appropriate mental health or healthy 
attitude or well being. Accordingly, the same person might be labelled 
mentally ill according to certain norms in certain circumstances, 
while viewed as mentally healthy according to a different set of 
norms (Macklin, 1981).
If we consider, for example, axis v ("highest level of 
adaptive functioning in the past year"), (Quick Reference to
the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-III, 1980, p. 16), the psychiatrist must 
estimate in objective method the patient's highest level of adaptive 
functioning in the past year. According to the DSM-III's manual 
instructions, such evaluation would have a significant prognostic 
and diagnostic value, because usually the individual patient returns 
to his past level of adaptive functioning after the onset of illness 
(Fernando et al, 1986). Accordingly, the diagnostician is responsible 
for deciding on the patient's behalf, what is an adaptive functioning 
and how his behaviour differs from or is similar to that of an "average" 
person (Davison and Neale, 1986). Thus, instead of examining the 
'patient' himself, the psychiatrist rates the severity of his problem 
to the standard reaction to the same stressor from an "average" person. 
What if both the clinician and the patient disagree or differ in 
their definition about the meaning or contribution of the stressor? 
(Williams, 1985). As Taylor in Davison and Neale (1986) and Roth 
in Fernando (1986) argue, the psychiatrist's definition concerning 
the patient's level of adaptive functioning refers crucially to his 
own personal values and subjective meaning about how a normal person 
should function at a specific time in his life and in specific
conditions. (e.g. A man should not smile while attending a funeral.) 
Surely, that leads us to emphasize the fact that the concept of mental 
illness involves a pre-determined set of norms such as that the patient's 
feelings are "inappropriate", he is "unable to be involved in an 
effective human relationship", he has "disorder of thoughts", or 
"withdrawal". The above description of the individual's functional 
disturbance presupposes or assumes a culturally agreed standard con­
cerning the appropriate limits of, for example, friendship or what 
are acceptable rational thoughts or the amount of acceptable emotional 
and behavioural distance between the 'patient' and his social reference 
group. Deviation from the above standards or ready-made societal 
norms would lead to the diagnosis of mental illness (Scheff ,
1971; and Scheff, 1975).
In many cases, such societal values represent a hidden 
but central hypothesis which determines the diagnosis of abnormality 
of any given individual which in many cases takes precedence over 
the severity of the symptoms (see Macklin, 1981). In this way, the 
diagnosis of mental illness is irreversible as no independent diagnostic 
indices or psychological tests have yet been developed to determine 
objectively the presence or absence of mental disturbance. As social 
or family values determine psychiatric definition (Greenley, 1975) 
alongside the presence of inner unverified explanatory methods of 
abnormality, it would be very difficult to conduct the necessary 
observation of the manifestation of illness. As a result:
"Psychiatric diagnoses, unlike those in other branches 
of medicine, are almost irreversible. Internists, 
neurologists, and pediatricians sometimes have to admit 
errors, but a psychiatrist never does; it is not he 
who was remiss, but the schizophrenia which is in 
remission .....
A medical diagnosis is much like a hypothesis in a 
science; it should lead to further predictions and be 
subject to disconfirmation. In science, hypotheses that 
cannot be disproved by any conceivable evidence are not 
hypotheses at all. Should we not conclude that diagnoses 
which cannot be disproved are equally meaningless? By 
showing that the diagnosis of schizophrenia is essen­
tially irreversible no matter how the patient subsequently 
behaves, Rosenhan has dealt the scientific pretensions 
of psychiatry a serious blow.
(Neisser in Scheff 1984, p . 193)
In fact, a careful evaluation of the definition of 'mental 
disorder' listed in DSM-III, for example, would reveal that the manual 
conceives mental functions as something that can be easily observed 
and isolated in a control clinic environment for the purpose of testing,
"... each of the mental disorders conceptualized as a clinically 
significant behavior ..." (DSM-III, p.401) or as something that has 
a recognised clear-cut set of norms, "pattern that occur in a person" (Ibid., 
1987). That is to say, most manuals and definitions of mental 
illness are worded in a way which gives a strong impression to lay 
public and health professionals, that diagnosing a person as mentally 
ill is an objective clinical process which involves specific symptoms 
of a specific disease for which the psychiatrist possesses a well- 
established and specialised knowledge in this subject (Schacht, 1985;
Szasz, 1987; Millon, 1983; Sarbin, 1967 and 1969). In fact, "the 
DSM-III implies the existence of a world in which control, clarity, 
and certainty about classifying mental disorders is possible and 
hence, expertise about these matters is also possible" (Schacht, 1985, 
p.515).
In reality, the individual's mental functions and his 
personal experience cannot be specified in terms of absolute categoriz­
ation and this makes it difficult, if not impossible, for mental 
health professionals to establish acceptable and precise boundaries 
where normal mental functions end and abnormal functions begin (Nathan, 
1980; Macklin, 1981; Roth and Kroll, 1986). Depression caused 
by external causes, for example, such as work problems or exam anxiety, 
which is very normal, is difficult to distinguish from depression 
that arises from floating anxiety or general mental instability.
The crucial question that follows concerns the ability of psychiatry 
to decide when the individual's behaviour or mental experience deviates 
significantly from the acceptable norms to certify its designation 
as 'illness'. What is more, who can decide, authoritatively, what 
kind of adjustment or behavioural norms are acceptable as criteria 
of health? (Roth and Kroll, 1986).
Thus, bearing in mind our previous discussion on the presence 
of subjective criteria in psychiatric diagnosis, one has to face 
the fact that violation of "communal expectations" (Weinberg, 1978, 
p.25; see also Pflang and Rohde, 1970) of functioning in
certain norms seems to be the basic criterion of healthy or unhealthy 
personality. For this reason, a great deal of emphasis needs to 
be placed on the uniqueness of the mental patient because:
"Understanding the uniqueness of the reality of 
each person is the very essence of psychological 
skill, skill that must deal not only with individual 
variance but with the person's shifting subjective 
state."
(Weinberg, 1978, p.27)
However, in practice, such psychiatric "skills" are difficult 
to apply. This is because, in reality, many individual cases would 
receive the definition of mental illness on the basis of administrative 
rather than clinical considerations (Mendel and Rapport, 1969).
The point that must be considered in this respect, is that 
the basic administrative component in the psychiatric definition 
of mental illness is the third party claim, i.e. the community members. 
That is to say that:
"The basic decision about illness is usually made 
by community members and not professional personnel. 
Although the very 'sick' are usually found in 
mental hospital, there are occasions when very 'sick* 
persons go unattended while moderately 'sick* 
persons receive treatment. This selection is clearly 
based on social criteria, not on psychiatric ones
  community persons are brought to the hospital
on the basis of lay definitions and once they arrive, 
their appearance alone is usually regarded as sufficient 
evidence of 'illness1."
(Mechanic, 1967, p.27)
Clearly, the definition or classification of the mentally 
ill could be made by the 'patient's' family (as in the case of Mr. D ) , 
his colleagues, his relatives, the police (Duzynski case), etc.
The problem is that by putting a label or a name on some class of 
'disturbed behaviour' or 'bizarre experience', psychiatrists think 
that they have actually understood the labelled condition. In fact, 
such understanding would be no more than a myth. Such labels do 
not describe the patient's subjective experience or the content of 
his thoughts or disturbance. A phobic "fear of open spaces may not 
prevent the mother of a young baby from caring adequately for her
child within the walls of her home: but if it later interferes with
being a good mother to school-age children the phobia will be regarded 
as more serious because more disruptive" (Miles, 1987, p.32).
Not being able to understand or to appreciate the nature, 
meaning, purpose, and content of the mother's phobia of open spaces 
and the 'patient's' ability to function socially in spite of her 
suffering, would incline many psychiatrists to interpret her single 
and temporary disturbance as an indication of a more serious 'mental 
disturbance' (ibid., 1987). That is because, in many cases, mental 
health professionals seek to apply standards of abnormality which 
could be best viewed as 'problematic'. That is to say that clinicians, 
in many cases, believe that maximum rationality is a necessary condition 
for mental health and ignore the fact that people are liable to some 
irrational thought and behaviour in their daily life which is accepted 
as quite normal. Similarly, Goffman, throughout his book "Asylum,
1960", describes the non-professional or non-psychiatric involvement 
in the definition of mental illness by stating that:
"... a psychotic man is tolerated by his wife 
until she finds herself a boyfriend, or by his 
adult children until they move from a house to 
an apartment; an alcoholic is sent to a mental 
hospital because the jail is full, and a drug 
addict because he declines to avail himself of 
psychiatric treatment on the outside; a rebellious 
adolescent daughter can no longer be managed at 
home because she now threatens to have an open 
affair with an unsuitable companion, and so on."
(p. 129)
For Goffman, such "social contingencies" which can determine 
the patient's future well-being can play a central role in the psychia­
tric decision to admit or discharge the patient. The problem is 
that the third party claim is not a well-founded interpretation of 
the individual's presumed suffering or distress (Wing, 1978). Such 
social contingencies and the third party claim alongside the presence 
of vague and unspecified factors which are not always medical in 
nature, have led to the conclusion that Mr. Duzynski and Mr. D must 
be mad.
In other words, the definition of mental illness is, in 
many cases, unconnected or vaguely related to the actual symptoms 
presented by the patients in the sense that if, for example, the 
psychiatrist empathises with the above 'cases' or is influenced by 
their social status, he is likely to label them as neurotic or suffering 
from personality disorder, etc. But if the psychiatrist fails to 
establish basic empathy with the patient and he finds it difficult 
to understand what factors are involved in the problem, the patient 
might be labelled as 'psychotic' (Light in Gove, 1982; Mechanic, 1967). 
For example, in the psychiatric hospital in Kuwait there is a basic 
tendency among psychologists to characterize Bedouins as untidy, 
scruffy people, with an unpleasant body odour due to lack of personal 
hygiene and as lacking in socially acceptable 'civilized' behaviour. 
Thus, inevitably, when interacting with such people, the psychologist 
is influenced by his negative attitudes and prejudices with the result 
that he would rarely listen carefully or take seriously what the 
Bedouin patient is saying. Such psychologists might even be convinced
that the Bedouin patient is mentally retarded before any tests have 
been applied. Some mental health professionals even go so far as 
to give an I.Q. score to such individuals without ever conducting 
the appropriate tests. They justify such actions on the grounds 
that the physical appearance and overt behaviour of the patient indicat 
that he is 'dull1 or 'mentally retarded'.
Thus, there is often a proneness in many cases for the 
clinician to depend on his subjective impressions of the patient's 
behaviour when making a diagnosis. Szasz (1987) put it convincingly 
when he stated that there is a basic confusion and a gap in the 
psychiatrist's decision between his subjective view of the individual 
patient (as someone who is irrational, unpredictable, and thus invalid) 
and the disturbed condition in itself as something 'objective' which 
must be considered as unconnected with the pre-determined subjective 
norms.
A careful analysis of current psychiatric practice in Kuwait 
would reveal that psychiatric definition of the presented problem 
is largely based on one or two basic features or symptoms (see Costello 
1970). Duzynski would be considered by a Kuwaiti psychiatrist as 
"a typical psychosis" due to the presence of 'word salad' of a duration 
less than two weeks. The reason why they would not apply DSM-III's 
complete criteria, for example, is quite clear if one considered 
the following facts:
1. As mentioned in the previous chapter, psychiatry is a recent
profession in Kuwait, thus there are very few psychiatrist who have 
had to deal with a large number of cases. A proper application of
a long list of criteria and complicated definition, as in the DSM-III, 
for example, needs no less than 20 minutes for each case. Every 
doctor has to interview (40) patients in the out-patient clinic, 
which means 800 minutes must be provided for sufficient diagnosis 
for all cases. If the doctor is not familiar with DSM-III, more 
than 20 minutes would certainly be needed. (The same problem can 
be seen in Botswana and in many developing countries - see Ben-Tovim, 
1985).
2. Because of the shame and stigma attached to the labelled
individual, the schizophrenic, for example, may remain undiscovered 
for many years. This situation will create many difficulties for 
the psychiatrist in deciding whether the case has 'schizophrenic1 
disorder (a duration of more than six months is needed to establish 
the diagnosis) or 'schizophreniform' (more than two weeks) or a typical 
or 'reactive psychosis' (less than two weeks). In other words, it
is very difficult to specify accurately the chronicity of schizophrenia 
due to the fact that many patients show unstability in terms of the 
presented symptoms and the long term outcome (Kendell, 1983).
3. Almost all diagnostic schemes encourage mental health 
professionals to use their personal 'experience' in the clinical 
judgment. The fact that DSM-III, for example, is based on a descriptive 
(a theoretical) analysis with a significant lack of empirical research
and strong evidence or operational definitions of many psychiatric 
disorders, had led many psychiatrists to rely heavily on their subjective, 
personal experience and their cultural norms of interpretations.
Suppose, for example, that a Kuwaiti patient complains of headache.
Then suppose he goes on to say that his headache is caused by an 
"evil eye". If this patient is well educated, the British psychiatrist, 
for example, will find that specific explanation bizarre due to the 
inability of the patient to give an explanation of his headache that 
sounds reasonable in terms of the psychiatrist's own experience.
That is to say, the British psychiatrist would probably use his concept 
of an acceptable standard of 'physical explanation' that is used 
by all 'normal' people in Britain as criteria of judging the abnormality 
of our case. As a result, the British psychiatrist will start to 
view the patient as "a paranoid psychotic". A Kuwaiti psychiatrist, 
on the other hand, is likely to appreciate that the patient's belief 
is culturally normal and may as a result consider a number of different 
possibilities, e.g.
(1) the patient's headache may have certain organic causes and the 
'evil eye' is irrelevant;
(2) relating physical complaints to some 'evil eye' is considered 
to be an acceptable explanation for all Kuwaiti culture;
(3) the patient may have a family problem and the headache is an 
expression of these problems. (The above hypothetical case 
was originally adapted from Rack, 1982.)
In addition, if one examines, for example, current textbooks 
in developmental psychology published by Western authors, one would
notice that the main function of the 'normal* or 'mentally healthy' 
family is to provide the adolescent with enough emotional stability 
and security to enable him to separate himself from the family environ 
ment (Lidz, 1971).
However, it could be said that almost the reverse is true 
for Muslim societies where maintaining long-term continuing ties 
between the members of the family is considered to be the main goal 
of child-rearing. In Kuwait, for example, a person who separates 
from his family would be considered as not a true Muslim and the 
family that encourages such separation would be viewed as abnormal 
and needing counselling.
The above example shows clearly how the Western concept 
of mental health or mental illness is imposed on non-Western cultures 
who have different forms of philosophy and life-experiences (Fernando, 
1988). According to the Western concept of a mentally healthy family, 
a Muslim family might be viewed as abnormal because it is 'father- 
centered' or 'authoritarian' or 'too close'. Although such character­
istics are considered to be positive in the Muslim family, Western 
psychiatrists might consider such a family as pathological or not 
totally healthy because it departs from what had been accepted as 
the 'healthy* norm for the white nuclear family (Ibid., 1988).
Thus, as previously mentioned, the problem of many psychiatr 
diagnostic systems is that they do not take into account the role 
of such subjective impressions or current norms in different cultures
or the definition of the problems at a personal level. Let us elaborate 
what we mean by personal levels in some detail. In Kuwait, for example, 
most psychiatric patients cannot accept a definition of their problem 
in terms of unconscious inner conflicts or in psychoanalytical language 
in general. European patients, for example, tend to perceive their 
problems in terms of duality, e.g. "body or mind", "organic or functional" 
"genetic or environmental", whereas in most Third World countries, 
they are likely to conceive their sufferings in terms of a "continuum" 
without specifying accurate or systematic boundaries (Wig, 1983).
In addition, because psychiatric service in Kuwait is a 
new profession, many psychiatrists over-evaluate current Western 
psychiatric definition schemes. Such emphasis on using criteria 
alone creates two problems: 1) It gives psychiatrists in Kuwait an
immature conception of certainty in the definition of mental illness 
and 2) it maintains and reinforces public confidence in psychiatric 
decisions based on an objective and scientific basis. Despite this, 
many mental health professionals are fully aware that the limitations 
of their psychiatric tools might bring about a negative attitude 
towards their professions. It must be emphasised in this respect 
that many mental health professionals in Kuwiat, as everywhere else, 
are vulnerable to the certain negative aspects of their profession, 
particularly after working for many years in a mental hospital.
Thus, mental health professionals are often overwhelmed by feelings 
of helplessness and anxiety (burn-out phenomena) (Farber, 1983; 
Freudenberger, 1980) because they recognize that:
(1) Their diagnostic tools do not always provide them with a valid 
estimation of the individual's mental problems.
(2) Their prediction of dangerousness and later functioning is not 
always reliable.
(3) Their therapeutic skills are not fully effective.
(4) Many patients suffer from different courses of relapse in their 
post-hospitalisation period.
(5) There is no world-wide accepted definition or medical theory 
or model that is approved by all mental health professionals.
As a result, psychiatrists develop an unconsciously aggressive attitude 
towards themselves for selecting such specialities or towards their 
patient who continues to give them the feeling of failure and eventually 
feelings of powerlessness and feelings of guilt.
For that reason, many mental health professionals try to 
change their career from a clinical to an academic setting or to 
develop their sense of accomplishment (which they lack generally) 
through publishing books, writing articles, and generally trying 
to educate the public through the mass media. That is to say, their 
main preoccupation may shift gradually from, the clinical setting 
where the identification of success is very difficult to a non-clinical 
area where one's commitments and obligations are of a different nature 
and the compensation is very high. However, for the psychiatrist 
who does not succeed in changing his career there is always the danger 
that he will gradually become less sensitive to the patient's needs 
or his rights. For example, such a psychiatrist might start to ignore 
the importance of seeing the patient regularly or the necessity to
apply a follow-up treatment plan. That is because the psychiatrist 
believes that, at the end of the day, the inevitable result will 
be a deterioration in the patient’s condition rather than a cure.
The above argument could possibly explain some of the dynamics behind
psychiatric abuse. That kind of practice marked by uncertainty had
led many mental health professionals to ignore the importnace of
the content, meaning and purpose of psychiatric symptoms, the role
of observation in determining the validity of such symptoms, and
the involvement or the role of non-psychiatric factors in their decisions
(see, Cocozza and Steadman, 1978).
As a result, one must be very cautious when examining the 
psychiatric clinical rationale implied in diagnosis or research 
objectives. Many psychologists and psychiatrists, for example, try 
to provide a neuropsychological explanation for the concept of mental 
illness. Venables in Frith and Done (1988) proposed a ’defective 
filter' theory in which the 'schizophrenics' are believed to have 
lost their brain capacities to filter out the irrelevant information.
In a related attempt, Frith and Done (1988) present what they called 
an 'internal' or 'central monitor system' in which the schizophrenic 
suffers from a confusion in distinguishing between 'spontaneous or 
self-generated actions' and environmental stimuli. Frith and Done 
believed that the mechanism underlying the delusions and hallucinations 
that occur in the schizophrenic are due to the disturbance in the 
patient's monitoring system which eventually leads to a confusion 
about the source of actions or thoughts. For them, such a confusion 
might be the result of brain defects. The question which needs to
be addressed here is how one is able to identify the limits and 
boundaries of such inner psychological apparatus. What is presented 
above is merely a hypothetical inner abstract without giving any 
account of how an individual becomes a mental patient or the signif­
icance of his subjective experience or the effect of non-clinical 
factors in perpetuating his disturbance (see Scheff, 1975; Leiffer,
1969; Szasz, 1979, 1984, 1987; Laing, 1960; Laing and Esterson,
1970).
That is because the general purpose of any definitional 
or research attempt is to classify subjects according to what they 
commonly share with each other or their family grouping, which means 
that the individual's differences and uniqueness are disregarded 
(see Valentine, 1982; Ingleby, 1981).
It could be argued, therefore, that the diagnosis of mental 
illness within the general framework of DSM-III, for example, often 
emphasises arbitrary and unimportant traits or qualities, while omitting 
central unique differences among individuals. Labels such as 'being 
out of touch with reality' or 'loss of insight' (see the three defin­
itions quoted earlier in this chapter) or 'defective filtering' or 
'monitoring', as suggested in the above studies, ignore or do not 
give a sufficient insight into how the individual patient uses his 
mental awareness or his personal motivation in fitting himself to 
the environment. Furthermore, such terms ignore the extent, nature 
and the manner in which the labelled individual deals with reality 
or with his loss of insight or how he perceives his reality or the 
relative nature of such reality.
Moreover, the use of definitive terms such as "mood 
disturbance", "delusion", "disorder of thoughts", etc., in the diagnostic 
criteria, may create a wrong conception of discontinuity between 
normal and abnormal behaviour (Nathan, 1980). Rimland (1961) has 
summarised this position by arguing that some patients in mental 
hospitals are "saner" than non-patients, and that it is sometimes 
difficult to draw a clear line between "deep unhappiness” and "psychotic 
depression" or between anxious and depressive symptoms or between 
schizophrenic episodes and reaction to drug abuse (see the study 
presented at the APA annual meeting by Wilkins cited in Psychiatric 
News, June 17, 1988). Another example is when the psychiatrist has 
to deal with patients that can be defined as either schizophrenic 
or suffering from endogenous depression, when in reality he might 
be designated as suffering from both illnesses, or neither, or he 
may be suffering from some sort of illness which the psychiatric 
definitional system is not yet prepared to identify (Drury, 1973).
The term schizophrenia, for example, when used by psychiatrists, 
usually implies the presence of symptoms such as bizarreness of thought 
or irrationality rather than specific physiological deviation (as 
some organic psychiatrists claim in their definitions). It is not 
difficult for the reader of abnormal or clinical psychology to discover 
the lack of an agreed and well-defined theory on the real causes 
of schizophrenia. The psychiatrists themselves are well aware that 
they are controlling the patient's thoughts for the sake of his family 
and society, rather than curing certain biological abnormalities.
For that reason, many psychiatrists in Kuwait avoid telling 
the patient his diagnosis either because they know very well that 
terms such as 'schizophrenia' do not tell us much or because they 
have doubts about the accuracy of the diagnosis or because they are 
afraid that they might be wrong. Moreover, the patient may be inclined 
to doubt the validity of a diagnosis of schizophrenia or may fear 
the onset of many attacks and relapses (which do occur in many cases).
In other words, terms such as 'schizophrenia' tend to motivate the 
public to think in terms of ’irreversibility’ or ’progressive deterior­
ation’ or 'chronicity' (Drury, 1975). This has led Drury to emphasise 
that words such as 'hysteria', 'character neurosis' and many psychiatric 
words can create an inaccurate frame of understanding. According 
to Drury, many psychological theories that are widely accepted through­
out the world have become ’fact-proof' due to their being based on 
"logical error" rather than on clear conceptual and scientific 
foundat ion.
Drury goes on to cite Wolp's learning theory of neurotic 
symptoms. For Wolp, the stimulus for floating anxiety is 'space', 
'time', and the 'idea of self’. Using such terms makes it difficult, 
if not impossible, to test them experimentally. Therefore, in Drury's 
own words, "... it is not possible to refute him [Wolp] because he 
has said nothing" (Drury, 1973, p. 17).
Drury's criticism of Wolp's ambiguous terms highlights 
the importance of the vocabulary mental health professionals use 
in their daily practice. The importance of psychiatric terms results
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from the following three facts:
1. Such terms shape the way mental health professionals think and 
behave.
2. It is not only the labels or terms in themselves which create 
the problem but also the moral consequences of such terms which 
might be permanently fixed.
3. Many psychiatric terms might create a confusion in understanding 
where the psychiatrist who uses such terms might indicate a 
specific professional meaning and the patient might formulate
a very different kind of understanding. e*g* hysteria = not
to be taken seriously; alcoholic = loss of control; schizophrenia
= mad, etc. (For more details, see Drury, 1973).
A full acount of the above three points will be discussed in the
last section of this chapter.
The previous discussion of the problematic nature of psychiatric 
definition inevitably leads us to question the clinical reality of 
conditions described as mental disturbance. In the following pages, 
we will examine the concept of mental illness when applied in a clinical 
or research setting or in actual practice and we will show how such 
a concept poses different theoretical and practical questions which 
need to be resolved.
U 7
The Concept of Mental Illness: The Clinical
Boundaries and Limitations
"If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we 
know them?" (Rosenhan, 1976, p.28)
In general terms, there is a great deal of controversial 
data on the reliability, validity, and meaning of such terms as are 
used to define the concept of mental illness (Webster, 1985; Martin,
1985; McGuire, 1973; Rosenhan, 1973; Kendler, 1987; Fabrega,
1987; Schacht, 1985; Gorenstein, 1984; Beck in Davison and Neale,
1986; Ennis and Litwack in Helzar, 1977 ; Ward et al in Helzar,
1977; Fuhrer, 1986; Ben-Tovim, 1985; Simon and Zusman, 1983;
Mezzich et al, 1985).
As noted earlier, the lack of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an accurate applicability of psychiatric definitional 
terms and the presence of overlapping and inconsistent criteria for 
the description of mental phenomena, have contributed to the low 
degree of validity in the definition of mental illness (Macklin,
1981; Costello, 1970). For that reason, some groups of mental health 
professionals have pointed to the need for a careful and detailed 
system of definition and classification of mental illness (e.g. DSM-IV 
and ICD-10 are in the process of research and development in the 
hope that such new editions of the above systems would solve the 
current problem in psychiatric definition and classification of mental 
illness) .
Another group of mental health professionals and researchers 
represented by Szasz, Laing, Leiffer, Scheff, etc., argue as previously 
mentioned, for a radical change in the current system of definition 
of psychiatric disorders and the need to free the definition of mental 
phenomena from concepts such as disease, health, and other medical 
terms.
The above controversy which centres around the validity 
of the concept of mental illness does not mean that abnormality, 
or mental suffering do not exist. Nor does it imply that psychiatric 
labels are totally devoid of objective significance, are wholly lacking 
in diagnostic criteria, or are totally discontinuous with labels 
concerning physical illness. Such labels and feelings do exist in 
reality, but the 'clinical* diagnoses or labels which follow from 
such conditions as "schizophrenia", or "manic-depressive psychoses" 
or different forms of mental illness in general may be "less substantive 
than many believe them to be" (Rosenhan , 1976, p.28).
Now, if we believe that mental suffering or anxiety represent 
real clinical symptoms in the medical sense, can we accept the psychia­
tric interpretation of such symptoms? In other words, would the 
presence of such symptoms within the general framework of psychiatry 
as a medical profession justify the interpretation of such symptoms 
as residing inside the patient, or can such symptoms be related to 
the environment? Again, if we consider the DSM-III definition of 
mental illness, for example, it reflects the assumption that the 
individual's total life and experience is irrelevant or can be easily
separated and controlled when conducting a mental state examination.
In recent years, the above assumption has been debated on the ground 
that mental health professionals are more likely to develop a false 
estimate of the extent of their actual knowledge and awareness of 
environmental and psychological factors (Mechanic, 1985). What is 
more, such factors tend in many cases to be misleading and confusing 
when considered in the context of a single disturbed experience rather 
than within the totality of the individual's experience and functioning.
The above mentioned clinical limitations of the concept 
of mental illness are well illustrated in a controversial study by 
Rosenhan ( 1976) in which eight normal people succeeded in admitting 
themselves to twelve mental hospitals by claiming that they suffered 
from certain hallucinations and anxiety. All of them except one 
received the definition of schizophrenia and although they then started 
to behave normally, it was fifty-two days before the last one gained 
release. "Patient engages in writing behaviour" was one of the nursing 
notes discovered on one of the pseudo-patients who was never asked 
about his writing. Clearly, the hidden assumption was that since 
the patient is in a mental hospital, therefore, he must be mentally 
unhealthy. Consequently, "writing behaviour" must be an evidence 
of such mental disturbance. Thomas Szasz (1983) illustrated this 
point by stating:
"In psychiatry the classificatory act functions 
as a definition of social reality. As a result, 
no one committed to a mental hospital can be 
"normal" because his very commitment defines him 
as "mentally ill"." (p.212)
In reality, even if the patient is discharged from the hospital after 
being 'cured', he will still be considered by 'others' as potentially 
'sick' and every single instance of behaviour which doesn't fit the 
general expectation would be considered as a sign of potential breakdown 
and a real threat to the acceptable norms of 'healthy' personality.
Now, Rosenhan believed that the fact that his pseudo-patients 
were diagnosed as mentally ill, even though they did not display 
a group of interrelated symptoms is a prima facie evidence that normal 
individuals or people with an average 'problem of living' can be 
differentiated from the seriously abnormal one. But, according to 
Rosenhan ( 1976):
"When the sanity of the pseudo-patient was never 
discovered, serious implications and challenges 
should be raised to those who support the trad­
itional modes of psychiatric diagnosis." (p.251)
Thus, Rosenhan's study shows clearly that it is very difficult to 
conceptualise a clear dividing line or a neat boundary between normal 
and abnormal behaviour. In other words, the grouping of mentally 
healthy individuals at one end of the spectrum and mentally ill people 
at the other end is difficult to accept.
Another study which demonstrates the unreliability of 
psychiatric diagnosis is that of Aaron T. Beck and his colleagues 
in Davison and Neale (1974). Beck and three other well-qualified 
psychiatrists diagnosed 153 pat ients during their admissions to 
the psychiatric hospital. The psychiatrists used DSM-III in their
diagnostic procedures. Although the psychiatrists had met to discuss 
the DSM-III criteria before interviewing the patients, they reached 
two different diagnoses. The reason for disagreement between them, 
according to the study, was due to the lack of clarity in certain 
criteria in the manual. The differentiation between criteria which 
was needed was too fine, and the presence of these particular criteria 
was not specific enough. As a result, the diagnostician would be 
obliged to use non-specific or general criteria rather than specific 
one. That is to say, the clinician would be more in favour of using,
for example, the criteria for "schizophrenia" rather than for
"Hebephrenic or latent type".
Lipkowitz and Idupugant in Cohen and Cohen ( 1986) have 
shown in a related study that there are significant disagreements 
between mental health professionals over the interpretation of many 
psychiatric terms such as 'schizophrenia1.
A case study by Simon and Zusman ( 1983) concluded that
a psychiatrist who was hired by the respondent's side in the courts 
will reach a different conclusion than the plaintiffs one. In both 
groups of psychiatrists, their questions were formulated in such 
a way as to gather certain expected information that is most appropriate 
to satisfy the policy of the institution rather than the benefit 
of the patient himself. For example, the plaintiffs' psychiatrists 
were more prone to see disease, while the defendents' psychiatrists 
tended to oppose any affirmations about the presence of disease in 
the person (contextual effects).
Another study by Fuhrer (1986) on 136 French psychiatrists 
led the researcher to conclude that they were using their experience 
more than the DSM-III in respect of certain Axes.
Finally, Ben-Tovim ( 1985) has conducted a research study 
on the applicability of DSM-III in Botswana. Ben-Tovim discovered 
that citizens in Botswana do not really believe that long-term problems 
are serious or display a need for psychiatric intervention. Therefore 
it is difficult to apply Axis II (personality disorder and specific 
developmental disorders) in this country. The researcher emphasised 
the fact that some psychiatric conditions are culturally specific, 
for example, Axis IV (which assumes a long-term marital separation 
as an indication of severe stress). In Botswana, marital separation 
is not viewed as causing severe or even mild stress due to the poor 
quality of grazing land in this country which requires most people 
to take their cattle to be grazed elsewhere. Additionally, in Axis V 
child and adolescent adaptive functioning is significantly related 
to school performance, whereas in Botswana, Ben-Tovim maintained, 
education is not compulsory and it is very normal for children to 
be absent from school for a long time or even not to attend at all.
The studies discussed above indicate the difficulties in 
specifying a clear and workable system for the classification and 
understanding of the concept of mental illness. It must be re-emphasised 
that the crucial factor which is responsible for such conceptual 
limitations of the concept of mental illness is that many mental 
health professionals refuse to allow socio-cultural factors to enter
in their diagnosis of conditions described as mental illness. That 
is because they view such factors or values either as unspecific 
and too diverse, and thus incapable of being put under scientific 
control or prediction, or as 11... a state of affairs existing somewhere 
beneath a person's skin" (Rimm and Somerville, 1977, p.36).
Leiffer (1969) describes the above problem stating that 
"To claim that mental illness has a meaning independent of psychiatric 
social functions and values is analogous to claiming that money has 
a meaning outside of the economic system in which it is used" (p. 111). 
That is to say, the concept of mental illness is not a "neutral, 
value free, concept" (Scheff, 1970).
One cannot deny the fact that "varying customs and accepted 
behaviour in different cultures necessarily precludes a universally 
applicable conception of mental illness" (Macklin, 1981, p.399 and 
see also Feinstein in Anthony Clare, 1980). The absence of a compre­
hensive psychopathological view of human behaviour that is acceptable 
to most mental health professionals in the field, creates many theor­
etical and practical obstacles in providing a universal applicable 
criterion for the definition of mental illness (Macklin, 1981). Even 
in the same culture, however, the concept of illness fluctuates from 
time to time. Consider the problem of "homosexuality". Before 1974, 
homosexuality was defined as sexual dysfunction and represented a 
central criterion under psychosexual disorders in the DSM-III. However, 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA), under continuous pressure 
from different liberation groups (such as Gay Movement), voted in
1974 to drop homosexuality from the classification of mental disorders. 
In fact, a careful anthropological study of different societies would 
reveal many differences in the definitions of what constitutes 
psychiatric conditions and in the interpretations of those conditions 
(see a study by Baskin, 1984). Thus, it is very difficult to conceive 
of any possibility of applying the DSM-III view of appropriate standards 
of mental health and illness to all cultures because this system 
of diagnosis is largely established on American values, culture and 
private philosophy which are by no means universal.
Consider, for example, the two fundamental American values 
of self-reliance and personal strength, which have created unsympathetic 
attitudes towards individuals who are 'weak' and not 'self-reliant* 
(Townsend, 1978). If, on the other hand, we consider an Islamic 
context, it would see that Muslims are more in favour of adopting 
a code of ethics or conduct which is centered on the notion of respon­
sibility towards others. God is the ultimate power, therefore Islam 
accepts weakness, helplessness, or disease. What is more, Islam 
emphasises the importance of the responsibility of every individual 
for the well-being of society and the obligation of every member 
of society for the welfare of others, which should equal his obligation 
to himself. Another cultural value in Islam is that the 'true' Muslim 
must be completely dependent upon God, in whom he believes, as his 
guide, director and supporter. According to the Quran:
"Say: Nothing will befall us other than that
which Allah [God] has decreed for us. He is 
our patron; and in Allah let believers rely 
and put their trust." (II, 59: V.5I)
Thus, God-reliance rather than self-reliance is the basic 
value in Muslim countries. Now, when examining the value of being 
'strong', important concepts in Islam need to be analysed. In Islam, 
being disadvantaged or poor or needy is an honourable state which 
receives a significant value among Muslims.
That is because the more patience or tolerance the individual 
shows towards his weakness, the more he gains a higher rank among 
believers in the hereafter. In fact, the sick or the weak are con­
sidered by Muslims to be close to 'God'. "If a man has only his 
Islam and his health, it is sufficient for him" (The Holy Prophet). 
AccorcUng to the Quran:
"Your wealth and your children are only a trial.
Whereas Allah with him is an immense reward."
(6, S 64: V. 15)
Thus, in Muslim countries, the best man is not the strong 
one, but the one who is useful to mankind or who loves his brother 
(other Muslims) as he loves himself and the one who can tolerate 
his weakness or disease without complaint. What would be expected 
as a result is that a long-term impairment and a chronic feeling 
of weakness or he lple ssness would not be taken as evidence of mental 
illness in any Muslim society.
Although the culture-specific nature of the concept of 
mental illness and its conceptual limitations has been established, 
that does not prevent many mental health professionals from holding 
the belief that there are predetermined genetic factors underlying
the problem which will be discovered in due time. (For more details 
on the arguments for and against medical and genetic determinism, 
see Bloch and Reddaway, 1984; Szasz, 1987; Schacht, 1985; Millon, 
1983; Persons, 1986; Coleman 1967; Kety, 1971; Sarbin, 1967.)
Such a belief, as mentioned earlier, motivates some mental health 
professionals to regard mental illness as permanent with constant 
deterioration regardless of later behaviour and social functioning 
(Coleman, 1967; Tarrier, 1979). Thus, many psychiatrists are con­
ditioned to believe that mental illness refers to a long-lasting 
defect in the 'patient's' personality and has a poor prognosis. 
Moreover, when the psychiatrist designates a person as mentally ill, 
such definition does not imply that the patient's thoughts or behaviour 
or beliefs are irrational, but that the individual himself as a whole 
is irrational (Moore, 1982). Even if the 'patient' manifests episodic 
reasonable behaviour from time to time, the clinician's response 
"... may be overdetermined by the detail, without due regard to other 
features now occurring with in. The response is thus determined 
by past contexts rather than by present contexts. It is therefore 
likely to be bizarre, inutile, maladjusted, and hence neurotic ..." 
(Hollingworth in Ullman and Krasner in Millon (ed.), 1973, p.300). 
Moreover, when judging the individual behaviour as bizarre, irrational, 
or 'delusional', such terms are not merely a 'description' of his 
behaviour as the DSM-III claims, but in reality imply a 'prescription' 
of how to deal with the labelled individual (Szasz, 1987; Clare,
1976; Rem, 1982; Leiffer, 1969).
Thus, by stating that the person is not mentally healthy 
or 'abnormal' the clinicians place themselves in a situation where 
they have to take some sort of action usually by means either of 
technical intervention procedures such as the use of psychiatric 
medication throughout the application of involuntary commitment as 
in the case of Mr. Duzynski or of 'non-technical interventions' such 
as counselling or psychotherapy (usually by means of voluntary pro­
cedures). Ironically, the voluntary patient will soon discover that 
it is difficult for him to gain discharge from any therapeutic procedures 
without the prior approval of the psychiatrist in charge. Such shifting 
from a voluntary to non-voluntary position is a common practice for 
many psychiatric patients, especially in the Third World countries.
It seems to the present writer, however, that the problem 
of the evaluative component of the definition of presented symptoms 
largely stems from the fact that what mental health professionals 
actually define is the form rather than the content of the symptoms.
Mr. D's spending behaviour was viewed as representing a radical depart­
ure from the socially acceptable norms of charity. A careful analysis 
of Mr. D's spending behaviour within the context of his total life 
and psycho-social functioning would surely change the definition 
of his rationality.
The question which needs to be addressed here is why 
psychiatrists generally give little concern to the importance of 
the patient's subjective meaning and the content of their disturbance. 
C.G.Jung (1960), in his book "The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease"
answered the above question by stating that:
"the medical student, being overburdened with 
specialised studies, cannot allow himself to 
make digressions into the realm of philosophy, 
and is subjected exclusively to the influence 
of materialistic axioms. As a consequence, 
researchers in psychiatry are concerned mainly 
with anatomical problems, so far as they are not 
pre-occupied with questions of diagnosis and 
classification. Thus the psychiatrist generally 
considers the physical aetiology to be of primary 
importance and the psychological aetiology to be 
only secondary and subsidiary; and because of 
this attitude he keeps in view only causal 
connections of a physical kind and overlooks
their psychological determination .....
Physicians have often assured me that it was 
impossible to discover in their patients any 
trace of psychological conflicts or of psycho­
genic symptoms, but just as often I found they 
had carefully noted all the incidents of a 
physical kind and had failed to note all those 
of a psychological kind ... because of a typical 
undervaluation of the importance of the psycho­
logical factor." (p.212)
It is true, as Jung argued, that medical students put great 
emphasis on the biological basis of behaviour rather than its psycho­
social origin. In actual practice, however, the problem occurs when 
the resident psychiatrists try to deal with people classified as 
'mentally ill' by relying on their medical training. The problem 
with general medical training is that it was originally established 
for solving defects in the body rather than defects in behaviour.
The above limitations have led many resident psychiatrics 
to "become obsessively pre-occupied with conventional medical details 
as a reaction to the vagueness and uncertainty of psychiatric principles" 
(Halleck and Woods in Light, D., 1980, p.247).
A further consequence of the uncertainty of general principles 
and definitions in psychiatry is that diagnostic or definitional 
terms are used in an uncommitted way. Most psychiatrists and residents 
do not take the DSM-III terms, for example, very seriously due to 
the lack of content and meaning of many psychiatric terms. This 
has motivated many psychiatrists to compensate for the defects in 
their definitional terms, by using their personal inclinations rather 
than the DSM-III information to make a diagnosis. Furthermore, they 
endorse techniques (treatment) without giving a great deal of thought 
to the impact of such therapeutic procedures on the patient's problem.
In fact, the general medical training of psychiatrists has made them 
minimally sensitive to the fact that mental illness can only be compre­
hensible and intelligible when the individual's psycho-social identity 
is taken into account (Rack, 1982).
The central problem with general medical training is that 
it shapes the psychiatrist's methods when dealing with individuals 
suffering from certain 'problems of living' (Szasz's term). As a 
result, the psychiatrist's questions are phrased in a manner that 
assumes a pathology in the person rather than something which might 
be'the result of external environmental pressures. An example of 
the promotive questions that are cited in Light (1982) are: "Do
you have any trouble with your mother?" (This question can give 
the individual the right to deny or to agree on the information implied 
in this question.) The above question, although it suggests context, 
rather than inner pathology, can be framed in a way that can assume 
any response from the patient, so that even a denial would be an
indication of pathology or a sign of symptoms. The question becomes: 
"Tell me about your trouble with your mother?" (Ibid., p.40).
Sooner or later, psychiatrists or residents have to come 
to terms with the fact that their discipline is largely governed 
by conflicting models of interpretations and unspecified aetiology 
of mental illness. Being mentally ill, for many psychiatrists, is 
a very serious fate and the notion of a cure is no more than a myth.
As a result, many mental health professionals are accustomed to applying 
diagnostic labels without giving them much concern. Moreover, they 
have to face in their practice 'healthy looking' patients who are 
presumably sick and their diagnostic system must help them in detecting 
the abnormality of such cases (Light, 1982). Because of this, many 
psychiatrists tend to rely mainly on the episodic phases of psychosis 
for example, or on third party claims (as previously mentioned), 
rather than on the actual behaviour of the 'patient's' total functional 
performance to prove pathology underlying the presence of abnormality 
(Meyerson and Hamilton, 1985). For that reason, DSM-III puts great 
emphasis on the "shared descriptive clinical features" between people 
rather than on the understanding of the cause of mental disorders 
(Spitzer, 1985). Thus, whenever the aetiology factors or the content 
of mental illness is "... weak, the diagnostic descriptions or criteria 
become culture-specific" (Wig, 1983, p.83) and more socially determined. 
That led psychiatrists to justify their medical status by assuming 
that at the "bottom all mental illness has an organic basis and can 
be treated most effectively by physical means" (Caine & Smail, 1969,
This, however, is not to say that psychiatry, as many writers 
such as Scheff (1966 and 1975), Laing (1960 and 1983), Gove (1982),
Szasz (1987), Fernando (1988) claim, is completely governed by 
uncertainty and moral values or cultural factors. In actual practice 
mental health professionals have to use in their daily practice workable 
categories and practical psychological tests to identify many psycho­
logical symptoms such as 'withdrawal', 'delusion , 'hallucination', 
and so on. However, because such symptoms, as mentioned previously, 
differ in the way they manifest themselves in each society and since 
they may occur in perfectly normal people, employing a strict moral 
criteria in the diagnosis of human problems obscure rather than facilitate 
any effective psychiatric remedial intervention. Nevertheless, there 
are certain clear-cut forms of mental illness which cannot be inter­
preted on the basis of moral and cultural criteria exclusively.
What mental health professionals need, however, is a balance or a 
compromise between the necessity of promoting the patient's moral 
status or values and the need for a workable psychiatric classification. 
Such balance between moral values and workable psychiatric classific­
ation will be discussed in detail in following chapters.
Pushing the argument further on, let us first of all 
highlight the relationship between the psychiatric definition system 
on the one hand and the patient's moral agency on the other hand.
The definitional limitations and the moral agency of the
labelled individual:
"In medicine it is possible to act as if there 
were no right or wrong streptococci, merely 
dangerous ones. In psychiatry there is a formal 
effort to act as if the issue is treatment, not 
moral judgement, but this is not consistently 
maintained. Ethical neutrality is indeed difficult 
to sustain in psychiatry, because the patient's 
disorder is intrinsically related to his acting 
in a way that causes offence to witnesses." 
(Goffman, 1961, p.318)
Although ethical neutrality is difficult to maintain in the psychiatric 
definition of mental disorders, most psychiatrist will
"... dispute that their ideas on mental illness 
have any moral significance ... It is common for 
psychiatrists to regard their work as a kind of 
technology, which is seen as a means for producing 
a certain result (viz. mental health) which can 
be objectively defined. And it is often argued 
that just because the goal of therapy is 'object­
ively definable’, the only relevant criterion for 
evaluating the success of therapy is in terms of 
its efficiency in achieving this 'objectively 
defined' goal, and therefore that moral consider­
ations do not play any part. According to this 
view then ... a judgement of illness is not a 
value-judgement, but an objective and factual one; 
and psychiatric theory is a scientific theory which 
neither raises nor answers any moral questions." 
(Sayers, 1973, p.2)
Moreover, just because it is difficult to avoid a moral view of the 
individual problem, that does not mean that the diagnosis is itself 
inherently a moral judgement. Nevertheless, the diagnosis may still 
have morally sensitive possibilities. If, for example, the individual 
is diagnosed by the psychiatrist as having some sort of personality 
or psychosexual disorder, the form of treatment as a result would
be 'counselling* or 'rational-emotive therapy' or some other kind 
of 'psychotherapy1. If, however, the 'patient' is believed to have 
certain psychotic or affective disorder, the psychiatric intervention 
would take a totally different shape. The main 'therapeutic' pro­
cedures with the psychotic would imply 'ECT', 'anti-psychotic medication' 
and major tranquillizers with a long-lasting side-effect (see Torrey, 
1974). The question which arises from this argument is why the 
therapeutic intervention is different in both cases.
It seems that psychiatrists have two concepts of management 
when dealing with neurotics and psychotics. Being 'neurotic' would 
lead to the assumption that the 'patient' is valid, is capable of 
rational choice, is aware of others, is educated, has an insight 
and is a full human being. The neurotic patient, for psychiatrists, 
belongs to a group of well-educated people who need a careful interview, 
good counselling and high respect because they are capable of under­
standing. The psychotic, however, in the mind of many mental health 
professionals is highly associated with dangerousness, agitation, 
unpredictability, excitement, withdrawal, bizarre thoughts and behaviour 
with a complete lack of insight (out of touch with reality) (see 
Torrey, 1974). Thus, such bizarre thoughts and severe symptoms need 
a severe and bizarre treatment to 'restore' the patient's autonomy.
In fact, many psychiatrists ignore the episodic nature of psychotic 
symptoms and the capability of the psychotic patient to be prima 
facie capable of rational choices (Wear, 1980).
However, writers such as Jung (I960) believe that the 
ability of mental patients to function adequately is an indication 
of "... early signs of a defensive nature. This is a symptom of 
weakness, not of strength" (p.244). Thus, for such writers, even 
positive 'normal1 behaviour is interpreted as a sign of 'mental 
weakness'.
Such pessimistic attitudes have led many mental health 
professionals to be sensitive and alert to their reactions towards 
the labelled individuals. Therefore, it is not surprising to find 
that a central part of the training programme for new mental health 
professionals in many mental hospitals, in terms of effective relations 
with 'psychotics1, implies the following instructions:
"Don't get caught in collusionally false 
sentimentality. If you give them an inch 
they'll take a mile. Keep your distance.
Keep them in their place. Don't lose yourself
in 'over-identifying' with them. Don't 
inflame the psychotic process by rewarding 
psychotic symptomatology."
(R.D.Laing, 1985, p.28)
The above quotation from Laing shows clearly that being 
'mentally ill' can create a set of negative attitudes which can maintain 
and strengthen the general beliefs that occupying the role of mental 
patient - that is that he represents a radical deviation from socially
acceptable definitions of competency and moral agency to something
that can be best characterized as not fully human.
Now, if the basic attitudes among mental health professionals 
are essentially grounded on the assumption that mental illness equals 
losing one’s moral and rational agency and free will, then the treat­
ment prescribed must also obviously be tailored to fit such assumption.
Consider, for example, the application of behaviour therapy 
procedures to both ’psychotic' and 'neurotic' individuals. The 
behavioural model works on the belief that 'patients' can easily 
be manipulated and their behaviour can be remodelled according to 
the stimulus-response methods without any concern to the free-will, 
self-determination, and personal responsibility of such 'patients'.
For behaviourists, the reality of mental symptoms must 
be understood as the result of a mechanistic correlation between 
traumatic stimulus and faulty conditioned response (C.Rs). A young 
girl who saw her mother die while crossing the street one evening, 
would develop a conditioned depressive reaction towards a specific 
time of the day (i.e. the evening) because sunset correlates with 
her mother's death. The treatment procedures would be controlling 
"... the symptom itself, i.e. by extinguishing unadaptive C.Rs and 
establishing desirable C.Rs" (Eysenck, 1973, p.343). One could then 
imagine that the treatment of the young girl would employ certain 
recreational activities at sunset or the control of the anxiety 
impulse through desensitization methods or any other behavioural 
method, such as aversion or modelling, etc. Surely, the above approach 
is too simplistic and the way our problem develops and the methods 
we employ to deal with our troubles are too complicated for any
single correlation method to explain (for more details on the behav­
ioural methods, see Wolpe and Rachman, 1974; Dollard and Hiller,
1973). (See Chapter Three.) Although it cannot be denied that 
such behavioural methods may have a therapeutic effect on the patient's 
total function, it is doubtful whether such behavioural principles 
could operate effectively if the patient did not confront and experience 
the expectations or the demands of such techniques by employing his 
free will, or was not advised and governed by his total reasoning 
and intention in activating his autonomous purposeful decision to 
stop the 'bad habit' or the 'pathological behaviour' (Ledermann,
1982).
In the 'token economy' therapy with the 'chronic' psychotic 
patient, the procedure is 'working successfully' not because of the 
superiority of such techniques, but for other hidden factors. A 
central unnoticeable factor is the 'psychotic' motivation to change.
The 'psychotic' will surely behave 'positively' as the psychologists 
want (e.g. washing alone - eating by himself - decrease the aggressive 
behaviour, etc.), but that does not necessarily indicate an effective 
therapeutic agent implicit in such procedures (i.e. postive-negative 
reinforcement). That is because i/ofien. 'tokens' represent for the 
patients the only method to satisfy basic needs in the wards (cigar­
ettes, sweets, drinks, etc.), "patients work for them" by behaving 
in a way the staff expect them to behave (Bloomfield, 1976, p.79). 
Psychotics might decide to stay calm in the hospital and perhaps 
they hope to remain in the hospital for a long time. Such decisions 
taken by 'patients' might possibly reflect a logical choice that
is implemented by manipulating their behaviour (Braginsky in Townsend, 
1978). Laing (1983) described the above by stating that:
"... behaviourist theory comes to determine all
decisions taken on what is to be done to you and 
me who are inadvertently implicated by way of being 
stuck on as utterly redundant appendages." (p.29)
Laing ( 1983) goes on to argue that being scientific or objective 
does not have to lead psychiatrists to ignore or disregard the patients' 
motive and intentions or to treat others as 'things'. The 'scientific'
or behavioural methods when applied to both 'psychotic' or 'neurotics'
may not actually take into account that individual's system of values, 
his motives and his experience which are devoid of objective content.
The patient's subjective experience and his personal motivation can 
never be duplicated, or reproduced or put under control by S-R methods 
as they occur in an objective experiment (see Laing, 1960, 1983).
Mr. D's case illustration which was presented by Drury 
in Clark and Winch (1970) and discussed earlier in this chapter, 
is an excellent example of how the understanding of the individual's 
system of values and his subjective experiences would facilitate 
any real attempts to define or classify the presented symptoms (a 
more detailed analysis of Mr. D's case will be presented in Chapter 3).
Now let us examine the relationship between the psychiatric 
terms and the moral agency of cases such as Mr. D and Mr. Duzynski.
In both cases, the definition of mental illness invalidates their 
claim - "You are an invalid, and what you say is therefore invalid:
You are sick because your label says so ..." (Dr. Alexander Mitchell 
in Clare, 1976, p.62).
It could be argued, therefore, that once the psychiatrist 
labels a person as 'mentally ill', he (the person) becomes invalid, 
and in some way, not fully human. He is not valid because he is 
not healthy. He cannot deny the description of his total life and 
experience as mental illness because no matter how much rationality 
or partial functional effectiveness he exhibits, there is a somatic 
pathology underlying his problem and predispositional factors which 
undermine any 'pretended rationality' and make him vulnerable. Thus, 
the concept of mental illness when used in practice promotes the 
meaning that both Mr. D and Mr. Duzynski's behaviour for example 
is involuntary, irresponsible, and unaccountable, "but this none 
the less involves a technical schema, not a social one, and ideally 
ought to disqualify the patient for any participation in the service 
relation even while qualifying him as an object of service" (Goffman, 
1961, p.317).
Invalidation of the individual 'patient' is done either 
by labelling him as 'mentally ill' or by 'physical restraint' (Berke, 
1977; and Klerman, 1977). The problem basically arises when applying 
the 'sick' role, which is basically derived from the medical model 
to psychiatry. Such application had led many mental health professionals 
to hold the belief that being 'mentally ill' implies 'irresponsibility' 
for one's behaviour. Thus, the 'patient' needs a medical intervention 
to restore his responsibility. Moreover, the application of the
medical model or sick role in psychiatry had consequently led to 
consider terms such as "illogical thinking", "metaphorical speech", 
"magical thinking", etc., (Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria 
from DSM-III (mini-D), pp. 103-106) not as implying a possible sign 
of the presence of mental illness but somehow as mental illness in 
itself. That is to say, for most mental health professionals, the 
above terms do not in themselves represent a description of the 
individual’s 'bizarre' behaviour which might indicate the presence 
or absence of mental illness. Instead, such terms are taken to stand 
for mental illness itself (Light, 1982). As Szasz (1987) puts it 
"mental symptoms do not point to a possible illness, they are (the 
same as) a mental illness" (p.97). As a result, the clinician would 
interpret the individual's 'symptoms' not as something that merely 
indicates to a possible irrationality, but as evidence that the 
individual himself is really irrational.
Consider, for example, the DSM-III's definition of "Anti­
social Personality Disorder". Such a definition tends to view the 
sociopath or psychopath as displaying a group of symptoms such as 
expulsion from school for misbehaviour, lying, irresponsible parenting 
unorganized sexual relations, low school grades, violations of rule 
at home or school and refuse to accept social norms, etc. (For more 
details see Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-III, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1980, pp. 179-182).
The above symptoms may or may not be a result or a conse­
quence of 'abnormality' of personality (Blackburn, 1988). Furthermore
the above descriptions are not in themselves personality characteristics 
Such symptoms are not always present at the time of psychiatric evalu­
ation. As a result, it is the past history of 'sociopathics' behaviour 
that counts. The past history rather than the presence of a real 
symptom or 'hard evidence’ of pathological deviation in the individual's 
personality, makes the above definition of Antisocial personality 
"little more than a moral judgment masquerading as a clinical diagnosis" 
(Ibid., 1988, p.51 1).
In addition, when the concept of mental illness is applied 
in 'clinical' settings, the resultant effects on the individual patient 
tend to be very negative. In practice, the concept of mental illness 
is generally a set of societal value standards (Scheff, 1975; Szasz,
1987). When such a concept is attached to any given individual, 
it would "mark his deviation from one or another of these standards 
[societal value standards], rather than describe and explain his 
conduct. It labels him as bad, it justifies his isolation from the 
group, it classifies him as in need of behavioural and thought reform, 
and it deprives his actions of social legitimacy" (Leiffer, 1969, 
p. 114). If a Kuwaiti patient, for example, is diagnosed as 'homosexual' 
this label immediately sets him apart from the rest of 'normal' Kuwaiti 
society. The problem is that such terms use an evaluation, yet are 
paraded as value-neutral scientific explanation. Thus, the concept 
of mental illness when applied in psychiatric practice promotes the 
meaning that the 'patient' is unreliable as a human being and he 
will sooner or later "degrade from full existential and legal status 
as human agent and responsible person to someone no longer in
possession of his own definition of himself, unable to retain his 
own possessions, precluded from the exercise of his discretion as 
to whom he meets, what he does. His time is no longer his own, and 
the space he occupies is no longer of his own choosing" (Siegler,
Osmonde and Mann, 1972, pp. 102-103). In other words, he (the patient) 
is "out of touch with reality", thus he misinterprets the events 
around him. As a result, the patient cannot be taken seriously.
Scheff (1975) reacts against the above morally negative image of 
the mental patient by arguing that schizophrenia, for example, is 
defined by psychiatrists on the basis of "withdrawal", "flatness 
of effect", "thought disorder", language aberrations, and hallucinations 
or delusions. For Scheff, such image will surely lead to a view 
of the schizophrenic as a "passive, inward-dwelling, remote person 
who lacks interpersonal and other competences that other members 
of the society see as necessary to maintain or improve one's status 
in society" (Ibid., p. 17). Such an image of the mentally ill individual 
might lead the authorities in a given society to undermine or weaken 
the importance of "equitable dealing, the preservation of liberty, 
and beneficient treatment ..." (Brody, 1985, p.60).
Thus, Mr. D and Mr. Duzynski can be viewed as "justifiably 
persecuted scapegoats" (Szasz, 1973, p.239) because their psychiatrists 
perceive their behaviour as closely connected with a list of negative 
concepts, such as: unintelligibility, unpredictability, unfitness,
incomeptency, unawareness, etc. (Szasz, 1972, 1973, 1984, 1987;
Moore, 1982, 1984). Accordingly, preservation of liberty and equitable 
dealing will be considered as a secondary matter.
From everything said so far, it becomes clear that our 
concern is not really with the possibilities that psychiatric labels 
may have an objective content or that such labels might have in the 
future an accurate operational criteria of diagnosis. Rather, our 
main concern is with the moral and ethical consequences of such 
psychiatric labels. Thus, it seems morally and practically desirable 
to limit the act of labelling to the very extreme and clear cases 
only and these are very few in psychiatric daily practice.
Accordingly, a plausible proposal would be that instead 
of trying to find commonality of symptoms or cause or lesions, mental 
health professionals in all countries have a moral obligation to 
investigate the actual process of labelling a person as mentally 
ill, the moral outcome of such labelling, and the significance of 
the individual's total functioning as reflected in psychiatric inter- 
pretat ion.
In conclusion, what mental health professionals need is 
not more revised editions of psychiatric manuals, but a humanistic 
and responsible consideration of the implication, meaning, and the 
consequences of being labelled as mentally ill. That is because 
"the very naming can damage the patient whom we essay to help" (Karl 
Menninger in Macklin, 1981, p.394). Throughout this chapter, the 
discussion acknowledges the damaging results which follow from placing 
a person into the class of 'mental illness', whether this classification 
has been made on subjective grounds or on the basis of actual symptoms 
displayed by the 'patient'. Surely, the most damaging effects result
from the application of the concept of mental illness to people who 
are not radically ill. Ironically, it is a fact that a high proportion 
of mental hospitals' inmates, in most countries, receive a diagnosis 
of 'schizophrenia' (the most common diagnosis of mental illness).
In other words, most individual who have been admitted to mental 
hospitals are likely to be classified as 'mentally ill' (schizophrenic) 
rather than suffering from some sort of temporary personality or 
anxiety disorder.
A proposed definition of mental disorders
As mentioned earlier, the current definitions of mental 
disorders have received a considerable discussion among philosophers 
and mental health professionals in general. The definition of mental 
illness includes not only 'medically' objective terms but also socio­
political decisions (see Scheff 1971, Goffman 1961, Szasz 1987).
The gross abuse of psychiatry in many countries (e.g. Soviet Union) 
highlights the vulnerability and the limitations of the concept of 
mental illness in psychiatry.
Bearing in mind the subjective and evaluative nature of 
psychiatric diagnosis (see Cohen and Cohen, 1966), it seems difficult 
to be objective, not necessarily unsystematic, when defining mental 
illness. What hinders mental health professionals in establishing 
a consistent view towards mental illness is the complexity of psychiatric 
phenomena. A person who receives the diagnosis of 'schizophrenia', 
for example, might have an acceptable degree of insight, be able
to develop an adequate or moderate dealing with his everyday problems 
and prima facie, be self-governing. Another group of patients with 
a diagnosis of floating anxiety, on the other hand, might be 
uncontrollably tense and disoriented (Berke, 1977).
This has led us to emphasise the fact that being disturbed 
in one particular context does not necessarily mean that one should 
be labelled as 'mentally ill' and treated as such. One specific 
form of behaviour could be perceived by others as representing a 
major defect in reality testing. But it is doubtful whether such 
a single disturbed behaviour should be classified as a sign of 'illness1 
if the individual's total psycho-physio-social functioning shows 
little or no evidence of any significant radical deterioration from 
the acceptable healthy standards (Wear 1980 and Edwards 1983).
In the present writer's view, it may be useful to consider 
an account of mental illness which provides a morally rather than 
a conceptually advanced perspective of mental disorder by emphasizing 
the following aspects:
1. Mental illness is neither a necessary condition nor a consequence 
nor is it linked with physical or brain lesions.
2. The "mental patient" must be viewed as a unique person who has 
the right to evaluate his own suffering, and not as a type of 
'disorder' with a mechanical cause.
3. Mental illness is basically related to the individual's total 
ability to function effectively in the psycho-physio-social aspects 
of his life.
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4. Assessment for total failure in all the individual's major 
function is a necessary condition for deciding whether it is 
a case for treatment or not.
5. The individual's personal account of his functional failure is
a sufficient condition for determining the degree of such failure.
These five aspects will be discussed and defended in the following 
chapters.
In conclusion, it might be more appropriate to consider 
mental disorder as a condition where an individual suffers from a 
temporary radical total functional failure in all his major psycho­
physio-social functions. A temporary total failure might interfere 
profoundly with his problem-solving abilities and with his ability 
to cope effectively with the tasks of life.
The above definition which will be called a "Reactive 
functional disorder" (RFD, for short), does not necessarily mean 
that being in an RFD condition implies the presence of 'pathological 
manifestations' with underlying causes, or that an exact definition 
of a condition described as RFD will reliably reveal the causal chain 
of the disorder and the appropriate treatment to be used. Neither 
does it imply prima facie that the labelled individual lacks the 
will to be rational or that bizarre or illogical symptoms such as 
imaginary perception, or unjustified conceptions, or inappropriate 
emotional expression are recognised and identified by their causes 
rather than by the way in which they present themselves or the way 
they are experienced by the individual himself.
1 1 8
It must be emphasized here that the 'patient’s' verbal 
report and his personal claim about his total functioning is more 
important than a third party claim in any psychiatric attempt to 
define the 'normality' of his functional effectiveness.
The reality as perceived by the 'patient' (Rogers, 1951) 
and the way the patient's perception might interfere with his insight 
is a crucial point to be considered in any psychiatric decision.
The above account attempts to incorporate some of the 
aspects of mental illness often omitted by current definitions, i.e. 
that psychatric disorder is basically related to functional disturbance 
as perceived by the 'patient' himself. It also tries to highlight 
the terminological limitations implied in accepted descriptions of 
mental illness and the negative consequences of such terminology 
on the 'patient's' moral agency. Terms such as "mental", in general, 
continue to motivate many mental health professionals to focus on 
inner unverified mental factors rather than external observable functions 
(Sarbin, 1967). Nevertheless, the term 'mental illness' remains 
a nebulous and fluid concept for it is intrinsically difficult, if 
not impossible, to draw clear and definite boundaries when dealing 
with human behaviour. This is because the reasons for such behaviour 
are inaccessible to direct physical examination. Consequently, the 
application of the medical or disease model which is highly preferred 
by many psychiatrists is misleading and confusing in many cases.
'Out of touch with reality' or 'disorder of thoughts' - terms which 
are considered to be highly scientific - fail to show whether the
patient has total or partial functional failure or to consider the 
moral agency of the labelled individual.
Therefore, symptomatic behaviour can be more adequately 
conceptualised in terms of specified functions as they are perceived 
by the patient himself rather than by relying on an ambiguous and 
unspecified symptom usually reported by significant 'others'.
Conclusions
A careful analysis of the current definitional system in 
psychiatry will lead to a conclusion that could be best viewed as 
disappointing (McGuire, 1973). That is to say that no exclusive 
definition of mental illness exists which is approved by all mental 
health professionals. Thus, while it is true to say that the DSM-III 
or ICD-9 provide a single definition of mental disorders, not all 
countries use these manuals in their practice of psychiatry (Cooper,
1988). Moreover, even in the same country (for example, Kuwait), 
some mental health professionals use in their diagnostic practice 
ICD-9 or DSM-III, while other professionals do not use any manuals 
or use both of the above mentioned manuals.
The above argument is basically related to the fact that 
to classify human problems is not an easy task that could be done 
in an objective way as many mental health professionals believe.
The individual's concept of his suffering is something that cannot 
be understood by reference to certain laws of generalisation because
it is too diverse and much more limited to the individual’s particular 
life experience. Moreover, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to detect and follow the individual’s mental problem to its early 
stage or basic roots and cover sufficiently all aspects of the problem 
That is to say that there is a problem of ’rarity’ or conceptual 
clarity with which a particular psychiatric symptom can have a precise 
causal relationship to the presence of the symptoms (Kanfer and Saslow 
1973).
For that reason, most psychiatric classification schemes 
put a greater emphasis on the description or frame rather than the 
content of the disturbance.
In view of the almost complete lack of accurate aetiological 
perspective of most mental disorders, the inherent pejorative connot­
ation and evaluative component of the concept of mental illness, 
and the ineffectiveness of most psychiatric treatment, one could put 
forward the following question:
What is the point or the value of psychiatric definition and class­
ification of mental phenomena anyway?
We have suggested that the negative consequences of 
psychiatric definition are outweighed in many instances by the value 
of such a definition. A proper system of identification of the 
individual problem is the crucial requirement. For the purpose of 
classifying and identifying the people who need psychiatric help, 
we need a careful study of how to define and classify the individual
problem in a way that promotes the patient's feeling of respect and 
minimizes the morally negative outcomes of such definition.
In the present writer's view, a Reactive Functional 
Disorder Model is the best possible alternative. Such a model emphasises 
the importance of the individual's ability to recognise and define 
his need for psychiatric treatment. Moreover, such a model concept­
ualises a human problem as a total failure in the major psycho-physio- 
social functioning and not just as a partial failure. Mental health 
professionals, according to the RFD model, would be interested in 
specifying the kind of functions which are fully disturbed. Their 
job would be more effective if they adopted a view or a concept of 
autonomous "contractual" psychiatry which was developed originally 
by Szasz (1987). In lcofttractual' psychiatry, the 'client' is 
totally free to enter either a therapeutic or diagnostic psychiatric 
relationship with the psychiatrist. A detailed account of the above 
points will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Introduct ion
The current position of the concept of mental illness is 
the target of a deep psychiatric and philosophical discussion. 
Conflicting conceptual models of mental illness and the lack of reliable 
causal interpretation of psychiatric symptoms in current psychiatric 
manuals have both contributed to render the concept vulnerable to 
abuse.
The different conceptual models which are currently in 
use in psychiatric practice are as follows:
(i) the medical model;
(ii) the psychodynamic (psycho-analytical) model;
(iii) the behaviour model;
(iv) the social model.
The above models of mental illness were originally established in 
the hope that they would facilitate understanding of the concept 
of mental illness in terms of the identification of mental phenomena 
and treatment of mental disturbance. None of these models, however, 
have succeeded totally in providing a conclusive and workable definition 
and treatment procedure for mental disorders. The models are illus­
trated in the following pages.
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In addition, throughout this chapter an attempt is made 
to highlight and analyse the problems of psychiatric diagnosis and 
terminology as expressed in the DSM-III. It is further argued that 
the adherence of the DSM-III to the medical model makes psychiatric 
procedures less responsive to the actual needs of individual patients 
with psycho-social problems.
In many cases, unfortunately, psychiatric diagnoses go 
far beyond the actual symptoms of patients and present a definitional 
image that is entirely different from the patient's actual condition. 
Moreover, as we have already established in Chapter Two, the current 
diagnostic terms in the DSM-III give the impression, to both clinicians 
and individual patients, of chronicity, irreversibility and long- 
lasting dehumanising effects. At best psychiatric diagnoses are 
a limited and inexact evaluation of the reality and uniqueness of 
individual psycho-social backgrounds, and at worst they can stigmatise 
and dehumanise a person for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, 
despite the many conceptual limitations of the concept of mental 
illness, many clinicians still adhere to the use of DSM-III diagnostic 
terms.
To avoid some of the problems outlined above, the present 
writer proposes to view mental illness as a Reactive Functional Disorder 
(RFD). This term emphasises the idea of totality in studying functional 
disturbances in that it regards mental illness as a total failure 
of the psycho-social and possibly the physiological functioning of 
the individual. The emphasis here is on the concept of abnormality
as related to functions and not just as unspecified symptoms. A 
full analysis of this model will be presented in this chapter.
The Current Conceptual Models of Mental Illness 
and the Problems of Explanation
From a historical and traditional perspective, the definition 
and hypothesis of mental illness has been established by social, 
theoretical and political forces which have led to the inclusion 
or exclusion of conditions such as homosexuality on political, social, 
and moral grounds rather than scientific ones, and to the formation 
of specific criteria as in the Soviet diagnostic system to incorporate 
many political dissenters (Szasz in After Dark, 1988). The models 
which are currently in use in the mental health professions are con­
flicting in the way they explain human behaviour because they are 
grounded on limited and often biased concepts of mental illness 
(Lazane, 1981). Many theories and models of mental illness have 
been developed, not on the basis of new experimental data in the 
field, but in the absence of new valid theories needed to dispute 
the current models of mental illness (Tyner and Steinberg, 1987).
As a result, the definition of mental disorder often 
reflects the principles and hypotheses of different schools and models 
which are difficult to refute. The disease or medical model, for 
example, regards mental disorders as a consequence of physical or 
chemical change in the brain or the body (although such organic basis 
has not been well established in many of the cases psychiatrists 
treat). Psychiatric intervention would consequently aim to cure
the underlying pathological disturbance and to "ensure a sense of 
wellbeing" (Peele, 1981, p.816). Another model in psychiatry is 
the psychodynamic model. This model could be identified by analysing 
the basic assumptions on which the psychoanalysis school is based.
The psychoanalysis school put a great emphasis on making the inner 
mental process and the forces which interact with it more accessible 
to direct assessment (Skinner in Moore, 1984). This led Freud and 
many of his followers to emphasise the process of understanding and 
explanation of human behaviour as an expression of internal events 
rather than external factors. Freud's explanation of psychiatric 
disorders is based on the belief that environmental factors can stimulate 
the inner mental structures of the individual with disturbed behaviour. 
Such interaction between external factors and inner mental process 
would be manifested in the form of compromising symptoms (see Bloch, 
1982).
However, the problem of psychoanalytical interpretation 
is that the association in the causal chain is not often clear or 
specific. In fact, in many cases such a link turns out to be mis­
leading when external factors are 'remodelled' into 'conscious' and 
'unconscious' experience (Skinner, 1953), terms which hinder rather 
than facilitate a genuine understanding of the complexity of human 
behaviour. This is a view which firmly places the individual at 
the mercy of his past conflicts and the forces of his repressed emotions 
or unhappy experience, thus depriving him of the power to determine 
his life through conscious thought, belief and action. For psycho­
analysis "... there is nothing trivial in mental life" (Bloch, 1982,
p.69). In other words, human action and thoughts must be thought 
in terms of 'psychic determinism' (Ibid., 1982).
Behaviourists, on the other hand, believe that mental 
disorder is a learned behaviour which puts the individual in conflict 
with himself and society. Such inappropriate learned behaviour is 
the 'illness', not the pathology of the brain. The treatment plan, 
therefore, is to establish a new model of learning habits which replace 
the 'bad' learned behaviour. Such a view of mental disorder is useful 
in terms of problems that involve specific variables (e.g. phobias 
from specific objects). In severe mental illness, however, such 
behavioural learning procedures are not applicable because they are 
too simple and because treatment strategies based on the ideology 
of S-R are being applied in a simplistic and mechanistic fashion 
to human behaviour as if it (the behaviour) is something independent 
from the human. Moreover, S-R's ideology does not take full account 
of the immense variety of factors which contribute to the totality 
of individual experiences.
In practice, alcoholics do not stop drinking alcohol merely 
because of the application of aversive behavioural techniques (e.g. 
positive response to alcohol might be followed by electric shock 
as a negative reinforcement) (Ledermann, 1982). The theoretical 
aims of such behavioural techniques are to control and to reconstruct 
the negative or the 'weak will' of the patient. For behaviourists, 
the ability to decide or to act autonomously cannot be considered
as an effective variable in any estimation of whether the patient 
is capable of facing the problem or not.
The ’patient* for the behaviourist is a 'passive',
'deficient' and 'helpless' object (Fairbairn and Fairbairn, 1987) 
who occupies the role of 'patient' as a result of S-R correlation.
In addition, the problem with the behaviourists' approach is their 
complete reliance on an impersonal machine-like approach in dealing 
with human problems. By applying methods and scientific procedures 
to the understanding and treatment of individual symptomatic behaviours, 
they are likely to ignore or undermine the subjective reality of 
thought, experience and an individual's systems of values (Walker,
1984). Whereas, as Walker (1984) argues, in reality an individual's 
"conscious thoughts and beliefs are among the most important determin­
ants of their actions and behaviours, both in mental illness and 
in health" (p.146).
Finally, the social model of mental illness considers the 
influence of social and familial factors as an important element 
in the causation of mental illness. This model emphasises the role 
of pressure groups, cultural stereotype attitudes towards mental 
health, environmental factors (e.g. social and economic influences), 
and current experienced problems and social events. For the social 
model, the impairment is the result of an inability to fulfil role 
expectations or social norms. The treatment orientation of such 
a model, therefore, would be either to make changes in social and 
environmental factors or to consider the 'labelled' individual as
not really ill. For them, he is victim of a residual stereotyped 
concept of conformity which reinforces his role status as someone 
who is different from others and hence 'abnormal'. (For more details, 
see, Scheff, Lemert, Laing, Goffman.)
Clearly, these conceptual models in psychiatry are clear 
evidence of the problems psychiatry suffers when attempting to make 
sense of human behaviour.
Although not all the models outlined above share the same 
scientific status some models (such as the behavioural one) are 
considered to be more advanced than others because they are built 
on experimental grounds or they incorporate a large amount of case 
histories, they all seem to be, to different extents, inadequate 
in providing a sufficient explanation of abnormality (Gorenstein,
1984). This is because human behaviour is far too complex for any 
of the above models to establish a universal concept of mental illness.
The RFD model presented here was developed in the hope 
that it might fill some of the gaps, specifically, the moral perspective 
of psychiatric labelling, left by current conceptual model of mental 
illness, and perhaps help to shift some of the generally accepted 
perspectives on what constitutes mental illness.
It is our belief that mental illness cannot be as easily 
conceptualised in terms of a defect in one major function (e.g. organic 
or social or psychological or behavioural) but is best viewed within
the 'total* function of life. The models listed above attempt to 
highlight factors responsible for the patient's suffering, or the 
symptoms of such suffering. Such models tell us little, however, 
about the individual 'patient' as a whole in terms of, for example, 
his ability to function in spite of his suffering, or his ability 
to determine his own course of action, or his life in general. The 
resultant presumption is that the patient's symptoms or suffering 
constitute a major defect in his/her personality traits or an inapprop­
riateness of early experience or some general and fundamental weakness 
in the patient's make-up. It seems, therefore, that no one model 
offers a sufficient and comprehensive explanation of the concept 
of mental illness. The models discussed above merely provide an 
interpretation of individual functional behaviour consistent with 
the principles and ideology which govern the logical structure of 
the model. In schizophrenia, for example, if the suffering is considered 
to be a manifestation of a pathological inner agent, the condition 
would be treated by physical means (the medical model). If, on the 
other hand, the patient's past family history or his inner conflicts 
are perceived as responsible for his problem, he would be transferred 
to a psychotherapist (The psychoanalysis model.) Finally, if his 
problem is interpreted as a reflection of inappropriate learning 
habit, token economy therapy would be viewed as the best course of 
action. (The behaviourist model.)
The above example shows that the psychiatric implications 
of such models are highly contradictory and that the patient might 
receive different and confusing messages. To illustrate the problems
further, consider the following case which was seen by the present 
writer. Ms N is a 28-year old single Kuwaiti woman, a lecturer at 
Kuwait University. She was convinced that she had lost control of 
her bladder and that her clothes were therefore permanently permeated 
with urine.
Ms N was a religious woman who prayed and fasted at the 
prescribed times and this was the basis of her problem. A praying 
Muslim must be 'Taher' or 'ritually clean'. This involves washing 
the hands, feet and the head before praying. Many things can make 
a person 'unclean' and therefore not fit for praying. These include 
the passing of urine, stools or wind, sexual intercourse or falling 
into a deep sleep. The case's main clinical feature was a mild depressive 
state because she often felt unclean due to her unrealistic but persis­
tent idea that she was urinating in her clothes. Therefore she had 
to wash thoroughly before every prayer. If she accidentally splashed 
some water on her clothes, she would believe, upon noticing the wet 
marks, that the water had mixed with the urine on her clothes. If 
she sat down on chairs while in this state she believed the furniture 
itself became unclean and was anxious if her family sat on them lest 
they become unclean by contact and their prayers rendered invalid.
This led the patient to engage in obsessive cleaning behaviour.
This behaviour (washing her body, clothes and the furniture) lasted 
for two to three hours daily. Ms N had few friends and was unmarried.
This is not considered normal in an Arabic country where women usually 
marry at an early age and have many friends of the same sex. Never­
theless, and inspite of her condition, Ms N was an accomplished
lecturer. Her mother believed that her daughter was suffering from 
irrational and illogical beliefs and she was very anxious about her. 
Eventually the mother telephoned the emergency room at the psychiatric 
hospital in Kuwait and asked for advice. The psychiatrist in charge 
advised her to bring her daughter to the hospital. As a result of 
the family pressures and psychiatrist's advice, Ms N admitted herself 
to the hospital. She had previously refused psychiatric help because 
she thought her problem would be regarded as insignificant by pro­
fessionals. Moreover she thought it would solve itself. During 
the admission procedures, she was very embarrassed about her problem 
and felt ashamed that other professionals knew about it. After the 
routine evaluation, she was given a course of mild tranquillisers 
(Ativan 2 mg.) to help her cope with her obsessive behaviour (medical 
model). After two weeks she was subjected to brief psychoanalysis 
(psychodynamic model). According to the psychoanalyst in charge, 
her obsessive compulsive behaviour was due to feelings of guilt 
because of having masturbated ten years before. Two months later 
she was subjected to behaviour therapy (systematic desensitisation).
One year later the patient reacted negatively to her hospital 
experience. She isolated herself even further because of the stigma 
of being an ex-mental patient and eventually she took a long vacation 
from the university because she was unable to carry out her duties.
The present writer recently received a letter from her in which she 
described how the admission procedures (the opening of a file, being 
issued with a card, etc.) had led her to fear that she was seriously 
disturbed. (It must be pointed out that the patient herself had
been aware, prior to admission to the hospital, that her belief and 
behaviour were irrational, but had hoped that her condition was not 
serious and would right itself eventually.) It seems that after 
treatment, her morale, far from improving, had deteriorated in that 
she felt unable to make decisions about her personal life any more 
and felt she needed psychiatric help for virtually all her current 
problems. Although Ms N ’s obsessive behaviour had obviously caused 
her a lot of suffering, ’suffering' in itself is not pathological. 
Suffering in bereavement, for example, is a justified emotional expression 
and not pathological. Ms N's mother and the psychiatrist in charge, 
however, presumed unhappiness as the basis for applying the concept 
of psychiatric disorder. The point which needs to be made here is 
that if happiness and unhappiness were to be used as yardsticks to 
measure the 'normality* of behaviour, then most of us would find 
ourselves in a psychiatric hospital at some time or other in our 
lives. The question, as Szasz (1973) puts it, is "what kinds of 
behaviour are regarded as indicative of mental illness, and by whom?"
(p. 15). It is wrong, Szasz maintains, to apply a general or a hypo­
thetical term such as the concept of mental illness in the name of 
medicine, to problems whose very existence is not medical in nature.
Thus Szasz rejects the inclusion of the concept of mental illness 
in the classification of a medically valid illness and instead he 
proposes 'problems of living’ as an alternative concept.
Clearly, Szasz’s position on mental illness conflicts with 
the medical model (Gorenstein, 1984). However, mental illness will 
not disappear and mental patients will not be cured by Szasz's arguments
(see Roth, 1976). In fact, as we mention in previous chapters, Szasz 
does not claim to provide mental health professionals with a workable, 
conceptually advanced alternative for the concept of mental illness. 
Rather, as we shall see in the following chapter, he presents an 
ethical account of the concept of mental illness.
The above case shows clearly that mental health professionals 
are not always able to provide a convincing and logical answer to 
many human problems or personal difficulties. Problems emerge when 
mental health professionals, in spite of their clinical limitation, 
promise virtually every individual patient that there is always a 
psychiatric clinical answer to his problems, regardless of whether 
the presented complaint is relevant to psychiatric expertise. In 
reality, mental health professionals cannot always keep their promises 
because of the inherent limitation of their field and can merely 
give logical answers for their failure. For that reason, clinicians 
often put a great emphasis on the contributory effects of unintellig­
ibility and irrationality in individual behaviour, rather than the 
ability of the individual to function in spite of his suffering.
This may well be a way to conform their role status as reliable clinicians 
who have the ability and the professional knowledge to detect 'patho­
logical' mechanisms underlying the 'illogical* behaviour (Price and 
Denner, 1973; Schatzman, 1972; Farrell, 1979).
In psychiatric practice in general there are a number of 
patients who are diagnosed as psychiatric cases although their problems 
might be moderate, adjustable problems which are generally shared
by others who make an effective adaptation without any kind of psychia­
tric intervention. Infrequent, mild delusions or occasional feelings 
of depression or anxiety may interfere little or not at all with 
the psycho-social functioning of the individual (see Berke, 1977). 
However, the clinician ’’may impute undue significance to particular 
symptoms that occur commonly and that are self-limited" (Shepherd,
M. et al in an Editorial Paper presented at the 72nd Annual Meeting 
of the A.S.A., 1978, p.385). That is because the psychiatrist needs 
to protect his image as a clinician who can easily judge the abnormality 
of any given behaviour. Moreover, not validating the patient's personal 
claim of his problem or the family's report of distress would upset 
both the patient and his family and eventually questions regarding 
the physician's professional validity and the efficacy of psychiatric 
services in general would be asked.
In fact, many mental health professionals believe that 
accepting and confirming the patient's personal claim of distress 
has a positive therapeutic benefit such that the individual whose 
"complaints, worries or fears have appeared unreasonable and irritating 
to those around him, finds some sympathy and understanding after 
illness has been diagnosed and treatment begun" (Miles, 1987, p.203).
Thus psychiatric procedure "produces a bias toward over­
treatment, subjecting some patients unnecessarily to risks of iatrogenic 
illness and stigmatisation" (an Editorial Paper presented at the 
72nd Annual Meeting of the A.S.A., 1978, p.385). Instead of stimulat­
ing the individual's willpower to cope with life's stresses, the
clinicians may have emphasised trivial symptoms stressing the belief 
that there is some sort of impairment residing inside the individual. 
The problem of psychiatric abuse occurs when the psychiatrist, in 
addition, feels some sort of obligation to find 'anything' that can 
count as disturbance in the patient, in order to reinforce or validate 
the family claim of illness without any regard to the patient's general 
ability to function in spite of his problem. A possible explanation 
for this kind of practice is that when the psychiatrist faces an 
overlapping and unspecified symptom, this might cause him an embarrass­
ment in front of his colleagues or in the presence of the patient's 
family or the police, etc., through failing to relate the symptoms 
to a plausible interpretation or diagnostic criteria, this would 
create doubt regarding the validity of what he learned or his clinical 
skills in general. Such dilemma might lead the psychiatrist to ignore 
or misperceive vague symptoms, or he might hold an episodic phase 
of disturbance as a positive indication of impairment. Ms N, for 
example, was able to carry out most of her daily duties effectively 
in spite of her obsessive compulsive behaviour. Szasz (1973) refers 
to cases like this by arguing that individual patients are rational 
and aware of themselves and the environment around them. Such an 
awareness^ Szasz believed, must not be ignored.
As already established, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment 
depend on the model of mental illness to which the mental health 
professional adheres, the nature of therapeutic relation between 
professionals and patients, his personal experience, the institutional 
norms, and whether the patient is motivated for the therapy or not
(as the amount of available data for evaluation will be relatively 
small if the patient is not motivated). Such variables interfere 
with the psychiatrist's ability to interpret and conceptualise the 
individual's problem and may lead to misinterpretation. To illustrate 
the above points, and the problematic nature of the concept of mental 
illness in general, consider the following case which was interviewed 
by the present writer. Mr. B is a 21-year old single Kuwaiti man 
who was a student and had a good part-time job in the Ministry of 
Information in Kuwait. Two years ago, while in the last year of 
secondary school, he became attracted to another male student. This 
student was good looking, articulate and popular with the other boys 
in the school. Mr. B was lacking in such characteristics, which 
was largely due to his disturbed family background. His father was 
a cruel, over-protective man who isolated his children, refusing 
to let them mix with others, and frequently punished them if they 
disobeyed him. Mr. B admired Mr. A and subsequently he established 
a friendly relationship with him. Gradually he became more and more 
attached to him, to the extent that he started feeling jealous if 
he saw Mr. A talking to another boy. He shared his problem with 
Mr. A. The two boys would meet socially outside school hours, eating, 
drinking and talking together. Mr. A accepted the relationship as 
a normal school friendship. When they finished secondary school, 0 
Mr. A went to the University of Kuwait to study English. Mr. B did 
the same in order to be near Mr. A even though he had no interest 
in English. At this stage in the relationship, Mr. A began to with­
draw from Mr. B because he was becoming worried by the intensity 
of the relationship. Mr. A did not want to be seen at university
if\(j male companion. Mr. B sensed his withdrawal and 
his academic performance and family relationship began to deteriorate 
as a result. Mr. B's father contacted a friend who is a psychiatrist 
in the hospital for help. Under the combined pressure from the family 
and the psychiatrist, Mr. B agreed to admit himself to the hospital.
On admission the psychiatrist diagnosed him as 'homosexual' and advised 
him to stay away from Mr. A. Mr. B began to feel that his relationship 
with Mr. A was considered immoral and 'dirty', and eventually became 
depressed and frustrated. He was eventually referred to the present 
writer for psychotherapy. From subsequent sessions, it transpired 
that Mr. B believed he had found in his relationship with Mr. A the 
love and understanding that was lacking in his family. It was from 
Mr. A that he learned how to talk to others, how to dress appropriately, 
etc. However, the psychiatrist in charge, with the co-operation 
of a psychologist, interviewed Mr. A and advised him to disassociate 
himself from Mr. B due to the 'threat' of a possible 'homosexual' 
motivation on the part of Mr. B. M r . A has now left the university 
and has gone to the United States to study English ( in order to escape 
from Mr. B!). The case felt that he had been mis-diagnosed, and 
that his life had been ruined by the suggestion that his deep friend­
ship was somehow 'immoral'. As a result he has become very depressed.
While examining his file, the writer discovered that Mr. B 
had been given more than one diagnosis. The first one was 'homosexual' 
accompanied by 'depression', the second diagnosis wass 'simple schizo­
phrenia' (due to disturbance in his work and family relations, with­
drawal symptoms, emotional disturbance and hypociondff’ia). Accordingly,
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he was subjected to twenty sessions of ECT as well as a course of 
anti-psychotic medication. The present writer could find no symptoms 
of simple schizophrenia in the case. During the interview, Mr. B 
told the writer that he had none of the problems listed above before 
'psychiatric treatment'. He thought that his friendship with Mr. A 
had been misinterpreted and accordingly he developed a reactive 
depression.
Before the psychiatric treatment, Mr. B had conducted his 
life in an effective way. He had been an average student at the 
university, had driven a car, planned a future that included marriage. 
Now he felt his life had fallen into pieces. The university dismissed 
him because he was absent for one year. He started having problems 
at work and had several car accidents.
It is obvious from the above case that the diagnosis of 
the clinician involved was based on the subjective moral belief that 
deep friendship between the same sexes is unnatural and leads to 
emotional disturbance which requires psychiatric intervention.
Dr. Ewald Busse in Bloch and Reddaway (1977) has summed 
up the above point clearly by arguing that psychiatry should not 
be in the business of determining human values.
In dealing with cases such as M r . B, it is necessary for 
mental health professionals in general to consider the concept of 
'neutrality' in their diagnosis and treatment plans (Plog and Edgerton,
1969; Wear, 1980; Gorenstein, 1984; Fabrega, 1987). Psychiatrists 
must be unbiased and impartial towards moral and personal issues.
The professional ability of psychiatrists to impose their decisions 
must be done without denying the right of Mr. B, for example, to 
expect a decision relevant to his total life. In many psychiatric 
cases the problem arises when the patient's behaviour is interpreted 
in terms of moral appropriateness. Moreover, the psychiatrist tends 
to judge the 'psychiatric patient' within the general framework of 
psychiatric efficiency standards. However, in many psychiatric cases, 
it is difficult to define objectively or accurately the efficiency 
of behaviour because the concept of efficiency as related to any 
given behaviour is in itself a value-laden term. For some psychiatrists, 
incompetent behaviour would imply non-conformity or residual deviation 
(troublesome behaviour for example), while others interpret inefficient 
behaviour as behaviour which escapes any standardised norm of evalua­
tion or prediction, therefore constitutes a threat to the individual 
himself or society in general (e.g. bizarre behaviour, suicidal 
threats, etc.).
The question which arises from the case illustrated above 
and the discussion which followed is this: was the functional or
behavioural effectiveness or efficiency of Mr. B diminished or increased 
by psychiatric treatment? In fact, as pointed out earlier, Mr. B's 
mental health noticeably deteriorated after the psychiatric treatment 
due to the fact that many mental health professionals had under-estimated 
or ignored the content, purpose, and meaning of his behaviour by 
interpreting it in sexual terms. The official diagnostic manual
of the APA - DSM-III was established in the hope that symptomatic 
behaviour could be specified in objective and clear-cut norms, but 
it has failed to do so because of the many controversial issues regarding 
the problematic nature of the concept of 'mental illness', i.e. because 
symptomatic behaviour implies abnormal vis-a-vis normal. The question 
of what is exactly normal or abnormal, and for whom, and many other 
related problematic issues need to be specified accurately before 
any proposed definition of what constitutes "symptomatic behaviour", 
and hence psychiatric disorder can be established. In saying that, 
one must bear in mind that the individual's psycho-physio-social 
functions are inter-related and interact in their total methods of 
operation, and differ greatly in degree in different ways. Therefore, 
diagnosis of any disturbance in these functions must acknowledge 
the "interlocking and graded nature" (Farrell, 1985, p.5) of such 
functions. Accordingly, it is difficult to appreciate any attempt 
to classify individual disturbed functions in "separate boxes" (as 
analogous to physiological functions) as in DSM-III and many classific­
ation schemes (Ibid., 1985).
DSM-III and the Concept of Mental Illness: A Conceptual Analysis 
The nature and structure of DSM-III
This manual, published as DSM-III in 1980, was later modified 
on its third edition (DSM-III-R). The manual has been established 
in the hope that it will facilitate communication among mental health 
professionals, for the keeping of statistical records on the occurrence 
of several types of individuals' problems, and for planning treatment.
As we have already established, many of these aims have not been
reached.
The manual is basically oriented towards the description 
of the individual's suffering rather than explaining it in terms 
of causes. In fact, DSM-III-R encourages psychiatrists to depend 
heavily on 'impressionistic' clinical judgement or their experience 
(e.g. when estimating the severity of a disorder) (Sarason and Sarason, 
1987, see also Rey et a l , 1987; Spitzer, 1985).
Another characteristic of the manual is its use of a multi- 
axial system. This means that no patient will be classified into 
a single category, instead the definition will be in the form of 
a group of symptoms that are distributed in five axes:
Axis I : incorporates "clinical syndromes, conditions not attributable
to a mental disorder that are a focus of attention or 
treatment" (e.g. fear of heights) (Quick Reference to 
The Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-III, 1980, p.5).
Axis II: involves personality disorders and developmental disorders;
Axis III: involves physical disorders that are relevant to the psychi­
atric condition (the patient's previous history of some 
sort of chronic physical disease, for example);
Axis IV: provides a rating of the severity of psycho-social stresses
that are defined as being significant in the development
of the disorder (e.g. divorce, traumatic accidents, etc.);
Ax is V : permits the psychiatrist to make an evaluation of the
individual's highest level of adaptive functioning during
the past year. (The DSM-III specifies adaptive functioning 
as three major areas: social relations, occupational
functioning and use of leisure time) (Ibid., 1980, pp.5-17).
DSM-III and the Concept of Mental Illness
There would be little doubt that a newly graduated psychia­
trist would probably view Mr. D's over-spending behaviour (see Chapter 
2) as representing a "gross impairment in reality", or "incorrectly 
evaluates the accuracy of his or her perceptions and thoughts", or 
"incorrect inferences about external reality", etc. (DSM-III, p.404).
Such a description of Mr. D's general psychiatric condition 
is obviously based on the assumption that the concept of 'reality' 
can be either 'correct' or 'incorrect' - and that mental health pro­
fessionals are adequately equipped to judge such distinction.
In order to validate the above description of Mr. D's 
spending behaviour, psychiatrists use a highly technical term - which 
is not, in fact, very different in nature from terms used by the 
lay public. That is to say, instead of describing Mr. D as 'mad', 
'bad', or 'wrong', a psychiatrist would use terms such as 'illogical' 
or 'irrational' thinking or similar words. 'Bad' in clinical terms 
would be 'incorrectness of perception or evaluation'. 'Wrong* in 
the psychiatric formula would mean 'inappropriate' or 'incompetent' 
act. Such descriptions whether made by the public or psychiatrists 
do not provide a detailed personal account of a case like Mr. D.
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Accordingly, one wonders how pyschiatrists can ever be sure of their 
judgemental accuracy of the significance of, for example, Ms N's 
unrealistic and persistent idea that she was urinating in her clothes, 
or the clinical reality of Mr. B's deep friendship with Mr. A.
No such assurance can be attained because the nature 
and content of the cognitive and motivation system or the psychological 
machinery underlying behaviour is simply not yet well understood.
In reality, only Mr. D, Ms N and Mr. B can know exactly 
the boundaries of their suffering and their true abilities and limit­
ations to face their present problems. "The scientific enquiry may 
help us to understand some of the mechanisms by which an experience 
[of Mr. D, Ms N and Mr. B] occurs; it tells us almost nothing about 
the experience itself. For the experience is not happening in the 
brain ... but in a person and a person is far more than the sum of 
his biological system" (Runions, 1984, p.224). Thus, current psychiatric 
diagnostic procedures still suffer from methodological problems of 
validity and reliability when attempting to evaluate the subjective 
experience or the significant motivation of behaviour of the individual 
'patient* by "objective" and "accurate" methods.
In many cases, the psychiatrist goes far beyond the actual 
symptoms of the patient to something else. In other words, the 
psychiatrist can translate many minor problems of behavioural conduct 
far beyond the actual limits of such problems (Straus et al, 1969). 
Consider, for example, Mr. B's close friendship with Mr. A when taken
as an indication of homosexuality. Another example would be Mr. D's 
spending behaviour to the poor which presumably is viewed by the 
admitting psychiatrist as a sign of 'psychosis'.
In other words, the psychiatrist's definition of the patient's 
symptoms lacks, in many instances, an accurate perspective and that 
is why psychiatrists tend to use in their diagnostic schemes terms 
such as "the person is more likely to ...", or "he is nearly ...", 
"often", "almost", "some", etc. (e.g. the depressed patient "is likely” 
to commit suicide "if"...) (Robins and Helzer, 1986), or to support 
their terms by using statistical explanations which are more convincing 
to the public and other medical societies (Gove, 1982). Such terms 
show clearly how the psychiatrist's definition of the patient's present 
symptoms have a low level of probability. Such a low degree of 
probability can be seen evidently when one considers the presence 
of different overlapping criteria and ill-described categories in 
the DSM-III, such as "undiagnosed psychiatric illness" or "atypical 
disorder" (Robins and Helzer, 1986) which indicate the residual category 
of the disorder. Furthermore, the presence of exclusion criteria 
in DSM-III such as the phrase "not due to" creates many practical 
problems because it is very difficult to define exactly in terms 
of an operational manner how one disorder can emerge or be separate 
from other disorders. Depression, for example, cannot be established 
easily as being 'caused by' phobia (Boyd et al, 1984). Such terms 
make the concept of mental illness more vulnerable to abuse by mental 
health professionals. The process of abuse begins with cases such 
as M r . B in which his 'close friendship' symptoms do not accurately
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satisfy the precise criteria of DSM-III and therefore the psychiatrist 
is free to designate Mr. B as in the category of "unidentified 
psychiatric disorder" (ibid., 1984) or any such psychiatric description.
Moreover, Mr. D's response to a command from the Gospel 
can be viewed as having 'paranoid personality disorder' or 'paranoid 
schizophrenia'. That is to say that the limits between such disorders 
are blurred because the concept of the above disorder and many psychia­
tric labels are not totally comprehensible or consistent in their 
view of the different forms of human suffering (Gorenstein, 1984;
Monroe, 1982).
Pushing the argument even further, let us quote the descrip­
tion of "schizophrenic disorders" criteria, as it appears in the 
DSM-III, in order to get a clear picture of how difficult it is to 
conceptualise mental illness in clinical practice:
A. At least one of the following during a phase of
the illness:
(1) bizarre delusions ... such as delusions of 
being controlled, thought broadcasting, 
thought insertion, or thought withdrawal;
(2) somatic, grandiose, religious, nihilistic, 
or other delusions without persecutory or 
jealous content;
(3) delusions with persecutory or jealous 
content if accompanied by hallucinations 
or any type;
(4) auditory hallucinations in which either a 
voice keeps up a running commentary on the 
individual's behaviour or thoughts, or two 
or more voices converse with each other;
(5) auditory hallucinations on several occasions 
with content of more than one or two words 
having no apparent relation to depression
or elation; (this criterion is in itself 
bizarre, it could include almost anyone);
(6) incoherence, marked loosening of associations, 
markedly illogical thinking, or marked poverty 
of content of speech is associated with at 
least one of the following:
(a) blunted, flat or inappropriate affect;
(b) delusions or hallucinations;
(c) catatonic or other grossly disorganised 
behaviour.
Deterioration from a previous level of functioning 
in such areas as work, social relations, and self- 
care .
Duration - continuous signs of illness for at 
least six months ... The six-month period must 
include an active phase during which there were 
symptoms from A, with or without a prodromal or 
residual phase, as defined below:
Prodromal phase - a clear deterioration in 
functioning before the active phase of the 
illness not due to a disturbance in mood or to 
a Substance Use. Disorder involving at least 
two of the symptoms noted below.
Residual phase - persistence following the 
active phase of the illness of at least two 
of the symptoms noted below not due to a 
disturbance in mood or to a Substance Use 
Disorder.
Prodromal or Residual Symptoms:
(1) Social isolation or withdrawal;
(2) Marked impairment in role functioning as 
wage-earner, student or homemaker;
(3) Markedly peculiar behaviour (e.g. collecting 
garbage, talking to self in public, hoarding 
food);
(4) Marked impairment in personal hygiene and 
grooming;
(5) Blunted, flat or inappropriate affect;
(6) Digressive, vague, over-elaborate, circum­
stantial, or mataphorical speech;
(7) odd or bizarre ideation or magical thinking, 
e.g. superstitiousness, clairvoyance, 
telepathy, "sixth sense", "others can feel 
my feelings", overvalued ideas, ideas of 
reference;
(8) unusual perceptual experiences, e.g. recurrent 
illusions, sensing the presence of a force or 
person not actually present.
The full depressive manic syndrome (criteria A 
and B of major depressive or manic episode), if 
present, developed after any psychotic symtoms,
or was brief in duration relative to the duration 
of the psychotic symptoms in A.
E. Onset of prodromal or active phase of the illness 
before age 45.
F. Not due to any Organic Mental Disorder or Mental 
Retardat ion.
(Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-III
(Mini-D), pp. 103-106)
However, it is questionable whether all of the above criteria 
or symptoms have to be present when making a diagnosis. The presence 
of some would be a sufficient condition for labelling someone as 
schizophrenic. The problem, however, is that even a selection of 
the above symptoms is very rarely found in a single individual patient. 
Moreover, the psychiatrist may have noticed only some of the symptoms 
mentioned above because the patient did not manifest the others at 
the time of the interview. In fact, only a limited number of patients 
show the classic 'textbook symptoms' (Townsend, 1980).
Thus, few psychiatrist would hesitate to view Mr. D's 
spending behaviour as an indication of impairment in his social function­
ing, as bizarre delusions (command from the Gospel), and odd thinking. 
Thus, he is schizophrenic. In fact, mental health professionals 
have the ability to label any individual as schizophrenic. Ms N's 
irrational behaviour, for example, might be considered by some 
psychiatrists as implying the presence of thought disturbance. There­
fore, Ms N too might be diagnosed as 'schizophrenic' or vulnerable 
to schizophrenia, or she might suffer from 'latent' schizophrenia.
Our final example is Mr. B whose close friendship with 
Mr. A implies the presence of emotional disturbance or "inappropriate 
affect" and whose present deterioration in social functioning (e.g. 
work and school achievement) is taken as an indication that he is 
' schizophrenic'.
In DSM-III it is quite possible for the 'clinician' to 
diagnose Mr. B as schizophrenic in the absence of hard evidence of 
any deterioration in his total functioning. Mr. D was presumably 
admitted to the mental hospital on the basis of a single reference 
that represented auditory hallucination (command from Jesus). Mr. B 
and Ms N were admitted on the basis of their family claim when the 
families reported that their children suffered from strange behaviour, 
even though all the above cases show an acceptable level of functioning 
in their total life.
In many cases, even if the individual manifests a simple 
deterioration in his social functioning, but is able in one way or 
another to manage to function in an acceptable standard within his 
work,sat isfying his biological needs and so on, psychiatrists still 
tend to consider that such partial deterioration in his social function­
ing is a signal of a more general and significant deterioration in 
his total functioning which is bound to occur in due time (e.g.
Daithesis - stress theory which implies a genetic vulnerability to 
schizophrenia).
Wing ( 1978) summarises the above discussion by stating 
that some psychiatrists "may be much more ready to apply labels such 
as 'schizophrenia' because some aspects of attitude or behaviour 
is socially unintelligible or out of touch with reality" (p.246).
The question which needs to be asked here is: "How is
the psychiatrist capable of deciding that the present deterioration 
is more significant than his previous level of functions?" Could 
it be that Mr. B or Mr. D's present level of functioning is much 
better than their previous one? (See criterion 'B'.)
Related questions concern the ability of mental health 
professionals to estimate with confidence the patient's previous 
level of functioning and the availability of special or independent 
psychiatric tests for detecting the patient's previous and present 
level of functioning.
A careful analysis of criterion*B' would give the impression 
that there is an internationally agreed standardised scale of function­
ing in certain ways and that any departure from this would be considered 
an abnormal state.
An examination of Axis IV, for example, would reveal that 
the "DSM-III specifies no particular procedure for eliciting inform­
ation about stress or occurrence, and although it provides a list 
of examples it would be unrealistic to suppose that this list is 
systematically used ..." (Rey et al, 1988, p.288).
Why is Axis IV not used systematically by mental health 
profess ionals?
Studies cited in Rey et al (1988) establish that the definition
of what is considered to be a significant stressor in any psychiatric
interview is 'sporadic' and 'idiosyncratic' (Paykel in Rey et al, 1988).
Research (see Chapter 2) also reported that the raters in
different cultures might formulate different understanding or rating 
when confronted by different events. Thus what counts as aetiologically 
significant for a Kuwaiti psychiatrist might not be so for a British 
psychiatrist. That is to say that there is no accepted guideline 
for obtaining the relevant data.
It must be clear that psychiatrists do not have a special 
instrument for deciding objectively and precisely the abnormality 
of any psychiatric condition in a reliable way. The DSM-III solution 
to the above problem is to encourage clinicians to use their experience 
or their commonsense when rating the individual's previous level 
of functioning and the severity of the stressor, or by creating certain 
exclusion criteria as in criteria (F). The main purpose is to solve 
the problem of psychiatric uncertainty as to which of the major 
psychoses is present (Monroe, 1982), and to give the clinician more 
flexibility when judging the presence or absence of abnormality.
It would appear, therefore, that when psychiatrists agree 
with each other to use one specific label that does not mean necessarily
that the label is accurate. Consider Rosenhan's study which was 
quoted in the previous chapter. All the psychiatric staff in the 
hospital agreed that the volunteers were schizophrenic and all of 
them were wrong. This obviously prompts us to question the validity 
of much psychiatric diagnosing.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the above limitation of the 
DSM-III, the manual equips its practitioners with unlimited authority 
in the form of "linguistic dominance" (Schacht, 1985) which helps 
them to promote a total compliance with their decisions. Furthermore, 
such a diagnostic manual provides the clinicians with a powerful 
medical status which enables them to impose their authority and super­
vision on every aspect of a patient's life (e.g. his competence to 
make a contract, the denial of the individual's right to be autonomous 
through compulsory hospitalisation, separation of parents from their 
children, etc.) (Schacht, 1985).
The problem occurs on a large scale when one considers 
the fact that such "linguistic dominance" has given mental health 
professionals a false impression that they actually understand mental 
functions or psychological machinery. Another related problem is 
that many mental health professionals tend to believe that the inform­
ation they obtain from the patient and his behaviour is reliable 
evidence of his total personality rather than a result of different 
factors such as the situation and context in which the patient finds 
himself, or the nature of interaction between him and a nervous 
psychiatrist or adminsitrative staff, or the role of subjective meaning
and value, which the patient attaches to his problem. Such factors 
might lead to a significant distortion in the collected data. That 
is to say, mental health professionals do not deal in reality with 
'a schizophrenic' but rather with an individual who might have 
schizophrenia.
What mental health professionals need is a method of analysis 
which is not confined to one aspect of the individual's abilities 
to face the problem but is oriented towards the individual's total 
life and functioning as it is perceived by themselves.
One possible alternative would be to view mental disorder 
as a reactive functional disorder. A full account of this approach 
will now be discussed.
The Reactive Functional Approach and the Concept of 
Mental Illness
Throughout this chapter the term "Reactive Functional 
Disorder - RFD" will refer to a temporary reactive 'total' failure 
in all the individual's major psycho-physio-social functions, which 
merits psychiatric intervention.
The term 'reactive' is used here to mean the individual's 
reaction to external rather than internal processes. 'Functional' 
here refers to the three major levels on which an individual conducts 
his life, i.e. the psychological, the physiological and the social.
(A detailed analysis of these functions will be examined through 
different parts in this chapter). Each of the above functions must 
be fully deteriorated and the overall disintegration must be signif­
icant to a degree that signals the individual’s call for help.
The RFD model was developed to deal primarily with cases 
suited to psychotherapy rather than with severe forms of psychosis.
As already mentioned, in most circumstances, the RFD model 
incorporates the patient’s own judgement of the degree to which his 
major functions have deteriorated. This reference to the patient's 
own interpretation represents an important step away from the dangerous 
reliance, in the DSM-III model, upon psychiatrists' subjective inter­
pret at ion.
To illustrate the above definition and other related terms, 
it would be much more convincing if we examine the following case 
illustration which was interviewed by the present writer in 1982.
Mr. M is a 28 year old single Kuwaiti man who works as 
school social worker. At the age of 8, while he was in the last 
year of primary school, he was attacked on his way home by a couple 
of 15 year old boys who badly beat him up, and then raped him. Mr. M 
was extremely distressed by the experience, but was ashamed to tell 
anyone because of the stigma attached to being raped. Subsequently, 
he became excessively fearful of becoming the object of another attack 
and had to be taken to and fetched from school by his family on the
pretext that he was feeling tired or unwell. Another expression 
of his extreme anxiety was his sudden refusal to eat anything sweet, 
even though he had a very sweet tooth, because he did not want to 
put on weight (his family had always told him that he looked more 
handsome when he was fatter, and he was afraid that his good looks 
might provoke another sexual attack).
At the age of 19, when he was in the last year of secondary
school, he joined an extreme Islamic group and three months later
he started to behave in an obsessive manner. For example, the customary 
pre-prayer wash would take him one hour instead of the usual two 
minutes, and he would pray twice as long as it was customary. A 
couple of years later, he developed obsessive anxieties about driving 
his car. Every time he got home at night he worried that he might 
have run someone over and would retrace his journey looking for the 
body.
At the age of 27, Mr. M developed an obsession about having 
been infected with the AIDS virus during a sexual relationship two 
years previously, and started to interpret minor illnesses as symptoms 
of the disease even though his doctor had told him that there was 
nothing seriously wrong with him.
Now let us imagine a hypothetical situation where Mr. M
is arrested by the police one night while searching for the 'body* 
of the person he imagines he has run over. During the investigation 
procedure conducted by the police, Mr. M admits to his fears, and
the police eventually refer him to a mental hospital for a decision 
as to whether he is mentally disturbed or not. There is very little 
doubt that, having been referred to a mental hospital in Kuwait,
Mr. M will be diagnosed as 'mentally ill', either suffering from 
'disturbed thoughts' (schizophrenia) or from obsessive-compulsive 
neurosis. Having labelled Mr. M  and having assigned him to the 'career' 
of mental patient, the psychiatrists would then proceed to interpret 
all his subsequent behaviour as a symptom of this illness. So, for 
example, a query on the part of the patient regarding treatment, 
or an application to be discharged, or even just a request to see 
the doctor in charge, would not be taken seriously because the patient 
would be regarded as lacking the necessary insight for making a 
rational decision. Even significant improvements in the patient's 
condition would not be taken seriously because at the end of the 
day, Mr. M is the victim of incurable conditions which render him 
vulnerable to different relapses in his life. Moreover, by labelling 
Mr. M as 'mentally ill' - obsessive-compulsive, for example - 
psychiatrists focus on just one aspect of this person's total life 
functioning and, by doing so, completely disregard the individual's 
overall capacity to function effectively, and to live a positive 
life despite his problem. What psychiatrists fail to acknowledge 
is that personal suffering can in some cases have a positive contrib­
ution to the development of the individual's self-esteem and his 
personal growth, and as Frankl (1967) points out:
"Even a man who finds himself in the most dire 
distress - distress in which neither activity 
nor creativity can bring value to life, nor 
experience give meaning to it - such a man still
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gives life meaning by the way and manner in which 
he faces his fate, in which he takes his suffer­
ing upon himself." (p. 127)
It is a sad fact that the ability of a patient to live 
with his problem would very probably be viewed by clinicians as an 
expression of his 'disturbed' personality - escaping the unresolved 
conflicts of his unconscious by over-compensating (devoting all his 
energies to his professional life). In this way, the power of the 
patient's will and his self-determination to live with his problem 
and be in charge of his own life, is completely discredited, which 
in turn demeans and devalues the whole meaning of the individual's 
life, and creates feelings of weakness and dependence on the part 
of the 'patient'.
Thus, one is compelled to question the practical benefit 
of applying a concept such as 'mental disorder' to Mr. M's efforts 
to live his life in the best way he can. Is the purpose to help 
Mr. M achieve more positive goals than he has already achieved?
Or is the aim merely to provide a psychiatric diagnosis for the hospital 
records, without any regard for the effects such a diagnosis might 
have on the individual? In fact, the process of railroading Mr. M 
to a mental hospital raises questions about his mental competency.
It seems that the very fact that Mr. M was brought to the mental 
hospital by the police would be considered in itself a sufficient 
proof of his disturbance, and if he rejects psychiatric definitions 
and refuses to be admitted, his behaviour would, invariably, be inter­
preted as a sign that he is too ill to appreciate the help of the 
psychiatric services.
Analysis of the above case, according to the RFD model, 
would reveal that although the case was obviously malfunctioning 
on the psycho-social level, failure in functioning was only partial, 
as the case had managed to lead a full and successful professional 
life, and although aware of problems in personal relationships, was 
in general happy with his life.
Clearly, the present model is based on the assumption that 
a total, not a partial, failure of the individual's major functioning 
is a necessary condition for psychiatric intervention. Thus, it 
is crucial to draw a distinction between total functional failure 
on the one hand, and partial failure on the other.
Total Functional Failure can be identified when the patient 
or in most cases 'significant others', have observed a radical inability 
to function adequately due to the total disintegration of the psycho­
logical and the social function. A failure of the physiological 
function, however, would receive a somewhat different consideration. 
Although such failure could occur as a result of failure in the pscyho- 
social functioning, there are certain cases, for example psychopaths, 
where a breakdown on the psycho-social level does not necessarily 
result in failure to function on the physiological level. The RFD 
model, therefore, accepts that in certain cases, failure on the physio­
logical level is not a necessary condition for the application of 
RFD. However, one must be clear about the actual contributory effects 
of the physiological function in any analysis of the individual's 
total functioning.
A central feature of total functional failure is the 
complete disturbance and disintegration of motivational, social, 
cognitive, and perhaps physiological abilities. At this stage 'others' 
rather than the individual himself, are more likely to initiate the 
'call for help' or action procedures.
Partial Functional Failure can be defined as a state in 
which the individual continues to function adequately on the three
major levels, but acknowledges certain limitations in his ability
to function fully effectively. People who suffer from partial functional 
failure are on a continuum of what is accepted as normal since most 
individuals experience a different degree and quality of suffering 
throughout their lives. Total functional failure, on the other hand,
represents an extreme point on this continuum, but can be viewed
as a temporary deviation from a more moderate position on the continuum.
A point which needs to be emphasised here is that the 
'patient's' self acknowledgement or self-referral might indicate 
in a relatively sufficient manner the degree of functional failure,
i.e. partial or total.
The most salient feature of the above definition is the 
emphasis on the individual's own decision to seek help for his suffer­
ing. The present writer's experience in the psychiatric hospital 
in Kuwait shows that a great number of patients do not ask for psychi­
atric help unless their suffering becomes intolerable and their 
mechanisms of control begin to collapse. This reluctance is mainly
because of the stigma attached to being a psychiatric patient, and 
because of the view held by many people that mental problems are 
not serious because they do not usually affect one's body, or that 
they are 'imagined' anyway and probably also because of the negative 
attitude held by the public towards psychiatric services in Kuwait 
generally. Thus, when an individual does apply for psychiatric help, 
that must indicate that his suffering has become unmanageable, even 
if at the onset the problem has been only partial.
However, self-seeking help behaviour does not necessarily 
suggest accurately the degree of functional failure, whether partial 
or total failure. In fact self-referral itself might be a culturally 
defined notion. In the United Kingdom, for example, self-referral 
would be a sign that the patient did not have a total functional 
failure. In Kuwait, however, as in many other countries in the Third 
World where long-term suffering is considered not to be pathological, 
self-referral would be regarded as a last resort after the failure 
of every possible traditional alternative. In this case, self-referral 
in such countries might be taken - in certain psychiatric conditions - 
as a sufficient manifestation of a real failure in the patient's 
major or total functions (see Ben Tovim's study in Botswana (1985) 
which was discussed in the previous chapter).
Surely accepting the individual's own assessment of his/her 
inability to function on the psycho-physio-social level, (George 
Herbert Mead in Weinstein, 1983; Szasz, 1972) does not necessarily 
mean that - in Szasz's terms - 'other definition' do not determine
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the sick role in many psychiatric conditions. A third party's claim, 
therefore, cannot be ignored in deciding the career of mental patient. 
However, significant others report must be examined and studied carefully 
before making a decision as to whether the individual's functional 
efficiency has totally failed (Fernando, 1988). The limitations and 
arbitrariness of the third party claims has been discussed in detail 
throughout this thesis.
The RFD model, nevertheless, emphasises the importance of 
the individual's claim which could be considered in certain psychiatric con­
ditions as an appropriate criterion concerning the severity of his 
problem. In many cases, the patient himself is aware of his functional 
limitations, and feels the need for psychiatric intervention. A 
detailed analysis of the value of the individual's personal claim 
will be discussed in the following chapters.
Adherence to this principle, on the part of mental health 
professionals should lead to a significant reduction in involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalisation. Furthermore, a patient who has 
voluntarily sought psychiatric help is much more likely to benefit 
from such treatment because he is obviously motivated to improve.
A  full account of the principles of the claims requirement 
and its limitations will be discussed in Chapter 5.
As mentioned previously, a related major concern of the 
RFD model is its emphasis on individual functional behaviour as a
'whole', or the concept of totality as largely derived from the work 
of Ernst von Feuchtersleben, a nineteenth century Italian psychiatrist 
who viewed mental illness as a defect in the "psycho-physical totality 
of man". Accordingly, the treatment plan must involve a social as well 
as a medical perspective (Ernst von Feuchtersleben in Laor, 1982).
Karl Jasper (representing the existential view) has discussed the con­
cept of studying the "man as a whole" as the basic principle of psycho­
pathology. Jasper believes that it is crucial to evaluate the individual 
conscious experiences by using the following procedures:
(i) obtain an accurate 'understanding' of every aspect of the 
individual's life;
(ii) establish the importance of the interlocking and inter-related 
nature of the individual's problems, and how such problems can 
relate to other 'phenomena identified'.
To do so, Jasper believed that the mental health professional must 
use the patient's own description of his life and then by 'actualising' 
and appreciating such details, the clinician as a result can define 
and classify the phenomenon. Jasper called the above procedure 
"descriptive phenomenology".
Gestalt therapy also focuses on the importance of the 
"whole" personality in the practice of psychotherapy.
Finally, Aubrey Lewis (1953), in his essay "Health as a 
Social Concept", discusses the importance of the evaluation of the 
patient's "total performance" as a necessary condition for the diagnosis 
of mental illness. Implicitly, Lewis viewed such total performance
in its malfunctioning analogy to the disturbance of organs such 
as the heart.
Obviously, the work of the authors mentioned above 
emphasises the understanding of the person as a total human being 
which is a crucial factor in understanding psycho-pathology. The work 
of the above writers, however, does not fully explain how certain 
individual functions could be affected by a person's psychiatric 
condition, and by the moral consequences of psychiatric definition as 
it bears on the patient's moral agency.
The present approach is based on the concept of totality 
as it relates to individual total functional failure. The model of 
RFD aims to alleviate the problem of psychiatric abuse by viewing 
mental disorder as a reaction to or a result of external events rather 
than an internal residual event with unknown organic factors or 
caused by unconscious forces (a view developed by radical behaviourist 
- see Fairbairn and Fairbairn (eds), 1987). That is not to say that 
the 'external' events are free from evluative elements, or to deny 
the possibility of organic aetiology of mental illness. But these 
physiological elements are not yet fully understood and thus cannot 
generally be established as a causal agent for mental illness. (Recent 
research conducted by Dr. Hugh Gurling of the Middlesex School of 
Medicine at the University of London suggests that there is evidence 
linking schizophrenia and abnormal functioning as a cluster of genes 
on a part of chromosome 5. Another group of researchers, however, 
have found no such link (I.H.T. Friday, Nov.11, No.32, 881, 1988).
Our argument, however, is that the degree of judgemental 
accuracy of observable external events is much more significant than 
hypothetical inner mental states. This is because it is relatively 
easier to conduct systematic analysis and research on external variables 
and behaviour - an approach which would minimize the effect of subject­
ive variables. Systematic analysis can be done by collecting data on 
the observable factors of which behaviour is a function and by many 
other methods of observation (Skinner, 1987).
It is important at this point to state that the basic 
hypotheses and concepts of the RFD model have, to a certain extent, 
been inspired by the following writers:
1. The radical behaviourists, such as B.F.Skinner, who hold the view 
that human problems must be explained in terms of an environmental 
rather than a mentalistic or physiological account;
2. The radical psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists, such 
as Tomas Szasz, R.D.Laing, Albert Ellis, Leiffer, David L.
Rosenhan, Theodore Sarbin, Fulley Torrey, Goffman, etc. All the 
above writers have contributed by raising many problematic issues 
regarding the rights of mental patients, the validity of the 
concept of mental illness and psychiatry in general;
3. The humanistic pyschologists (or the 'third force' in psychology) 
which is represented by Carl Rogers, Laing, Abraham Maslow, etc.
The above writers have emphasised the centrality of the subjective
life and experiences of the 'client' and the idea of self-actualisation. 
The humanistic perspective puts great emphasis on the human potential 
of each person and his ability for growth and development.
Moreover, such an approach considers that the most crucial points 
in understanding the individual problem are to see how the 
'client* perceives such problem. Thus, the individual's inter­
pretation of his suffering is more important than the professional 
one (phenomenal self report). (For more details see Hall and 
Lindzey, 1957.)
4. Finally, the existential view which emphasises the importance of 
the individual as being himself and autonomous and the centrality 
of the individual's subjective experience. Moreover, the existen­
tialists believe that the verbal claim "given by the patients 
themselves regarding the change in their world of experience, 
their expressions, hallucinations, gestures, and movements can be 
logically understood in detail" (M. Bleuler in Shershow, 1978, 
p. 13) .
Now let us examine in detail the main features of the RFD 
approach and how such a model views human functioning. This view, 
as we shall see, has a significant moral bearing on the way mental 
health professionals define and deal with 'mental illness'.
The purpose of the present approach, therefore, is to 
establish the following criteria for determining the inefficiency of 
function in a given situation.
1. There are three major functions which give the significant character­
istics of each individual person. These functions are as follows:
(a) physiological function: in this function the behaviour is
motivated to satisfy the basic biological needs (e.g. food, water,
safety, survival, and so forth). This function is shared by 
all people and the normality of this function is crucial in 
maintining the individual’s life. The adequacy of such function 
can be inferred or understood from the observable inability of 
the individual’s motivated behaviour to satisfy his needs rather , 
than from a hypothetical biological inner dysfunction. 
social function: this function is characterised by an effective
interaction or communication between a person and his family, 
friends, work situation, and other environmental variables.
The reactive functional disorder (RFD) occurs when the 
individual’s social communicative skill is sufficiently deterio­
rated as to render the individual unable to meet desirable 
behaviour standards in his society.
psychological function: each individual has a unique experience
and interpretation of events around him. Thus, an individual's 
behaviour is a continuous reflection of his experience, personality, 
attitudes, and values. The individual lives in harmony when 
acting on the basis of his total experience. Moreover, the 
individual’s experience serves to adjust his behaviour to face 
familial and societal pressures. The effectiveness and acceptability 
of behaviour depend, thus, on the applicability and relevance of 
the individual’s total personality traits, his unique attitudes, 
and his personal qualities. Functional disturbance on this level 
is, thus, a sign of frequent and continuous societal and familial 
contradictions and misinterpretations which prevent the individual 
person from defining and expressing his potentialities (see 
Laing and Esterson, 1970). In other words, such functional
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disturbance might be the result of a basic contradiction in 
the content of understanding or reasoning that is attacked by 
both the individual himself and others.
2. The individual’s psychological suffering and symptomatic behaviour 
are only prima facie manifestations of the deterioration of the 
person's essential traits of competency, his sense of responsibility, 
and his capability for sound choice and judgement (Wear, 1980). It 
must be emphasised that each individual with reactive functional 
disorder should be viewed as a genuinely important, fully individual 
person and prima facie able to control the consequences of his social 
interpersonal relations in a method which complies with his personal 
objectives. The concept of reactive functional disorder does not 
invalidate the purposeful nature of function. The individual total 
functioning is basically sound and goal oriented. Psychiatrists in 
this respect must try to be unbiased towards all ethical and subjective 
components of the disturbed individual. The authority of the psychiatrist 
to make a decision must be counter-balanced by the individual’s right 
as an autonomous agent to have his unique choice and judgement. A 
necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of RFD in many psychiatric 
conditions, is considered to be the total failure of both the psycho­
logical and social functions as perceived and experienced by the 
individual himself.
A  failure of the physiological function, or a general 
deterioration in the physical or biological level could possibly, but 
not necessarily, be taken as an indication of failure on the psycho­
social level. This is because there are certain psychopaths and
severely disturbed individuals who manifest a clear total failure 
in their psycho-social function due to the fundamental incongruence 
between their own subjective experience and the established rules 
and values in their society. Those individuals might not even admit 
or be fully aware of their total disturbance and their physiological 
functions might work adequately. Therefore, it seems necessary to 
accept some limitations when dealing with the RFD approach as applied 
to certain conditions. It must be stressed here, however, that very few 
psychiatric cases represent individuals who are totally disturbed or 
severely psychopathic.
3. The individual's functional disturbance may come under psychiatric 
attention not because it is stressful or problematic in itself, but 
because of the nature and content of the cognitive and motivational 
pattern that both the individual and his basic group attach to the 
problem. Clinicians and lay people are usually moved not by the 
manifest function in itself, but by the consequences of such function 
(whether it is dangerous or threatening to the safety of others), and 
the suitability of the motivational and cognitive system that framed 
such function, especially if that system falls outside of their 
customary experience. Thus, it is crucial to evaluate the inefficiency 
of the individual's reaction to external stimuli on the basis of the 
person's own definition of himself and his environment as it is 
presented to the clinician in charge. The patient's own subjective 
judgement of the impact of stressful events in his life proved - 
throughout the research conducted by Byrne in Rey et al (1988) - to 
have a higher significance of predictive value than did a consensus 
evaluation of the same events.
In other words, the evaluation process of the individual's 
disturbed functions must take into account the individual's response 
as it appears within his total functional behaviour towards others.
That is to say, a central element in psycho-social functioning is the 
individual's motivational and cognitive system which is largely deter­
mined by his personal system of values. However, the degree of 
disturbance in this system is usually decided by psychiatrists in 
their daily practice on the basis of whether the total coherence and 
structure of the system is appropriate or inappropriate, reasonable or 
unreasonable. A detailed account of the above arguments will be 
presented in the following chapters.
Perhaps the best way to explain how RFD works is to apply 
it to some of the psychiatric cases discussed earlier. Let us start 
with Mr. D, who was apparently admitted to the psychiatric hospital 
because he gave all his money to the poor. Clearly, Mr. D's moral 
judgement is perfectly rational, if his strong commitment to religious 
belief is taken into account. His spending behaviour could be viewed 
as a reflection of altruistic motives which are characterised by self- 
sacrifice, unselfishness, sympathy and obligation to the poor that 
may take precedence over his personal wishes. Such behaviour could 
be the result of childhood training in which such characteristics 
might have been positively reinforced. It is crucial to bear in mind 
that people differ widely in the extent to which they display generous, 
giving behaviour (different people have different experiences and 
values). Thus, rather than classifying Mr. D's behaviour as abnormal, 
it is the clinician's task to understand why his 'patient' is functioning 
in this particular way, and why such altruistic behaviour could have
a negative effect and produce adverse evaluation on the part of the 
family. If Mr. D failed, for example, to be altruistic due to family 
pressure, this could have induced in him a partial failure in the 
psychological function (e.g. feelings of guilt, depression, etc.)
- as a consequence of not functioning in a way that reflects his 
actual personal values and unique experience (psychological function).
In addition, the family's pressure on Mr. D's spending behaviour 
represents an interference with his moral beliefs and an under­
estimation of his ability to make his own decisions and express his 
own judgement.
Now consider a hypothetical situation where Mr. D, after 
spending his money, felt that he had done something wrong and that 
he should not have acted in such a foolish way (as his family believed). 
Eventually, if he really was the very sensitive, intense and somewhat 
extreme personality that his condition indicated him to be, he might 
feel depressed, stupid, might refuse to eat or drink, and in the end 
might even try to commit suicide in order not to repeat his irrational 
behaviour. Clearly, in this case Mr. D would be viewing his behaviour 
as negative rather than as positive, altruistic behaviour, befitting 
a truly religious person. In other words, Mr. D would react to the 
situation by developing a negative functional reaction to his spending 
behaviour. He would attach a negative meaning and understanding to 
the act of spending as a consequence of the negative meaning which 
was attached by his family to such behaviour. As a result, a general 
deterioration in the individual's major functions would occur. On 
the physiological level, Mr. D might have a general disturbance in
the behavioural goals which are considered essential for survival 
(e.g. eating, etc.). On the psychological level he might suffer 
from depression and eventually try to commit suicide (as a result of 
the contradiction between his experience and actions on the one hand, 
and familial explanation of his behaviour as 'odd* and 'bizarre' on 
the other hand). In terms of his moral judgement he would attach a 
negative meaning to the value of helping the poor because he would 
feel that others view his altruistic behaviour as irresponsible, 
incompetent and illogical. Consequently, there will be a disturbance 
in Mr. D's social function, i.e. reduced capacity to keep friends, 
continuous conflict with societal demands, etc. In clinical psychia­
tric practice, mental health professionals would tend to view Mr. D's 
spending behaviour as an indication of "a psychotic condition". The 
main question which arises here is: what kinds of functional behaviour
are regarded by clinicians as "abnormal"? and on what grounds do they 
base their judgement?
Generally speaking, the decision that a person needs 
psychiatric intervention is prompted by a suicide threat on the part 
of the patient, for example, or the patient's presumed unhappiness 
which is considered to be deviant and as such alarms people into 
taking action. In reality, the criteria of being dangerous to oneself 
or not-conforming with the standards of an 'average' person has 
shifted the emphasis from the contribution of societal and psychological 
factors to the development of the disturbed function to something 
else that can be best described as protecting and safeguarding the 
feelings and wellbeing of 'others' rather than the individual himself. 
That has led psychiocfcristB to be less appreciative and less informed
about other functions of the individual patient which are little, 
or not at all, affected by his psychiatric condition.
Miss N's case which was mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
is another suitable illustration of the above points. Ms N suffered 
from an obsessive-compulsive neurosis and admitted herself to the 
psychiatric hospital under extreme pressure from her relatives and 
psychiatric friends. Her behaviour was presumably judged on the 
basis of psychiatric efficiency without any regard to her functional 
effectiveness as a lecturer, or her functional social activities in 
general. However, it is difficult to define efficiency of behaviour. 
Mental health professionals would need to evaluate Ms N's current 
disturbed level of function in relation to other average or normal 
functions. Thus, according to the RFD model, Ms N's level of performance 
in the two major functions, the physiological, and the social one, are 
of average or borderline standard. The only disturbance occurred on 
the psychological level and was due, in the opinion of the present 
writer, to her over-protected upbringing. Her mother was a very 
controlling and demanding person who had considerably limited her 
daughter's independence and freedom to construe reality in her own 
individual way. Ms N, therefore, had very little experience of coping 
with the everyday problems of living. Additionally, her problem was 
exaggerated by her family and subsequently by the hospital staff.
If one considers Ms N's total level of functioning, it 
could be said that this is not sufficiently disturbed to merit psych­
iatric intervention. Ms N has managed to live a fruitful life in 
spite of her so-called psychiatric condition. She is an accomplished
lecturer, and manages to conduct her social life in an acceptable 
way. She has a few close friends, she prays, fasts during Ramadan; 
she eats and sleeps normally - in other words, she functions adequately 
in most areas of her life.
Another example would be Mr. B's case which was discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Mr. B ’s close friendship with Mr. A  was 
severed due to the relationship being diagnosed as 'homosexual1 by 
the mental health professional in charge of the case. Similar to 
Ms N, Mr. B admitted himself to the psychiatric hospital due to persis­
tent pressure from his family, and the psychiatrist in charge of the
hospital. Mr. B's friendship with Mr. A  was, in fact, a perfectly 
rational goal-directed behaviour, if considered in the context of his 
family background which had failed to provide him with significant 
models of identification. Thus Mr. B had been functioning normally 
on the physiological, social and psychological levels until psychiatry 
intervened. That is to say, he had been an average student in the 
university with a few social relationships (social function). More­
over, he had been happy and fulfilled by his friendship with Mr. A 
and had been motivated to plan for the future (psychological function). 
He had not suffered any loss of appetite, lack of sleep, disturbance 
in his memory or intellectual function (physiological function).
Mr. B received a psychiatric label not because he was really 'sick' 
but because he had a concept of friendship which was somewhat 
different from the concept most 'normal' people are supposed to have 
in the opinion of the psychiatrist. One of the reasons why mental 
health professionals have tended to view Mr. B as 'abnormal' could 
be because it is stated in most textbooks in abnormal psychology or
DSM-III or any psychiatric manual, that over-attached relationships 
are not within normal acceptable standards. Mr. B's relationship 
with Mr. A is thus perceived as disturbed and irrational. Such psychia­
tric diagnoses will eventually create the feeling of moral 'weakness* 
on the part of the patient and a feeling of incompetency to formulate 
any forms of relationship in the future. Labelling Mr. B ’s relation­
ship with Mr. A as 'homosexuality' might eventually create a great 
confusion in his perception in general towards human relationships 
as something noble and respectable.
The above analysis illustrates clearly that none of the 
above cases has shown inconsistency in his motivational and cognitive 
system. Mr. D's spending behaviour was consistent with general 
humanitarian ethics that are accepted in most societies. In Kuwait, 
for example, Mr. D would be considered as a true Muslim and his act 
would be encouraged. Moreover, his act would represent an honourable 
and admirable one. In Muslim countries, there is an Islamic law 
which stresses the importance for every true Muslim to pay a certain 
percentage from his money (every year) to the poor. Again, Mr. D's 
case raises questions of the relative nature of the concept of mental 
illness and the competency of mental health professionals to decide 
accurately the dividing line between appropriate spending behaviour 
and irrational or crazy spending.
Now, can we say that Mr. D's response to a command from 
the Gospel can be judged as a form of delusion? According to Glover 
in Fields (1987):
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"Where I hold a false belief despite being 
presented with overwhelming evidence against 
it, and my doing so cannot be explained in 
terms of the beliefs common in my group or 
society, the only explanation that seems to be 
left is that my reasoning abilities are 
impaired to an abnormal extent." (p.201)
Fields (1987) disagrees with Glover's account by stating that:
"For if one considers a particular delusion 
in isolation from the patient's other beliefs, 
one may find either that he has no overwhelming 
evidence against it, or that it seems explainable 
in terms of a widespread ideology in his society. 
... We are able to judge that the patient's 
belief is a delusion when we take into account 
some of his other beliefs. We realise that the 
belief in question does not exist in isolation, 
but forms part of a set of inter-related beliefs 
in which the other beliefs of the set are clearly 
counter-evidential and idiosyncratic." (p.201)
Surely Mr. D's 'first order' (Harry Frankfurt in Fields, 
1987) desire to give his money to the poor is a response to a certain 
'illogical' command and is not based on false beliefs because there 
is no "overwhelming evidence against it" (Glover in Fields, 1987, 
p.201). Mr. D's behaviour, in addition, can easily be explained 
in terms of certain fundamental notions of Christian society (e.g. 
charitable and generous behaviour, self-sacrificing act, kindness, 
mercy, sympathy, understanding, etc.).
If we now discuss Mr. D's spending behaviour in the light 
of Fields's account, it seems that Mr. D's response to the command 
from the Gospel (if we believe that such behaviour is considered 
to be a form of delusion), does not indicate that other beliefs in
his life are coloured by such delusional thoughts. Our previous 
analysis of Mr. D's total functional ability indicate that there 
is no evidence that other central aspects of his life showed alarming 
deterioration. On the contrary, Mr. D's first-order motivation 
(helping the poor) was coherent and logical when one assumes that 
such an effective humanitarian desire might be a reflection of a 
church-going or earlier religious education.
Ms N's 'unrealistic' idea about urinating in her clothes 
was conceived by her as an irrational form of thought. Thus, Ms N 
was fully aware that the ideal norms and patterns that must govern 
the total working of the motivational and cognitive system had been 
violated by her irrational ideas. She had hoped that such consistency 
would be achieved in due time. Nevertheless, Ms N was able in many 
instances to master and to control the persistence of such thoughts 
(she was an effective lecturer, developed a few social relationships, 
etc.). That led us to the conclusion that the case manifested certain 
abilities to regain and re-attain the regularity and coherency in 
the motivational and cognitive system. In other words, Ms N showed 
a continuous effort of 'will' to overcome her - in Harry Frankfurt's 
terms (in Fields, 1987) - first-order motives (obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour). On many occasions she was fully conscious of her conflict­
ing desires (her first-order desire to respond to such 'irrational' 
thought and her second-order motives, not to respond). The case 
history of Ms N shows strong evidence that on many occasions, she 
manifested a strong determination to act in accordance with her second- 
order desire, i.e. not to respond to her ritual cleaning habits.
Finally, Mr. B, too, was judged by the psychiatrist in charge on 
the basis that his friendship with Mr. A was not within the 'clinical' 
limit of an accepted form of relationship. Mr. B's close relationship 
with Mr. A is a natural and expected response to satisfy an urgent 
need for a loving and dear friendship that might counterbalance 
Mr. B's previous empty life and his need for some sort of social 
compensation. Surely there is an intelligible awareness from Mr. B 
to his basic need and in addition there is a certain consistency 
between his motives or his desire for social life and the importance 
of such a particular friendship in the reconstruction of his social 
funct ion.
In conclusion, it has to be stressed again that none of 
the above three cases chose to be psychiatric patients. Moreover, 
psychiatric intervention in the above three cases was based on the 
assumption that their 'symptoms' represent a "hard psycho-pathology" 
(Wood, 1984, p.35) which was not established through a thorough analys 
of the cases.
5. The Reactive Functional Approach and the Problem of 
Psychiatric Abuse
As previously mentioned, the psychiatric labels that are 
currently used in the definition and classification of mental disorder 
such as 'undifferentiated type' or 'residual type', 'disorganised 
type' of schizophrenia, etc., are liable to misinterpretation and 
misapplication in actual practice. Moreover, such terms tend to 
promote many negative, long-lasting personality traits (Rimm, 1977).
The conceptual and moral limitations of many psychiatric 
terms alongside the absence of both reliable independent diagnostic 
system and specific pathological causes for most forms of mental 
illness have led many clinicians in different countries (such as 
Kuwait, Roumania, Uruguay, the Soviet Union, the United States, etc.) 
to abuse their profession. Psychiatry provides mental health pro­
fessionals in these countries with perfect tools to control those 
people who act against the social system. The psychiatric tools 
are words. Such terms, when used within the medical framework, lead 
to a confirmation of irremediable and changeless general traits of 
unfitness and incompetence. Thus the individual is dealt with as 
if he had lost his moral and civil status (Wear, 1980).
The question, however, is whether mental health professionals 
might not be treating individuals who actually have a sufficient 
capacity for rationality and potential positive qualifications to 
handle society's responsibilities (Wear, 1980).
In other words, does labelling individuals as mentally 
ill in current psychiatric practice actually imply the presence of 
a major defect or impairment in the individual's total ability to 
function effectively in a given society? Surely terms such as 
'delusion', or 'loss of touch with reality' or 'loss of insight' 
do not give a meaningful and practical account of the concept of 
mental illness. In fact, these definitional terms suffer from "a 
complete lack of content" (Gorenstein, 1984) when used as a means 
to understand mental phenomena. The compulsive Ms N or paranoid
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Mr. D or schizophrenic Mr. B may manifest their unacceptable symptoms 
only with certain limited contexts at certain times, and at certain 
places, while "much of their 'sensible manifold’ may remain objective 
even when they are hallucinating" (Wear, 1980, p.304). The total 
functional rating of our cases remains appropriate and within average 
or borderline standards. In other words, the ’patient's’ basic 
cognitive and motivational abilities might not be defective.
"A woman who believes that her husband has men in 
the attic who are trying to influence her by 
x-rays may be able to remember general information 
and events from her past life, to speak clearly 
and connectedly, and to appreciate where she is 
and whom she is with.
(Fields, 1987, p.203)
That is not to say that human suffering or mental distress cannot 
be established as an everyday fact, but what needs to be addressed 
and examined carefully is the current scientific practice of labelling 
of human suffering as a form of ’mental illness' (see Redlich, 1981).
"Communicating a large amount of information in a few 
words" (Robins and Helzer, 1986, p.426), does not justify creating 
labels or few words to describe the overall patterns of individual 
functioning. The individual’s total functioning is far too complex 
to understand in terms of one single experience or symptom. If a 
depressed patient, for example, kills himself, it does not follow 
that every depressed individual will commit suicide. The current 
diagnostic criteria in DSM-III are thus "imperfect descriptions of 
reality" (Robins and Helzer, 1986, p.4 18). Mr. D's spending behaviour, 
for example, is perceived by his wife, the police, and the psychiatrist
as irrational or delusional, but that does not make Mr. D's behaviour 
unintelligible and the others' intelligible simply because the other 
parties involved could not make sense of it. Not being able to 
comprehend Mr. D's 'bizarre' behaviour is not a sufficient condition 
for labelling him as mentally ill or irrational. In fact, many 
psychiatric symptoms are "only prima facie indications of the diminish- 
ment of an individual's capacity" (Wear, 1980, p.307; see Lidz,
1977). Mr. D's wife viewed his behaviour as bizarre or irresponsible 
and most people would presumably consider Mr. D as a psychiatric 
case and would certainly take some sort of action to 'protect' him.
And yet, if Mr. D failed to manage his personal money wisely, it
would be unreasonable to assume that another person, i.e. the psychiatrist,
could teach him how to manage his personal affairs. The psychiatrist's
basic training is in 'medicine' rather than in moral or ethical issues.
Therefore, he is not qualified for making judgements on personal
and moral values.
The problem stems from the following: first, the
psychiatrist's adherence to the medical model which results in viewing 
cases such as Mr. D as objectively 'diseased'. Thus diagnosing and 
curing has nothing to do with the patient's desire or motivation 
to change. Secondly, the current diagnostic schemes in psychiatry 
do not take into account or express the uniqueness of an individual 
case. In actual practice, mental health professionals identify the 
pat ient's symptoms either by the way such symptoms appear within 
the clinical interview or as they are reported by their families, 
and make a decision within the general framework of DSM-III or ICD-9,
etc., as to whether the individual has the right amount of given 
symptoms to justify the given definition. Moreover, there are certain 
groups of symptoms that can be categorised under more than one title 
in psychiatric manuals. This is because mental health manuals lack 
a definite and accurate definition of psychiatric symptoms or the 
concept of mental illness in general. Thus a definition of mental 
illness on the basis of criteria chosen by specific psychiatric school 
does not necessarily qualify mental health professionals to deal 
with problematic issues such as what is 'abnormal' behaviour, what 
are the feelings of 'psychotic' patients, what is the meaning and 
purpose of their irrational thoughts, or the problem of predictive 
validity of the different forms of psychiatric conditions. (Is Mr. D' 
spending behaviour, for example, deviant or abnormal?) Bearing this 
argument in mind, it would seem that the methodological and practical 
limitation of the concept of mental illness would lead mental health 
professionals to over-emphasise the significance of Mr. D's spending 
behaviour, for example, as an indication of thought disorder. There­
fore, Mr. D's spending behaviour is likely to be viewed as a symptom 
of schizophrenia for example, since non-schizophrenic individuals 
do not display such symptoms. It seems, however, that the above 
problem is related basically, as we have already established, to 
the difficulty psychiatry has in separating social values and norms 
from the 'clinical' norms. Homosexuality, for example, as a criterion 
in the DSM-III was dropped from the manual not because of the intro­
duction of a more accurate and advanced definition of the problem, 
but because of the shift of norms and attitudes in society towards 
more liberal ones. The crucial point here is that the medical
professional status of psychiatrists which gives them socially and 
legally approved authority to impose their values or standards on 
Mr. D, or Mr. B, or Ms N's or Mr. M's behaviour must be counter­
balanced by the rights of those individuals to their unique attitudes 
and choices built up throughout their life (Back, 1973, see also 
Abraham Maslow in Davison and Neal, 1986). Thus, it is important to 
understand and evaluate in detail both the frame and content of the 
individual patient's behaviour within his social and work group, and 
the action of the social group upon him. That is to say, professionals 
must pay attention to the underlying causes of inefficient functional 
responses and how such functional disturbance influences the individ­
ual's total functions. In addition, the significance of meaning 
of the "disturbed function" to both the individual and his social 
reference group must be taken into account. Mr. D's spending behaviour 
and Mr. B's friendship with Mr. A illustrate how the contradictory 
meaning of the function developed by the individual cases and by 
others (social group and clinicians), play a crucial role in determin­
ing the efficiency or acceptability of the behaviour in question 
(see Laing and Esterson, 1970). In fact, the understanding and meaning 
that both the patient and the reference group attach to the situation, 
and the way the patient interprets his problem determines the ways 
in which his major functions work and the acceptability or the effect­
iveness of the individual's total functional response.
Unfortunately, in psychiatric daily practice, the more 
threatening and severe the behavioural manifestation, the more mental 
health professionals are likely to ignore or deny the fact that people 
such as Mr. D, Mr. B, Mr. M  and Ms N do not react simply to the 
objective features of any given situation or problem, but to their 
own personal experiences, beliefs, subjective interpretation, and 
motivational system. Generally speaking, people create different 
forms of new adaptive behaviour and new meanings in their life and 
are not merely influenced by societal and familiar 'ready-made' norms. 
Our previous cases showed certain abilities to conduct their lives 
and to control the outcomes of their social interpersonal encounters 
in harmony with their personal goals, their unique experience, and 
the meaning they have chosen for their lives.
The RFD tries to incorporate the above issues and views 
mental disorder as a temporary reactive functional disorder, that 
is, a significant disturbance in the individual's major functions 
which would lead eventually to a significant malfunctioning of the 
psycho-physio-social response to different life stress. In such 
cases, the patient would have great difficulty in making the necessary 
balance between his unique experience and moral beliefs on the one 
hand, and the behaviourally tolerable standards of a given society 
on the other hand.
The emphasis on the totality of functional disturbance 
aims to highlight the fact that if the 'psychotic' patient suffers 
from a temporary or episodic disturbance in his functional ability
to cope with specific life stresses, it does not follow that his 
disturbance is related to his whole basic orientation or his total 
functional effectiveness towards the basic tasks in life that are 
necessary to maintain his social and humanistic agency. As we noticed 
earlier in this chapter, Mr. D's spending behaviour is not necessarily 
irrelevant or irrational or odd, although there are strong pressures 
on him to conform with the reference group norms or to judge him 
within the general framework of psychiatric efficiency. Instead,
Mr. D's behaviour or Mr. B's friendship with Mr. A could be viewed 
as meaningful and appropriate behaviour. Consider, for example, 
the hypothetical case of a woman who experienced a rape, and in conse­
quence developed a general wariness of any kind of future relation 
with the opposite sex. Obviously, within the psychiatric framework, 
she suffers from 'a phobic anxiety', although she has a rational 
and convincing motive to fear men. Thus, it is crucial to evaluate 
the disturbed function in the context of the total function of the 
individual and to analyse the level of functional disturbance. Such 
analysis must be based on a mutual agreement between both the psychia­
trist and the patient on the significance of the degree of disturbance 
in any given functions. (A detailed account of the nature and purpose 
of the mutual agreement or contractual relationship between psychia­
trist and patient will be discussed in the following pages.)
The RFD model emphasises total functional failure as a 
necessary condition for diagnosing a person as a psychiatric case. 
Could it be that if only a physiological functional failure occurs 
in the above case for example, this would be a perfectly sufficient
condition for psychiatric intervention, even though the remaining 
functions (the social and psychological) work appropriately? Of 
course, physiological functional failure is a very serious condition 
which can endanger seriously the life of the individual under discussion. 
But the question arises here as to whether such a hypothetical case 
or any case suffering from disturbance in physiological function 
should be treated as a psychiatric case. It is not difficult to 
argue that deterioration of the physiological function belongs more 
properly to the realm of general medicine rather than that of psychiatric 
provision. If we are to consider physiological functional failure 
as meriting psychiatric provision, it must be clear that such 
physiological deterioration is a reflection of a general or total 
failure of all the remaining functions. The problem with the physio­
logical function as a criterion, as we have already established, 
is when one considers some forms of psychopathic condition as involving 
patterns of mental illness (which are very few in reality). In those 
cases, the psycho-social functions are radically deteriorated, but 
the physiological function might work perfectly. For that reason, 
the present writer accepts an obligation to view the criterion of 
physiological function when applied to the above conditions, as a 
sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the application 
of the RFD model.
Bearing our discussion so far in mind, the question which 
arises is: in what way does the RFD model succeed while other models
of mental illness fail?
The RFD model works on the assumption that most individuals 
with conditions described as 'mental illness* have the ability to 
accommodate and adapt in one way or another to their suffering.
We do not really question the fact that people might have 
dehumanising and severe psychiatric conditions, or the fact that 
current psychiatric diagnostic tools, the definition of mental illness, 
and psychiatric prediction, although not always 'exact1 or precise 
are nevertheless appropriate procedures for judging the normality 
of certain cases where the total disturbance of the individual's 
major function is unquestionable. In other words, one must differentiate 
between the appropriateness of current psychiatric diagnosis and 
prediction, and the precision or exactness of diagnosis and prediction. 
Our main concern, however, is with the moral appropriateness of the 
current psychiatric descriptions such as "chronic mental defective" 
or "latent schizophrenic".
The present writer's main proposal is a humanistic and 
a moral approach that deals with a human being as the master of his 
body and functions; and recognises his ability to control rather 
than to be controlled.
The RFD account emphasises the disturbed function as 
something that could be observed and claimed by the individual himself 
rather than be presumed or assumed by certain unreliable concepts 
such as 'vulnerability', 'latency', etc. Adherence to the above 
principle will surely lead to more protection of the individual from
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being subjected to unnecessary confinement or unjustified physical 
treatment or bizarre diagnoses.
A related central point presented by the RFD is its emphasis 
on the concept of 'reactiveness' as a crucial element in understanding 
the nature of the disturbed functions. Once we regard the individual’s 
total functions as a reactive rather than an internal event, mental 
health professionals will be ready to view the individual’s original 
problems as an interaction between two parties or more (see Laing 
and Esterson, 1970) rather than the result of unconscious belief, 
or unspecified and mechanical early S-R relations.
Mr. D's charitable behaviour was presumably viewed by the 
psychiatrist in charge as a residual deviance (deviation from the 
acceptable standard of charitable behaviour (Scheff, 1971), or as 
the result of conflicting unconscious desires (Freud in Hall and 
Lindzey, 1957), or a consequence of a continuous positive reinforcement 
that accompanies spending behaviour (Skinner, 1957).
What follows from such different models of interpretation 
is the way Mr. D would be managed as a result. The above aetiological 
models put great emphasis on unverified inner concepts which negate 
any possibilities of free will or self-determination on the part 
of the case. Mr. D was presumably diagnosed as ”a psychotic case" 
which carried the assumption of inner unknown organic pathology (medical 
model). Being psychotic means that his spending behaviour is an 
irresponsible and non-reliable act thus meriting the application
1 8 8
of a 'sick or diseased role'. Needless to say, being psychotic would 
lead to long-term confinement followed by negative outcomes as a 
long-term stigmatising effect, different sorts of serious psychiatric 
medications, etc.
The RFD model would take a different point of view, that 
is, that Mr. D's spending behaviour is the logical consequence of 
Mr. D's personal values rather than the outcome of irrational impulse. 
Certainly, his over-spending behaviour might cause problems to his 
family. Such over-spending behaviour can best be viewed as a partial 
temporary disturbance or failure in his psycho-social functioning 
that results from the way Mr. D has over-reacted to his humanistic 
values.
The question which arises here is: can a temporary or
sudden malfunctioning in M r . D's psycho-social functioning be considered 
as a sufficient condition for labelling him as 'schizophrenic' and 
treating him against his will?
A related example would be Ms N. No one could deny the 
fact that Ms N was suffering, but there is a crucial difference between 
saying that, whilst Ms N had a partial and temporary functional failure 
on the psycho-social level she might possibly regain her past level 
of functioning, and saying that the case is at the mercy of her 
unconscious repressed conflicts or unpleasant conditional responses 
or bad habits.
Ms N, although suffering from an obsessive compulsive 
behaviour, managed to live, not perhaps attaining perfect living 
standards, but remaining within tolerable limits. That did not prevent 
the psychiatrist in charge from recommending her admission to the 
psychiatric hospital and accepting a pathological concept of her 
disturbance. This did not help the patient, instead she became worse.
The over-emphasis on the necessity of psychiatric admission and medic­
ation is the result of the failure of many mental health professionals 
to communicate effectively with the patient.
Thus, it seems much easier for psychiatrist to adopt a 
behavioural or medical view of Ms N rather than to adopt a functional 
approach. That is to say, formulation of a concept of Ms N's problem 
based on S-R conditioning or unknown physical pathology that will 
be discovered in due course has resulted in considering Ms N's problem 
as non-voluntary. In other words, the application of the sick role 
or medical model was much easier. Consequently, Ms N was viewed 
as an object without free will. She was the victim of a mechanical 
S-R continuous process or organic defect lying somewhere in her brain. 
Thus, medicafcc.on or behavioural technique was taken to be the most 
appropriate course of action.
Finally, Mr. B who was diagnosed as having an underlying 
repressed homosexuality, represents another example of how different 
mo tie Is of mental illness can have different perspectives which give 
rise to the idea that whatever Mr. B suffers, there are always irrational 
reasons for his suffering or appropriate explanations for such suffering.
Now let us imagine a situation where Mr. B is not willing 
to admit his suffering to the psychiatrist and instead his family 
report about his problem. Mr. B would be certainly diagnosed as 
a psychiatric case. For most models of mental illness, not being 
able to communicate is a sufficient condition for labelling the 
individual as a psychiatric case. If Mr. B lacks co-operative skills 
or if he refuses to provide a verbal claim about his problem, that 
means that he lacks the necessary insight or he is too disturbed 
to accept the psychiatric treatment, or that his 'seeming normality'
(a Soviet diagnostic term) is present theoretically only but not 
actually. That is to say that the present models of mental illness 
have the ability and the flexibility to designate Mr. B as a psychiatr 
condition whether he is able to communicate or not. Accordingly, 
all of us are vulnerable to being a 'case' in the future, no matter 
how closely we now conform to "the normal".
The RFD model instead puts emphasis on the importance of 
Mr. B's verbal claim and his concept of the problem as something 
which is tied with his actual experience. Such a claim should be 
examined in the light of the ability of Mr. B to function in other 
parts of his life. It is evident from the case history that Mr. B's 
only problem is the sort of psychiatric interpretation attached to 
his motivational and cognitive abilities, i.e. homosexual instead 
of deep friendship. Therefore, there is little point in talking about 
psychiatric treatment with Mr. B once we agree that his only problem 
is the psychiatric misinterpretation he received of the acceptable 
or tolerable limits of interpersonal relationship.
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The above discussion shows how the RFD model works on the 
assumption that a totality of failure in the individual’s major 
functioning with the exception of psychopathic cases, is a necessary 
condition for any psychiatric intervention. The emphasis here is 
grounded on the fact that a person is not sufficiently disturbed 
unless all his major functions are not effectively employed in different 
aspects of his life. The only possible exception, with regard to 
certain cases, is the physiological function which is best viewed 
as sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the application 
of the RFD model. The reason for this exemption has been argued above.
This analysis of the RFD model as applied in psychiatric 
practice, highlights the great complexities and singularity of the 
individual’s functions when applied in different spheres of psyco- 
social life. That is to say, it is very difficult if not impossible 
to evaluate the disturbed functions ’objectively' due to the inclusion 
of different variables such as the individual's intentions, his motiv­
ational and cognitive abilities, his power of will, etc.
For that reason the RFD model takes a strong position 
against any attempt to minimise or ignore the right of patients to 
evaluate their own experience and total functional effectiveness.
Such a right could be promoted by adopting (in Szasz’s (1987) own 
words) "a voluntariness stand” or "a contractual psychiatry” where 
the individual has the right to evaluate his current life and eventually 
decides whether he needs psychiatric treatment or not. Accordingly, 
the individual is totally free to accept or refuse the psychiatrist's 
interpretation of his problem.
What follows from the above is that the individual's verbal 
claim or his own assessment has to be considered as a valid and 
sufficient indication of the kinds of factors which have contributed 
to his present problem.
The problem with much psychiatric research is that findings 
are presented to the public in a way which create the impression 
that the individual's problems can be explained by certain mathematical 
correlations between the individual's functional failure and certain 
psychological or social factors.
The present writer does not claim that he has sufficient 
answers for all the above limitations. What the RFD model might 
contribute in this respect is that when judging whether a particular 
individual has a total or partial functional failure, the clinician 
must conduct a systematic and detailed analysis in order to decide 
whether the individual's major functions central to his ability
to pursue his psycho-physio-social activities are sufficiently disturbed 
or n o t .
A central means to that purpose as already mentioned is 
the individual's verbal claim or self-report and the adherence to 
the principle of ''contractual'' or "voluntariness stand" in any diagnostic 
or therapeutic relationship with people described as psychiatric 
cases. Or, as Mead in Weinstein (1983) proposes in his interactionist 
model, the importance of the individual's own definition of his 
'deviance' and the meaning which is ascribed by others to his deviation.
Clearly the above analysis puts great emphasis on the 'patient's' 
freedom of choice between different courses of alternative action.
Such freedom is a central notion that needs to be promoted in clinical 
practice. The importance of the 'patient's' self-government and 
his personal account of his life stems from the following factors:
First, there are few psychiatric cases who are, in Wear's (1980) 
own words, "totally irrational or compulsive. They (those cases) 
differ in degree, not kind, from the rest of us" (p.299). Secondly, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide accurately the degree 
of hallucination or delusion that would have a significant effect 
on the patient's ability for sound choices in his life. The patient 
"may suffer from hallucination but learn through therapy to disregard 
such presentations and lead a competent life" (Ibid., p.307). Thus, 
symptoms alone which may be present in one context, and disappear 
in another, cannot be a sufficient criterion for deciding the patient's 
ability for rational and appropriate conduct in his life. Such 
symptoms might have a significant effect on the patient's moral agency 
but only if they are accompanied by a total functional failure.
The individual must experience such failure and his inability to 
function in a proper way. Thirdly, there are a great number of marginal 
cases (such as Mr. D and Mr. B) where part of the patient's disability 
is re(a.ted to a label, i.e. arises from psychiatric diagnosis. Such 
a label assumes the worst of them and they are treated as 'labelled' 
rather than individuals with rights and moral values. Fourthly, 
the patient's symptoms or his total functional limitations cannot 
be understood if the therapist is not fully aware of or acquainted 
with all aspects of the patient's personal and social development,
his religion, and his family. That is to say, the patient's total 
function is 'idiosyncractic' or personal. For that reason such function 
cannot be governed by general laws or reference, but must refer 
specifically to a unique individual with his own personal life's 
events and experience. What we need, as Szasz (1972) argues, is 
"a semiotical analysis of psychiatric operations" (p. 132) in order 
to help people who suffer certain temporary limitations in their 
total functions. Finally, it is almost impossible to discover and 
change the patient's early experience and learning patterns due to 
the fact that such experience is based on a "massive indiscriminating 
identification" (Szasz, 1972).
The above mentioned factors clearly imply that even if 
there is incapacity, or total functional failure, one cannot easily 
accept the fact that such deterioration "carries a corresponding 
right to be protected and treated, and thus entails such a duty for 
others" (Wear, 1980, p.309).
The patient's autonomy and self-determination require 
"a delicate balance between self-assertion sufficient to safeguard 
personal autonomy, and self-control sufficient to protect the autonomy 
of others" (Szasz, 1972, p.2).
Unfortunately, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to reach an acceptable definition or conceptual clarity on the notions 
of 'patient's autonomy' or 'others' autonomy' or 'self-control*.
Whatever our definition is, the psychiatrist is not automatically
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entitled to impose a treatment plan on the patient even if he knows 
what is best for him.
However, no one should be denied the medical expertise 
of a doctor when genuinely needed, while at the same time, no one 
would argue that the patient is the only expert on himself, his body, 
personal thoughts and the nature of his suffering.
Obviously, the kinds of 'patients’ we described in the 
preceding discussion were the ones who are capable of having some 
sort of 'insight' into their actual suffering. Accordingly, the 
RFD is more applicable to cases fit for 'psychotherapy'. In other 
words, cases that are more willing to submit to some form of counselling 
or educational methods to gain a certain degree of understanding 
of their disturbed function, or to define their "own conceptions 
of psycho-social 'illness' and 'health'" (Szasz, 1972, p.255). Szasz 
( 1972) emphasises the above point by arguing that understanding the 
patient's behaviour and symptoms from his point of view is the basic 
element that underlines all "rational and autonomous therapy".
In conclusion, what mental health professionals need to 
accept before any possible attempts to intervene psychiatrically 
is that they must be aware of the following:
"... to steep oneself in the events, to approach 
the phenomena with as few preconceptions as 
possible, to take a naturalist's observational 
descriptive approach to those events, and to 
draw forth those low-level inferences which seem 
most native to the material itself.
(Carl Rogers in Hall and Lindzey, 1957, p.527)
6. Conclusion
This chapter has presented a functional approach to the 
concept of ’mental illness*. Many of the hypotheses discussed here 
are largely unverified, as they suggest a moral rather than a 
conceptual account of ’mental illness*. Moreover, the reactive 
functional disorder (RFD) model highlights the following points:
1. The vulnerability of the concept of 'mental illness' for 
psychiatric abuse.
2. The importance of the concept of 'totality' in studying functional 
disturbance and in reducing the problem of psychiatric abuse.
The emphasis here is on 'abnormality' as related to specific 
'functions' as perceived and experienced by the individual himself 
and not just to unspecified symptoms.
3. The role of the concept of 'reactiveness' as a crucial factor 
in evaluating the disturbed function. Thus, instead of viewing 
the concept of 'mental illness' as something 'residing' inside
the individual, the alternative would be to view the above condition 
as a reaction to environmental and familial conditions that occur 
outside the individual. The present approach places great emphasis 
on functional failure as something which occurs within the process 
of the individual's reaction and confrontation with life's events. 
Furthermore, closely related to the above point, is the importance 
of understanding the meaning of the experience which both the 
individual and his reference group attach to the problem, thus 
shaping the general frame of reaction of both (Laing and Esterson, 
1970). Therefore, it seems necessary to admit, as Tarrier (1979) 
argues, that the application of the concept of the 'sick role'
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in psychiatry would be inappropriate because of the following:
(a) the sick role induces in the patient the feeling that he 
is inactive or submissive and other negative attitudes which 
discredit his general ability to formulate decisions and to 
determine his own courses of action; (b) the 'sick role' concept 
promotes the idea of irresponsibility, through the disease 
condition on the part of the patient and others; (c) it conceals 
or masks the fact that the individual's current problem is a 
mere reflection of conflicting factors occuring in the environment 
rather than residing within him. In fact, as we noted earlier, 
people constantly create new actions and behaviours and are not 
merely influenced by the societal stereotype norms.
4. Although the present approach highlights the inappropriateness
of most current conceptual models of 'mental illness' in providing 
accountable and workable clear procedures for understanding the 
concept of mental disorder, some concepts and explanations derived 
from the behaviour model of mental illness, existential psychology, 
and the humanistic approach in psychology, have been found useful 
in defining the nature of RFD.
5. Finally, great emphasis is put on promoting the 'patient's' right 
to choose and to self-determination. Furthermore, it was argued 
that the individual's autonomy could be fostered through the 
application of the concepts of voluntariness or contractual 
psychiatry and a rational or autonomous psychotherapy. The above 
concepts will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THOMAS SZASZ AND THE CONCEPT OF
MENTAL ILLNESS
THOMAS SZASZ AND THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Introduct ion
Thomas Szasz is one of the most controversial American 
psychiatrists who argues consistently that mental illness is a 
'problem of living' rather than a real medical 'illness'. In other 
words, the concept of mental illness is a myth and psychiatry is 
a moral or political rather than a medical discipline. Critics of 
Szasz such as Moore, Vatz and Weinberg, Roth and many others, argue 
correctly that Szasz's view on the concept of mental illness and 
psychiatry in general is based on theoretical and philosophical methods 
rather than on clinical evidence (e.g. case history, etc.). Nevertheless, 
Szasz's arguments highlight the conceptual and moral limitation of 
the concept of mental illness. Central to Szasz's argument is his 
objection to involuntary hospitalisation and the need to establish 
psychiatry on the basis of consenting or autonomous psychotherapeutic 
relationship. In fact, Szasz, as he personally admitted in an interview 
on BBC2 on Friday, 10.2.1989, is not against psychiatry but against 
psychiatric coercion and involuntary commitment of people described 
as 'mentally ill'. Szasz's contribution has been to the analysis 
of the linguistic and diagnostic methods used by psychiatrists through 
which they maintain their powerful social status in the society.
Szasz considers psychiatric labels as representing a 
misinterpretation of the individual's behaviour and his methods of 
interpretation. For Szasz, the metaphorical interpretation or psychiatric 
labelling of the individual's problems of living could deprive him
of his freedom and autonomy when his struggle with life’s difficulties 
is viewed by psychiatrists as unintelligible or an indication of 
underlying pathological agents and therefore meriting psychiatric 
intervent ion.
Thus Szasz repudiates the application of the ’disease’ 
or 'medical' model in psychiatry. For him, the medical model requires 
a well-defined physiological defect in the body to make it legitimate 
and valid. The application of this model, however, in psychiatry 
is inappropriate due to the fact that psychiatry as a profession 
is based on social, psychological and moral norms rather than on 
well-established biological deviation. Although Szasz does not refute 
the scientific status of psychiatry, he argues that it cannot "attain 
professional integrity by imitating medicine or scientific integrity 
by imitating physics" (1973 , p.68). Such integrity could be attained 
by the recognition, Szasz maintains, of the fact that problems of 
behaviour and suffering cannot be explained and understood by the 
application of mechanical scientific methods because human behaviour 
requires a special method of explanation, understanding, and inter­
pretation that differs significantly from those methods that are 
applied in the medical model. Thus, the alternative would be to 
view such a problem as the result of social, psychological and moral 
factors. However, as we shall show, this is not an alternative model 
which Szasz accepts for psychiatry.
This chapter is also concerned with an analysis and discussion 
of Szasz's general position on the concept of mental illness and
201
related psychiatric issues. It will be argued that Szasz has made 
an original contribution towards many problematic issues, for example, 
psychiatric practices such as institutionalised psychiatry, the 
vulnerability of the concept of mental illness to abuse, the importance 
of the right of each psychiatric patient to define himself and his 
best interest without any kind of professional intervention (autonomy). 
Some of Thomas Szasz's ideas, however, tend to be rather extreme 
and need a careful examination. His arguments are based on contro­
versial ideas such as the responsibility of psychiatric patients 
for their abnormal behaviour and their consequent placement in the 
category of 'criminals' if their behaviour breaks established laws.
Such ideas need to be evaluated critically. Moreover, Szasz invests 
far too great a confidence in the medical model as if such a model 
does not suffer from the problems of scientific certainty or the 
problems of diagnosis, treatment, prognosis and many other questionable 
issues such as morality, neutrality and ethics. Szasz's position 
on these issues also needs careful examination. Nevertheless, Szasz's 
ideas have been very influential in the development of humanistic 
psychiatry and it is believed that an insight into his theoretical 
framework will enable us to highlight the limitations of psychiatry 
in terms of defining and treating mental illness and the significant 
role of psycho-social factors in the development of human problems.
Thomas Szasz and the Concept of Mental Illness
"Why does the concept of 'mental illness' cause continuing 
difficulties, both philosophical and practical?" (Szasz in Caplan 
et al^edlQSl, p.459). In many of his books and articles, Szasz suggests
that 'mental illnesses’ are not real diseases like medical conditions 
but are rather behavioural conditions or psycho-social and moral 
issues. Szasz goes on to argue that the concept of mental illness 
creates many definitional and explanatory problems. In the following 
pages, we will discuss the definitional and the explanatory function 
of 'mental illness' from Szasz's point of view.
1. The concept of mental illness and the definitional problem
"Is there such a thing as mental illness?" (Szasz, 9:384). 
The keystone of Szasz's theoretical arguments is that mental illness 
is a theoretical rather than a real concept such as physical illness. 
That is because "mind is not a body part or bodily organ" (Szasz,
1984 , p. 15). For that reason, the concept of mental illness causes 
continuing difficulties for the mental health professionals. For 
Szasz, psychiatrists cannot define the concept of mental illness 
in the same way physicians define physical illness in terms of 
independent diagnostic indices. Mental illness, as Szasz argues, 
could not be identified in this way because it does not manifest 
itself in terms of organic deviation. Szasz's argument begins with 
drawing some similarities and differences between bodily illness 
and mental illness (see Szasz, 1987). For Szasz, bodily illness 
causes pain or suffering, though it may not cause any symptoms 
('asymptomatic' - leukemia, hypertension, etc.). Thus, the clinician 
depends on objective signs that are manifested in X-ray or blood 
tests in order to decide the presence of bodily disease. Mental 
illness, however, is identified on the basis of symptoms alone which
express themselves in behaviour. For Szasz "a symptomatic mental 
illness is an oxymoron . How could a person who does not gamble 
suffer from pathological gambling? Or a person who does not drink 
alcohol suffer from alcoholism? Or a person who is never manic suffer 
from mania?" (Szasz, 1987 , p.93). However, Roth (1976) repudiates 
Szasz's claims by stating that "Micro-organisms such as the strepto­
coccus or tubercle bacillus cause fatal infections in some individuals 
and live harmlessly in others. As the latter do not suffer pain 
or incapacity we do not diagnose disease or regard them as ill" (p.318) 
Another example would be, an individual who, like many other people 
with normal physical structure, has a small gland. "As with everyone 
else, this gland causes him pain, increases his chance of early death, 
and prevents him from eating a larger number of foods. Despite the 
fact that this physiological condition (until corrected by surgery) 
is universal, no one would hesitate to label the state caused by 
it an illness" (Moore , 1983, p. 190). A  further
example would be a person who suffers from dyspepsia - a complaint 
which is rarely caused by noticeable organic abnormality. Nevertheless 
the condition can be very uncomfortable and sometimes quite painful. 
Clearly, these examples show that being ill does not necessarily 
involve a certain pattern of organic signs or norms. The crucial 
thing, as Moore believed, is the presence of "pain, incapacitation, 
and the prospect of a hastened death" (Ibid., p. 192). For Moore, 
the problem of Szasz's arguments is that he refuses to accept the 
dualist argument. Moore maintains that to discuss the concept of 
mental illness and physical illness as belonging to one category 
is a logical mistake or "category" mistake. Mental phenomena which
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imply rationality, motivation, mental experience and intentions, 
etc.), cannot be reduced to physical phenomena (see Boorse, 1982). 
Although Moore's arguments seem very convincing, the examples which 
he uses to refute Szasz's arguments are not very appropriate. Ronald 
Pies (1983) argues that bodily disease and mental
disease are identified on "what the patient is^  and does or is not 
and cannot do - not on the finding of a lesion or even a patho­
physiological change" (Pies, p. 196). The patient ^s^ in pain or 
suffering. He goes to the physician and describes the pain. He 
might be unable to talk or to move (Ibid.). However, one cannot 
deny the fact that judgmental accuracy in general medicine is much 
higher than in psychiatry.
Although Szasz fails to recognise that even general medicine 
suffers from problems of scientific uncertainty in relation to 
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis, (Roth, 1976), he has contributed 
an important theoretical perspective on the conceptual limitation 
of the concept of mental illness and the morally negative outcome
of psychiatric terminology under the guise of medicine. For Szasz,
the 'psychotic' or 'neurotic' individual cannot be understood by 
using medical terminology. Szasz believes that mental health pro­
fessionals have gone too far in the medicalisation of their language 
and that using medical language confers on psychiatrists the power 
to interpret the individual's problems in a manner which is 'a credit' 
or 'discredit' to them (Weinberg and Vatz, 1983, p.212). Human suffer­
ing, unhappiness and behavioural problems, Szasz argues convincingly,
cannot be conceptualised within the medical model because physicians
lack the necessary insight into the complex factors inherent in human 
suffering (Weinberg in Vatz and Rappaport, and Weinberg, 1983). 
Behaviour, Szasz maintains, cannot be interpreted as a form of disease 
The alternative for Szasz is that human 'problems of living' should 
be seen within the psychosocial moral framework. Szasz does not 
deny the existence of human suffering, or the existence of 'abnormal' 
people. What Szasz objects to is that human suffering and behaviour 
maladjustment are taken out of the context of the general human 
condition of which problems of living are an integral part and are 
firmly placed instead within the narrow confines of medical practice. 
The problem with this tendency in psychiatry, is that the medical 
model is ill-equipped to deal with the wider psycho-social and moral 
implications of human behaviour. What is more, Szasz convincingly 
argues that the medical model in psychiatry is cloaked in highly 
technical and exclusive language which invests the mental health 
professional with 'scientific authority' and endows him with the 
power to control the life of the individual. Taken to its extreme, 
this state of affairs can have serious implications for human rights 
generally, and for the rights of mental patients in particular.
Szasz supports his claim of the problematic nature of psychiatric 
terms by arguing that in actual practice few psychiatrists will 
hesitate to diagnose a person as 'psychotic' if he shows certain 
symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions. In fact, the psychiatri 
has no choice but to give such diagnosis or designate the patient 
as having "atypical psychosis" (APA, DSM-III, p. 115). The reason 
for this, Szasz argues, "lies in the prejudgments that words such 
as 'hallucination' and 'delusion' carry with them" (Szasz, 1987 ,
p.95). In other words, there is a great danger in the power hidden 
behind the language used by psychiatrists. Thus dissident political 
attitudes or socially non-conformist behaviour can be interpreted 
in some cases as mental symptoms. Such symptoms risk being viewed 
as constituting mental illness rather than as possible indications 
of illness. Szasz rightly argues that the terms used in psychiatry 
are often used as if they are a 'description* of the patient's mental 
functions when actually these terms are no more than 'a prescription' 
for how mental health authorities must manage the patients.
Let us consider in this context, Mr. D's spending behaviour, 
discussed in the previous chapter. His behaviour was diagnosed as 
an indication of mental illness and eventually it was recommended 
that he be placed in a mental hospital. In fact "once we have trans­
lated mental illness from description to prescription, we no longer 
have to accept or reject the assertion about mental illness" (Szasz, 
Ibid., p.283). Such manipulation of psychiatric vocabulary, as Szasz 
puts it, implies a strategic use of mental illness. Such vocabulary, 
as Szasz argues, could be used to justify, rationalise or obscure 
moral conflicts as in the cases where the psychiatrists have ration­
alised and justified the so-called "therapeutic abortion" (see Szasz, 
1962). In therapeutic abortion, the practice is based on subjective 
and unverifiable criteria such as to protect the woman's mental health 
rather than on well-established medical criteria. The above psychiatr 
justification was used when abortion was an illegal act in many 
countries. Nowadays, when abortion has become legal in many countries 
"the psychiatric disabilities so common to pregnant women disappeared
just as suddenly as they had appeared two decades earlier" (Szasz,
1987, p.292). Myre Sim in Crown (1970) provides a further support 
to Szasz's argument when he states that the puerperal psychosis which 
was considered to be the central justification for therapeutic abortion, 
is not affected negatively by the continuation or termination of 
pregnancy. Another example provided by Szasz would be the psychiatric 
justification of drug addiction. The blame in this example is not 
directed to the addict but to the drug itself and dealers. The addict, 
consequently, is an "innocent individual". To provide a full account 
of how psychiatric vocabulary could be handled in a manner which 
helps to obscure moral conflicts, consider the following case which 
was interviewed by the present writer. The case concerns a 24 year 
old Kuwaiti woman who had been adopted by a Kuwaiti family when she 
was two years old. The woman in question engaged in an affair with 
a Kuwaiti man. Her family discovered the affair and had her placed 
in the psychiatric hospital in Kuwait. The psychiatrists in charge 
at the hospital were faced with the problem of instilling a sense 
of morality and responsibility in her personality. This is explained 
as follows: In Kuwait, pre-marital sex is totally forbidden. This
is a concept that is derived from the Islamic culture where a family's 
honour rests on the chastity of their women. Each girl is responsible 
not only for her own, but also her family's reputation. Thus the 
admission of the case to a mental hospital serves to relieve her foster 
family from any moral conflict. The psychiatrist in charge provided 
the family with a morally acceptable answer to their problem by shifting 
the moral blame from the family itself to the 'disease' which affected 
their daughter's personality. The sexual problem according to the
psychiatrist, is due to personality disorder and not to the actual 
choice of the individual to behave in a certain way. Thus, their 
daughter is 'innocent'. On the point of sexual behaviour, Szasz 
argues in The Therapeutic State that "like any behaviour it may be 
judged to be good, bad or indifferent; conflicting and confusing 
such judgements with treatments is unworthy of the human intellect" 
(Szasz, 1984 , p.351). Szasz goes on to argue that psychiatric diagnosis 
and treatment for such cases "comes into being not because the alleged 
patient wants or is willing to submit to it, but because someone 
other than the 'patient' claims that the 'patient' is 'mentally ill" 
(Ibid., p . 17). Once admitted to a mental hospital, the patient becomes 
a 'mental case' and, as such, is defined in psychiatric terms which 
do not take into account the moral and psychosocial factors which 
usually have a significant bearing on the individual's total function­
ing. For Szasz, such factors cannot be dealt with by using medical 
terms. The only possible alternative is that human suffering and 
the daily struggle with problems be analysed and interpreted within 
the uniqueness of the psychosocial and moral context of each individual. 
One wonders whether, for example, if the psychiatrist in charge of 
Mr. D's case had investigated his psychosocial background more carefully 
and had become more aware of Mr. D's deep devotion to the true 
principles of religion, he would then still have diagnosed him as 
a 'psychotic'. What is more, psychiatric terms such as paranoia, 
schizophrenia, mania, etc., are highly evaluative in that they usually 
take behaviour as irrational or in some way incompetent (consider 
for example, the diagnosis of Mr. D's behaviour and that of the young 
Kuwaiti woman, discussed earlier). In both cases, the psychiatric
terms used to describe the 'patient's' behaviour serve to devaluate 
and discredit the inherent rationality and personal will of the people 
concerned. In fact, for Szasz, the use of such terms reflects a strong 
belief among mental health professionals that the problem is an indication 
of clear-cut inner pathological agents and not merely a subjective 
perception on the part of the person or his family. Szasz's objection 
is that such claims of suffering do not always necessarily reflect the 
actual belief and psychosocial structure of the individual. According 
to him "illness cannot be inferred from only a claim of suffering since 
we cannot infer suffering from that claim" (Szasz in Weinberg and Vatz, 
1983, p.210). For Szasz, psychiatrists cannot claim that they can 
evaluate objectively concepts such as subjective suffering or rationality 
or the intentional forces that rest behind the individual behaviour. 
Moreover, he maintains, even if mental health professionals presumably 
possessed such technical methods of evaluation or had highly developed 
communicative skills, it would be difficult to imagine that mental health 
professionals could effectively alter or reconstruct the individual's 
sense of responsibility or his power of rationality more effectively than 
the individual himself. Thus, Mr. D's spending behaviour reflects a 
strong belief in helping the poor with which his behaviour is in total 
congruence, while in the case of the young Kuwaiti woman, her behaviour 
while perhaps unacceptable from the point of view of Kuwaiti society 
would be understandable to anyone for whom responses to emotion are 
important.
It is, as Szasz argues, illogical to believe that psychiatrists 
can be effective in changing people's well-established beliefs unless
the individuals themselves are totally convinced that their attitudes 
or behaviour are wrong. This is because, according to Szasz, even if 
they possess highly developed communicative skills, psychiatrists cannot 
build up their patients' conceptual framework without the cooperation 
of the patients themselves or their motivation to undergo psychiatric 
treatment or their acceptance of their role as psychiatric patients.
Thus, it appears that the aim of psychiatric intervention in both of 
the cases referred to above is to "safeguard the sensibilities not of 
the patient, but of those he upsets. This is a moral and social, not a 
medical problem" (Szasz, 1973.., p.86) and it will "make no sense to 
select patients on moral or legal grounds, and then study them as if 
they were medically ill" (Szasz, 1987. , p.346).
In support of the above quotation from Szasz, consider the 
Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 which includes a category of moral defect­
iveness under which people were committed to mental hospitals for 
'immoral' conduct, e.g. sexual relationships and pregnancy outside 
marriage (Miller and Rose (eds.), 1986). In fact, even today, there 
are many cases of people treated in psychiatric institutions in countries 
in the Middle East where illegitimate pregnancy is taken as a serious 
act of breaking the moral and Islamic code, and an indication of lack 
of rationality and the ability to weigh up the outcome of a given 
behaviour. Such cases show clearly the danger of admitting a patient 
to a psychiatric hospital on moral criteria rather than on the basis of 
"voluntary psychiatry, or psychiatric relations between consenting 
adults" (Szasz, 1984 , p.25). Accordingly, Szasz put a great emphasis 
throughout his writings on the dangers of the over-medicalization of 
psychiatric terms.
As mentioned earlier, such medicalisation, Szasz maintains, 
will not solve the individual's personal suffering and his behavioural 
problems. That is because such problems have originally emerged from 
psycho-social factors rather than well-established medical inner agents 
(see Vatz and Rappaport and Weinberg, 1983). Unfortunately, Szasz does 
not provide mental health professionals with an alternative clear 
conceptual model in psychiatry to deal with patients who suffer from 
certain mental impairments. This is because he does not set out to do 
so (see Ibid., 1983). Szasz does not claim that his conception of mental 
illness is a new model for psychiatric treatment or diagnosis. His 
approach might best be viewed as a moral and theoretical argument aimed 
at highlighting the danger of the labels used by psychiatrists to diagnose 
and commit so-called patients against their best interests.
Szasz questions the current limitations surrounding many 
psychiatric issues such as the concept of mental illness, psychiatric 
therapies and diagnosis, psychiatric institutions (hospitals), and how 
such limitations affect the individual's ability to define himself and 
his best interest without any interference from others (psychiatrists). 
Szasz's position on the concept of freedom and autonomy as it relates 
to psychiatric practice will be discussed later on.
The Diagnostic and Explanatory Function of Mental Illness
Although Szasz’s controversial view on mental illness and 
psychiatric language cannot constitute a new practical alternative for 
psychiatric treatment and diagnosis, it does raise many crucial questions
regarding the validity and reliability of the explanatory and diagnostic 
function of the concept of mental illness.
"While I maintain that mental illness does not 
exist, I obviously do not imply or mean that the 
social and psychological occurrences to which
this label is attached also do not exist .....
It is the labels we give them that concern me, 
and, having labelled them, what we do about them."
(Szasz, 1973, p.21 )
Szasz's basic concern is that the labels which are currently 
in use in psychiatry imply, as we noted earlier, "Promotive statements 
in the guise of cognitive assertions" (Ibid., p.50). In reality, the 
use of terms such as "schizophrenia" imply that the individual's behaviour 
is irrational and "does not know what he is doing" (Szasz,
1983, p . 166). For that reason, Soviet authorities label dissidents as
'schizophrenics' and not as 'homosexuals' or as suffering from personality 
disorders.
In fact, Szasz does not dispute the fact that mental cases
exist in reality, but that does not mean that he accepts the concept
of mental illness. As he puts it, a disbelief in the existence of God 
does not lead one to disbelieve the existence of priests (Szasz, 1987).
Thus, Szasz accepts the classificatory act in psychiatry for those
'patients' who have 'real' suffering. His main objection, however, is
to the morally negative outcome of the very act of labelling. Such
negative consequences could range from a compulsory confinement of the 
classified individual, which can have dehumanizing effects on the 
patient, to social stigma, and the certification of incompetency and
irrationality of those who receive the labels. Perhaps the most 
dangerous consequence of such labelling is that its effects could last 
permanently. The possible alternative for Szasz is to consider "the 
context, nature, and purpose of the classificatory act" (Szasz, 1973, 
p.216). The purpose and nature of diagnosis and classification, Szasz 
maintains, would make sense only in terms of the availability of an 
effective treatment (Szasz, 1987). Surely, if a particular psychiatric 
diagnosis has a negative effect on the patient, as we mention above, 
and at the same time, does not lead to an effective treatment plan, 
then it would be not only pointless but positively damaging. In general 
terms, an effective diagnosis must be followed by an effective plan of 
management of the disorder, as is usually the case in general medicine. 
The medical patient, in most cases, knows the kind of treatment he will 
have and the limits and consequences of such treatment. Moreover, he 
builds "a concept of his need, and - in accordance with his judgement 
and his means to command the help he wants - he selects the expert whose 
service he wishes to enlist" (Szasz, 1973 ., p.240). In addition, he 
can reject his physician's diagnosis. The mental patient, on the 
contrary, is bound by his psychiatric condition, and by the floating 
concept of psychiatric causality, to deal with mental health professional 
alone and in rather vague and unspecified terms. That is to say, that 
there are "no clear limits on what the experts are allowed to do, or
what in fact they might do ..... the clients are insufficiently protected
from such acts they deem to be against their best interest" (Szasz, 1973 
p. 240). Szasz continues to argue that in many cases, the individual 
becomes labelled as a mental patient because someone else claims that 
he is mentally ill. Such an individual cannot refuse the psychiatric
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treatment or the psychiatric diagnosis. For Szasz, the process of 
classifying or diagnosing a person as mentally ill begins when such 
an individual occupies the role of mental patient. Once he occupies 
such a role, "the psychiatrist can - and often does - interpret his 
behaviour as a manifestation of mental illness" (Szasz, 1987, p.84).
To some extent, it is true that in many cases, where the 
individual patient is brought to the mental hospital by his family or 
the police, the psychiatrist finds himself in a difficult position for 
the following reasons: Firstly, mental health professionals feel a
kind of obligation to place patients into diagnostic categories because 
an unclassified patient is 'unpredictable’ and therefore cannot be 
managed clinically. Secondly, in the eyes of the psychiatrist, the very 
act of bringing the patient to the mental hospital either by his family 
or the police, is a clear indication of his 'mental disturbance' and 
thus merits the label of 'mental illness1. His failure to admit that 
he is 'ill' or his refusal to sign the treatment's consent form is inter­
preted as another indication of the presence of mental illness. As 
many mental health professionals believe, the mental patient is too 
sick to realise that he is ill. Finally, it may be difficult for the 
mental health professional to devaluate the perceptions of the family 
or police who have brought the patient, by refusing to admit him. 
Additionally, clinicians often feel they need to confirm the social 
expectation that they have infallible professional expertise and can 
easily detect the signs and symptoms of mental illness. Perhaps such 
behaviour can be explained in terms of a defence mechanism on the part 
of the psychiatrist. On the other hand, the psychiatrist's over-confidence
could be viewed as a reaction to the impreciseness and limitations 
of his diagnostic powers and explanatory function of the concept of 
mental illness. Unfortunately, although such limitations do exist, 
many psychiatrists in their daily practice tend not to give them 
sufficient consideration. What is more, the inherent weakness of the 
mental illness model can lead to feelings of insecurity on the part 
of the psychiatrist when confronted with a case he does not really 
understand. Szasz presents an interesting illustration to the above 
problem by stating that "if the patient arrives early for his appointment, 
he is anxious; if he arrives late, he is hostile; and if he is on 
time, he is compulsive" (Szasz, 1987, p.85).
Obviously, Szaszfs argument leads us to conclude that mental 
health professionals can interpret any sign of behaviour as an 
indication of psychological disturbance. The danger implied in the 
above methods of understanding abnormal behaviour is that psychiatric 
labels are often used "as if" they refer to something real or factual 
and not a judgement which can be open to error and misinterpretation.
Szasz goes on to argue that the conceptual and problematic nature of 
the concept of mental illness creates many problems for explaining and 
understanding abnormal behaviour. A plausible alternative, Szasz 
maintains, would be to view mental illness as a ’metaphorical’ disease. 
That is to say, mental health problems are in fact problems resulting 
from psychosocial and moral factors rather than medical ones. Mental 
illness, for Szasz, as we mention earlier, is a 'problem of living' 
and human problems of living need not be classified within the general 
framework of disease. It must be pointed out, however, that Szasz does
not argue against the presence of certain disturbances in the EEG 
patterns or some physical signs in some ’schizophrenics', for example. 
The problem, nevertheless, occurs when considering the fact that 
psychiatrists;
" .....  rarely look for such disturbances (chemical
or physical changes) in what we consider normal 
behaviour. In addition, if we found such physical 
evidence in a person whose behaviour was conventional, 
we would not call it mental illness. Furthermore, 
when a person is 'stricken' with mental illness and 
we discover certain EEG patterns, we rarely have 
prior EEG information on that individual. Quite 
possibly, he had the same EEG patterns when he was 
considered 'mentally healthy'."
(Weinberg and Vatz, 1983, p.213)
Throughout many of his publications, Szasz emphasises the 
idea that the individual occupies the role of mental patient as a result 
of his violation of an agreed social or moral code in his society 
rather than a deviation in his EEG patterns. Moreover, as Weinberg and 
Vatz argue, psychiatrists investigate the chemical disturbances in 
people who are already diagnosed as mentally ill rather than looking 
for normal people who might show the same chemical disturbance.
The above attack on the reality of mental illness does not 
lead Szasz to undermine the effectiveness of psychiatric treatments 
(e.g. medication-psychotherapy, etc.). For Szasz, the different 
models of psychiatric treatments are real and may help 'mentally ill’ 
people, "but this proves not that mental diseases are literal maladies, 
but only that mental treatments can be effective interventions" (Szasz, 
1987, p . 163). Thus, for example, the effective treatment of sleep
disturbance by sedatives does not in itself prove that the sleep
disturbance is in itself a disease - but only that the particular drug
has made the individual go to sleep.
In support of the above view, consider the following case 
concerning a relative of the present writer who was suffering from 
'schizophrenia'. Every time he 'relapsed' (or his family thought he 
had begun to relapse), the police would be called out to take him to 
the mental hospital. (He refused to admit himself voluntarily, hence 
the police involvement.) The police would arrest him while he was 
driving and would justify their action by claiming he had crossed at 
a red light - then they would take him to the mental hospital.
Each time he was admitted, he received ECT and a course of 
anti-psychotic drugs for 2-3 weeks. It could be argued that the
psychiatric treatment in the mental hospital might have helped the case
in question in terms of controlling certain hallucinations and delusions. 
However, after each discharge, the patient would ask the present writer 
to explain why the police had admitted him to the hospital when his 
only mistake had been to cross at the red light. Eventually, he began 
to display obsessive behaviour, for instance, he would tell a joke to 
his family, and he would look around and ask them 'will you call the 
police now?' and carefully watch their expressions to try and perceive 
what they were thinking about him. He lost his self-confidence and 
became reluctant to plan ahead even for the simplest action because 
he was afraid this might give his family the impression that he was 
beginning to 'hallucinate' again and they would call the police. Now, 
if we presume this case is suffering from psychotic symptoms and also
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presumably believe that involuntary psychiatric treatment will relieve 
him from the psychotic symptoms, should this lead us to conclude that 
because the psychiatric treatment results in an effective improvement 
in his general condition, there is something physically wrong with 
his brain? Szasz (1987) answers the above question by stating that:
"We do not infer the presence of medical illness 
from the fact that after taking a drug, a person, 
called patient, claims to feel better, or from 
the fact that someone else claims he acts better."
For Szasz, pathophysiological indication rather than 'other's' claims 
is the most reliable criteria for deciding the presence of 'disease'
or the effectiveness of treatment.
However, there are various other possibilities which Szasz
fails to consider in cases such as the one outlined above, namely
psychodynamic disruptions, dysfunctions of mental processes, mental 
causation, etc., all of which are possibilities of mental disease, which 
could, at some future date, be established by neuro-psychiatric research.
Nevertheless, if the case in question was really a patient 
suffering from 'mental illness' and if the psychiatric treatment was 
really effective, he should then have been happier after his treatment, 
something which obviously was not the case with the patient described 
above. The analogy with general medicine breaks down here because, 
even after invasive surgery or other distressing procedures, the general 
medical patient would probably feel greatly relieved if previous symptoms 
have been alleviated.
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For all of the reasons outlined above Szasz goes to the 
extreme of rejecting the concept of mental illness altogether and 
requires that a clear-cut inner pathological lesion be a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for the presence of ’mental illness’.
Such a view has been rejected by some writers who point out the fact 
that even in general medicine there are problematic issues regarding 
the diagnosis and treatment of some diseases. Critics of Szasz, 
however (e.g. Moore and Pies and Schoenfield, Roth, Clare and many 
others), do not give a full and convincing account of Szasz’s contro­
versial views. They assert that the qualification agents for illness 
are very few and the most important indication for the identification 
of illness is the patient's verbal report that he is suffering, but 
omit to answer a very important question, i.e. how a person receives 
a definition of mental illness in the absence of both lesions and 
complaints? (Weinberg and Vatz, 1983). As has already been pointed 
out, in psychiatric practice, there are certain cases in which the 
psychiatric label is attached by 'significant others' such as relatives, 
the police, his work colleagues, and other’ lay community members 
(as we saw in the case mentioned previously). In fact, this is the 
most common reason for psychiatric diagnosis. This then, reinforces 
the notion that mental illness is a third party illness.
Szasz's critics, in addition, are not prepared to answer 
questions regarding the negative moral consequences of psychiatric 
definitions and whether identifying human suffering or problems of 
living is more important than the negative outcome of such identification. 
Moreover, a definition of mental illness would not establish the
degree of subjective involvement of significant others in the identif­
ication of 'mental disturbance'.
The ambiguity and the low degree of objectivity in the 
process of defining mental patients has led Szasz to question the 
very nature of 'psychiatric disease':
"If we are to have a clear and meaningful concept 
of illness as a class of phenomena (say, Class A), 
then we must recognise firstly, that there are 
occurrences which look like illness but which may 
turn out to be something else (Class B) , and secondly, 
that there are occurrences which may properly belong 
in the class of counterfeit illness (Class C ) . All 
this is logically inherent in classifying certain 
forms of behaviour as illnesses."
(1972, p.52)
Clearly, for Szasz psychiatric disorders belong to the 
class of counterfeit illness. However, Glazer in Roth (1976) has 
reacted to the above argument by viewing such distinction between 
a Class A and non-A phenomena as no more than a "dichotomy game"
(p.317). Szasz's main problem, Glazer maintains, is that he strictly 
separates the class of mental illness from the class of physical 
illness without allowing for the fact that a class of phenomena may 
belong to both class A and B at the same time which is logically 
acceptable. Roth (1976) also questions Szasz's strict separation 
between the two classes of events by stating that:
"Szasz seems to have no conception of the mental 
attitude an ordinary medical man takes up when he 
is first called to see a patient, and the mental 
processes that then ensue. Probably the very first 
thing the doctor becomes aware of is a global 
impression, that the patient is (or perhaps is not) 
obviously ill. By his history-taking and clinical 
examination he then confines the fields of inquiry 
to perhaps one system. Step by step the diagnostic 
process works its way down to a syndrome, and 
eventually perhaps, to a disease. Dr. Szasz imagines 
it quite differently. As he supposes, the doctor 
first finds physical signs of macroscopic or micro­
scopic cellular changes, proceeds from there to the 
naming of a disease and finally from the presence 
of the disease concludes that the patient must be 
ill. If the signs aren't there, or aren't found, he 
then says that there is no illness."
( p . 317)
Indeed, even in the medical context, there are certain 
diseases which could be difficult to classify into clear-cut categories, 
a situation which could easily lead to errors in judgement. Even 
the fact that the degree of judgmental accuracy is much lower in 
psychiatry than in general medicine could be held against Szasz, 
since he attaches no meaning or consideration to such a fact. Never- 
thelessi Szasz's basic argument on the conceptual and practical 
problems which surround the concept of 'mental illness' still stands.
As we said before, one of these practical problems is the over- 
medicalization of human problems of living as if they are real diseases 
with a clear organic basis. Such "psychiatrization" of life can 
lead some psychiatrists to ignore the concept of autonomy and the 
freedom of the individual in their treatment plans. This has prompted 
Szasz to emphasise the moral and ethical aspects of psychiatric 
treatment (e.g. the right to define oneself in one's best interest, 
autonomy, human freedom, etc.).
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A careful analysis of Szasz's position on the issue of 
autonomy and mental illness would reveal that he does not actually 
claim that the 'mentally ill' individual can always be autonomous 
or can always be treated as a responsible moral agent. What bothers 
Szasz is that if we agree to treat patients with a somatic complaint 
as moral agents and at the same time assume that mental illness has 
an organic basis, just like physical disease, which will be discovered 
in due course, then the logical conclusion would be that we ought 
to treat mental patients with somatic complaints on an equal footing 
with medical patients. That is to say, we should respect the mental 
patient's autonomy and his personal claims just as we respect the 
medical patient's autonomy. In actual psychiatric practice, Szasz 
continues to argue, "people have been deprived of this right on the 
ground that their 'true' interest require that they receive 'life- 
saving psychiatric treatment" (Szasz, 1984 , p.97).
This state of affairs has led Szasz to propose what he 
calls 'the psychiatric will' - based on the idea of the 'living will*
- a written statement prepared by the patient in advance stating 
that he does not want to be subjected to certain life-prolonging 
procedures when his physical condition deteriorates. Szasz argues 
that the idea of the 'living will', can be extrapolated to psychiatry, 
in the form of the 'psychiatric will* in which the individual has 
the right to state in advance that he does not wish to be subjected 
to psychiatric treatment should be become psychotic (see Chodoff 
and Peeb, 1983). One of Szasz's main arguments is that psychiatric 
terms are totally inadequate because they tend to ignore the centrality
of psychosocial and moral factors in shaping the individual's total 
life. So what Szasz claims to be doing is to try to 're-ethicize’
... the language of psychiatry (Szasz, 1973 , p.2). The question 
which arises here is: Why is Szasz bothering to ’re-ethicize* the
language of psychiatry when he has already rejected the concept of 
mental illness and psychiatry generally as a medical discipline?
It would appear that Szasz is in some way confusing issues 
- the issue of ethics in general and the negative consequences of 
psychiatric labelling and the issue of the concept of mental illness 
in itself in terms of its validity and reliability. It seems to 
the present writer that the possible adverse consequences of psychiatr 
diagnostic practice cannot in themselves be used logically as a 
justification to negate the validity of the concept of mental illness 
or mental suffering or the existence of individuals with different 
sorts of psycho-social malfunctioning. What is more, maintaining 
that psychiatric diagnosis must be followed by an effective treatment, 
Szasz completely ignores the fact that a psychiatric diagnosis, very 
much like a medical diagnosis, is the first appropriate procedure 
in the investigation of a human problem - and that again as in general 
medicine, the problem is not always necessarily curable (see Roth, 
1976) .
It seems to the present writer that Szasz confuses issues 
here again - the issue of a diagnosis per se and the issue of the 
negative consequences of psychiatric diagnosis.
What is more, if mental illness is 'a myth* as Szasz claims, 
then it is difficult to understand his consistent desire to review 
psychiatric language, as if he is willing to accept the presence 
of psychiatry but with certain 'moral* reforms. Indeed, on different 
occasions, Szasz has emphasised that he is not against psychiatry, 
but against psychiatric coercion and the restrictions placed on the 
patient's self-determination (Szasz in After Dark Programme, 1988).
In addition to ’re-ethicizing' the language of psychiatry, 
Szasz proposes that in order to gain a scientific basis, psychiatry 
must:
"... recast its theories and practices in a moral 
and psychosocial framework and idiom. This would 
emphasise the differences rather than the similar­
ities, between social man and biological man." 
(Szasz, 1973 , p. 167)
The question which follows from the above quotation is, what kind 
of scientific foundation must psychiatry be based on? Is it the 
same foundation as that of general medicine? Or does Szasz have 
in mind special scientific methods used by mental health professionals 
exclusively? If the practice of psychiatry becomes based purely 
on "medical-technical methods" this would certainly encourage improve­
ment in its scientific status (i.e. more certainty, higher objectivity, 
etc .) .
Such a development, however, would almost inevitably destroy 
the centrality of personal and emotional variables in perpetuating
the individual's mental anguish. According to such a model, a 
dominant mother, or a traumatic accident, or a generally troubled 
life, etc., will have little bearing on the consideration of this 
current problem. Szasz's view on recasting psychiatric theories 
and practices within a moral and psycho-social framework, seems con­
vincing because the field that psychiatry is dealing in is that of 
relationships, in which emotional and psycho-social factors are 
implicated. Such factors do not always yield to direct observation 
and controlled experiment as is the case with the "world of objective 
facts" (Macmurray, 1939, p. 116). That is because human behaviour 
is too complex a subject, sometimes depending on intangible factors 
which might be rooted far back in a person's childhood experiences. 
Moreover, to study psycho-social factors scientifically, it must 
be clear that this is "only possible so far as we can stand apart 
from things and observe what is happening without interfering" (Macmurray, 
1939, p.86). In the mental health profession in general, it is difficult
for the psychiatrist or psychologist to stand apart from what they
observe because any given diagnosis or psychotherapeutic plan tends 
to reflect schools of thought (e.g. Freudian, Rogerian, behaviourist, 
etc.), religious beliefs, ethical codes, values and attitudes. Thus, 
as Macmurray (1939) puts it convincingly:
"... to produce a scientific theory of human
behaviour, which will be applicable to all human
behaviour without exception, we must assume that 
all human behaviour is objectively determined, 
or in other words, that it can be accounted for 
without reference to the will of the human beings 
whose behaviour it is."
(Ibid., p. 162)
Clearly, it would be difficult if not an impossible task to introduce 
a universal scientific theory which would apply to all human behaviour. 
That is because human behaviour is relative, is often context-specific, 
is mostly driven by the intentions (motives) and the will of each 
separate individual. What is more, one must consider the relativistic 
question of whether it is possible to observe a psychological phenomenon 
without thereby subtly changing the nature and the characteristics 
of the phenomenon which is observed.
The above argument leads us to conclude that to establish 
psychiatry or psychology on a purely humanistic foundation, as Szasz 
argues (an idea which also appeals to the present writer), will, 
unfortunately, mean that we will have to accept a low level of object­
ivity, validity and reliability in psychiatry and psychology as 
scientific disciplines.
Psychiatry or neurology: a problem of conflicting properties
"If psychiatrists are especially knowledgeable 
about the brain and the diseases that affect it 
... then they have a legitimate claim to being 
regarded as medical specialists. But if the domain 
of psychiatry is the brain and its system therein 
then the difference between neurology and psychiatry 
is the same as the difference between a glass half 
full and a glass half empty. Maintaining such a 
distinction-without-a-difference is indefensible 
both scientifically and economically. Given such 
a case and if academic institutions aspire to be 
scientific and the law rationally enlightened - 
educators ought to teach either neurology or 
psychiatry, but not both; the law ought to recognise 
either neurology or psychiatry but not both; ..."
227
and
"as soon as a disease thought to be mental is 
proven to be physical it is removed from the domain 
of psychiatry and placed in that of medicine, to 
be treated henceforth by internists, neurologists 
or neurosurgeons ... It is an ironic paradox then, 
that while definitive proof that mental illnesses 
are brain diseases would destroy psychiatry's raison 
d ’etre as a medical speciality distinct and separate 
from neurology,•the claim that mental illness is a 
brain disease has served and continues to serve as 
the psychiatrist’s most effective justification for 
legitimacy as an independent medical discipline." 
(Szasz, 1987 , p.70)
The above quotation provokes many controversial questions 
regarding the legitimacy and limitations of psychiatric practice.
Now, if psychiatrists claim that mental illness has an organic basis 
which can be detected in due course, the questions which arise are:
Who is the best qualified to discover the organic basis of psychosis 
for example? Is the psychiatrist adequately qualified to deal with 
pathology or with neurology? If, on the other hand, the neurologist 
and the pathologist were the best qualified to discover the pathology 
of mental illness, would that mean that the category ’mental illness’ 
should be removed from the domain of psychiatry and placed in another 
branch of medicine? (Szasz, 1987). Further, if it were the neurologist 
who established the pathology of mental illness who should then be 
responsible for the design of the treatment plan? And if mental 
illness were to be removed from the domain of psychiatry, what would 
then be the difference between psychiatrists and clinical pathologists?
Such questions are very difficult to answer. Moreover, 
answers to such questions might lead to conclusions which would be
unacceptable to many mental health professionals. If a researcher 
were to review the great amount of psychiatric research that is available, 
he would discover that there is a growing desire on the part of many 
psychiatrists to understand, explain and treat psychological problems 
and mental illness in terms of the general frames of the biochemical 
context. Unfortunately, such research does not tell us whether the 
neurological or chemical changes in schizophrenia, for example, are 
causes or effects, or why 'normal' people who have the same chemical 
changes do not show any bizarre symptoms. Now, if the psychiatrist, 
or indeed the neurologist, discovers the neurological basis for say, 
schizophrenia, such a discovery would mean that the patient's personality 
variables, his subjective needs as well as the environmental influences 
to which he is subjected are not related significantly to the disorder.
A dominant mother, as pointed out previously in this chapter, or 
emotionally traumatic situations, work pressures, conflicting and 
contradictory message during childhood, will have no significant 
bearing on the disorder once it were accepted that the disorder is 
primarily located in the physical structure of the patient.
Such a shift of the concept of mental illness, if it occurs, 
from the humanistic approach to the organic one would be fundamental 
and would require a great deal of careful research, consideration 
and discussion. If a biological basis to mental illness were to 
be discovered, there certainly would be fewer problems with objectivity, 
reliability or validity. But such a development in psychiatry would 
be at the expense of the totality of individual experience because 
a number of significant psychological phenomena would be denied validity 
as crucial determinants of mental illness.
As things stand at the moment however, the psychiatrist 
treats conditions which are considered to belong to the realm of 
psycho-social factors, a state of affairs which leads to the problems 
of low objectivity, low reliability and validity. Because of the 
complex interaction between the factors and because of constant 
criticisms directed at psychiatric methods of diagnosis and treatment, 
psychiatrists have begun to search for ways to solve the above 
mentioned dilemmas. Sadly, this has meant that psychiatry has 
increasingly sought to emulate general medicine in its quest for 
a scientific status. In their endless search for the organic basis 
of mental illness, psychiatrists have lost sight of the fact that, 
at the end of the day, they are dealing with human beings - their 
different personalities, feelings and relationships, all of which 
are subject to complex environmental pressures. Such psychosocial 
factors cannot be put under the microscope in order to look for 
pathological changes. This however, does not mean that the present 
writer rejects the application of scientific methods to the practice 
of psychiatry and the mental health professions in general. Rather, 
the aim here is to draw attention to the dilemma which arises when 
applying the methods appropriate to general medicine to the study 
of psychosocial phenomena.
In the final analysis, it seems that mental health 
professionals will have to accept that they work in a field which 
is largely governed by psychosocial factors - factors which are 
difficult to measure and analyse and which interact in extremely 
complex ways to mold the personal expression of each individual.
Under such circumstances, psychiatry can only be legitimate as a 
'helping* profession if it acknowledges its limitations in terms 
of the understanding and explanation of human experience and in terms 
of its present methods and investigations (Szasz, 1973a; 1987c).
Such an acknowledgement of the inherent obstacles to 'perfect' 
scientific understanding of human problems will, hopefully, lead 
to a greater awareness on the part of the psychiatrist, of the need 
for thorough and careful consideration of the multi-dimensional nature 
of psychological disorders and of psychiatrists' practical ability 
to help resolve human problems. Moreover, such an acknowledgement 
must inevitably lead the psychiatric profession to the conclusion 
that there can be few final or ultimate answers in their practice. 
Rather, it might be more realistic and profitable to think in terms 
of a primary diagnosis which is liable to change as the individual 
changes. Finally, it could be argued that, unlike neurology, whose 
properties are purely medical, psychiatry must acknowledge the subtle 
relationships between social and interpersonal factors as its very 
special property (see Szasz, 1987).
Conclusion
"In asserting that mental illness is a myth, I am 
not asserting (as some of my critics have claimed) 
that certain distressing phenomena do not exist.
On the contrary, it is belief in the existence of 
mental illness that prevents us from grasping and 
accepting the truth about behaviours labelled 
'mentally diseased'. In other words, just as dis­
belief in God does not imply disbelief in his alleged 
creations, so disbelief in mental illness does not 
imply disbelief in the myriad phenomena we now label
'mental illness'. Personal misery and social unrest, 
aggression and suffering quite unavoidably exist.
But they are not diseases. We categorize them as
diseases at great peril to our integrity, responsib­
ility and liberty."
(Szasz, 1984 , p . 15)
Szasz's views on the concept of mental illness are 
considered by many of his critics as representing no more than a
"polemical excursion" from a "bad philosopher" (see Roth, 1976, p.325).
However, such critics often misinterpret what Szasz actually argues. 
Szasz's arguments are based, essentially, on the moral and ethical 
consequences of psychiatric treatment. He does not deny the existence
of different forms of mental sufferings. His basic objection is to
the psychiatric coercion, involuntary confinement and inclusion of 
human suffering, often caused by problems of living, into the categories 
of mental disease. For him, the 'over-technicalization' of human 
suffering, has led mental health professionals to lose sight of the 
contribution of psychosocial factors in the development of individual 
problems which in turn has undermined the rights of patients for self­
definition and for autonomy. The assumption is that a patient is too
'ill' to know what is in his best interest and consequently, he needs,
for his own good, to be admitted for involuntary psychiatric treatment 
which, hopefully, would restore his autonomy. However, Szasz maintains 
when psychiatric treatment is imposed on the individual, he (the patient) 
will see the treatment not as serving his own best interests but the 
benefit of those who had identified him in the first place. Secondly, 
in Szasz's opinion, the psychiatric patient is considered, due to his 
illness, to be irrational, illogical and incompetent. In this way, 
the patient's refusal of psychiatric treatment can be viewed as a
reflection of his irrationality. When the patient is provided with 
the necessary treatment and begins to feel better, he will, no doubt, 
appreciate the help he has received. The problem of psychiatric 
abuse, according to Szasz, lies in the power of psychiatric authorities 
to force perfectly rational people to have psychiatric treatment 
for unspecified periods of time on the assumption that they will 
later be grateful because they would have, ultimately benefited from 
the treatment. The application of this 'thank-you' theory, Szasz 
argues, leads to the coercion of mental patients into involuntary 
hospitalisation and to the underestimation of the patient's capacity 
to be prima facie rational and capable of supervising his life in 
an acceptable manner, despite his 'illness'.
Psychiatrists, Szasz maintains, rationalise their actions 
"on the ground that the recovered patient's gratitude for getting 
involuntary electroshock or neuroleptics is adequate justification 
for psychiatric coercion" (Szasz, 1987, pp.315-316). However, it 
is highly questionable whether the promise psychiatrists hold of 
eventual 'cure' justifies the deprivation of autonomy, privacy, and 
personhood which many mental patients go through while in psychiatric 
care.
Szasz's ideas are difficult to ignore "for he is among 
the most prominent contributors to medical and psychiatric ethics, 
discussing issues with a nuance of understanding and sensitivity 
that is uncommon" (Dyer, 1988, p.77). Szasz's sensitivity is perhaps 
best reflected in the way he analyses the power of the label 'mental
illness' to dehumanize people by depriving them of their right to 
define their own lives. Significantly, Szasz believes that it is 
poor people with little social influence who get stuck with the label 
because such people are regarded from the start as deficient in some 
way. The influential psychiatric patient, on the other hand, tends 
to be regarded by psychiatrists as "a self-governing responsible 
client - free to decide whether or not to be a patient" (Szasz, 1973,., 
p.86). Thus, Szasz draws our attention to the crucial problem of 
psychiatric evaluation which is often based on social factors such 
as economic status, education, etc., instead of on observable symptoms. 
This 'poor-rich' criterion in psychiatric labelling is frequently 
evidenced in psychiatric practice in Kuwait where high social status 
seems to confer special 'rights' on the individual. Thus, high powered, 
influential individuals are usually visited by the psychiatrist in 
their homes and if such people ever visit the psychiatric hospital, 
they would be given a secret file, which will be kept locked in the 
psychiatrist's desk instead of in the filing cabinet. In addition, 
the mental problems of such individuals are likely to be viewed by 
the psychiatrist not as mental illness but as 'exhaustion' or 'anxiety' 
if diagnosed at all. This sort of practice has led Szasz to view 
psychiatric diagnosis as largely determined by the social and political 
status of the individual. This, according to Szasz, has led to the 
problems of political abuse of psychiatry in countries such as the 
Soviet Union and to malpractice in the courtroom.
Szasz's view of mental illness is primarily a moral one.
He entreats mental health professionals to be "... aware of the extreme
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limitation of their knowledge, to undertake a critical reappraisal 
of their practices, and the principles underlying them. He has made 
explicit the danger that in certain roles they may have double 
allegiance, to their patient and to the community1' (Roth, 1976, p.325).
Nevertheless, his writings have raised many controversial 
issues regarding the reality of the concept of mental illness and the 
moral implications of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.
CHAPTER FIVE 
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE IN THE SOVIET UNION:
An analytical study of Soviet psychiatric 
invalidation of citizens and the role of the 
RFD model in validating such individuals
Introduct ion
An important moral and professional goal of medicine is 
to develop and safeguard the mental and physical health of individuals 
Yet the practice of medicine, especially psychiatry, has been abused 
in many countries, such as the Soviet Union where medical and 
psychiatric practice is often influenced by the ideology and values 
of certain political powers rather than by the values that represent 
the true interests of the individual patient (see Koryagin, 1989).
A growing mass of clinical reports and media evidence in recent years 
shows that medical institutions have been influenced by society's 
political and moral ideology. Doctors in different countries, especia 
in the Third World, have collaborated with the political system in 
examining detainees in order to promote their tolerance to torture 
or have been giving false certifications to justify the death of 
dissenters while undergoing torture. Another form of abuse is the 
inadequacy of proper health care procedures for prisoners. In some 
extreme cases, prisoners are bled to death and then their blood is 
used to provide the blood banks with their needs (as is happening 
in Iraq). (For more details, see Zwi, 1987.) In fact, it would 
be out of the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed account 
of all the forms of politically motivated abuse of medicine. In 
psychiatry, the outcome of such abuse is believed to be more dangerous 
because of the negative personal, legal, and moral effects of psychia­
tric diagnosis. Psychiatric abuse invariably has a dehumanizing 
and devaluating effect on the labelled individual. As a result, 
misuse of psychiatric 'skills' is likely to result in profound and
long-lasting suffering due to, among other things, the stigmatizing 
effects of psychiatric labelling.
Today, there is a very clear indication of political abuse 
in many countries all over the world. Such abuse takes different 
forms such as the misapplication of psychiatric diagnoses on political 
dissenters (e.g. as in the Soviet Union, Romania, Bahrain, etc.), 
emotional and psychological manipulation of prisoners (e.g. Uruguay, 
South AFrica, Egypt, etc.), and psychological experiments involving 
drugs (e.g. as in the U.S.A. where some psychologists and psychiatrists 
are employed by the CIA, etc.). (For more details, see Marks and 
Greenfield, 1987.) This chapter focuses on the problems of political 
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Such an emphasis is justified 
by the extent of confirmation and data of such abuse in the Soviet 
Union and by the existence of a special Soviet diagnostic scheme 
which gives abuse scientific validity at least from the Soviet point 
of view. This diagnostic scheme, which is so broad that virtually 
anyone could be classified under it, provided the main rationale 
for the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union.
In discussing the problems of political abuse in the Soviet 
Union, one needs to be clear about two kinds of psychiatric practice. 
First, poor psychiatric functioning which causes patients to suffer 
rather than providing them with an effective treatment. Such a poor 
level of practice is related to factors such as insufficient or 
inadequate psychiatric training, psychiatrists' emotional problems, 
and inadequate psychiatric facilities.
Secondly, misuse of the methods used by psychiatrists in 
relation to the establishment of caseness and management plans for 
reasons other than medical ones (Bloch, 1984). Throughout this chapter, 
our main emphasis will be centered on the second kind of psychiatric 
practice - that is, the misapplication of psychiatric principles 
of diagnosis and treatment for political reasons rather than the 
mere reflection of medical incompetence. Our second concern in this 
chapter is to examine the role of the Reactive Functional Disorder 
model (RFD) in providing a framework of response to Soviet misuse 
of psychiatry for political aims. In doing so, the present writer 
hopes to establish whether the RFD model could provide clinicians 
with some conceptual answers to Soviet diagnostic practice under 
which virtually every individual in the world could be classified 
as mentally ill. Throughout this chapter our main aim will be to 
certificate the failure of such system to distinguish mental illness. 
Thus the major contribution to the RFD model will be to establish 
on the conceptual and empirical level a set of criteria which would 
help mental health professionals in general to distinguish between 
the genuinely mentally ill or those who are just labelled mentally 
ill. A number of case illustrations and evidence will be provided 
to affirm the misuse of psychiatric diagnosis for political reasons 
and the role of the RFD model in clarifying the diagnostic unreliab­
ility and moral weakness of the Soviet system.
Moreover, as the chapter progresses, we will try to establish 
whether the RFD model could help to provide mental health professionals 
with a sense of awareness of the responsibilities of their profession
and to stimulate a debate around the political abuse of psychiatry 
in general. In other words, our main concern would be to examine 
the possibility of providing a morally advanced perspective on the 
methods of defining the individual's total suffering.
The vulnerability of the concept of mental illness and its 
invalidation of the individual's moral agency
As we already established in the previous chapter, the 
concept of mental illness is vulnerable to abuse through the application 
of the concept of 'sick role' which leads to the assumption that 
the 'patient' is irresponsible and therefore needs involuntary hospital­
isation. Moreover, we discussed the different conceptual models 
of mental illness and how they contribute to psychiatric abuse by 
viewing the patient as "a passive victim of compulsions, irresistLble 
impulses, or unconscious forces" (Szasz, 1987, p.60). Thus, the
patient is "not really himself ..... as someone who engages in behaviour
he does not really intend" (Ibid., p.60). Further, it was established 
that the central criterion of judging a person as mentally ill is 
whether his behaviour deviates or not from the expected tolerance 
standards of what society considers to be appropriate limits of conduct 
(see Scheff, 1971).
Thus, many political, religious and moral beliefs can be 
viewed as representing no more than a residual deviance or a violation 
against socially accepted norms of adjustment and hence meriting 
the class of 'mental illness'.
We shall now discuss the Soviet system of labelling in 
order to show how the concept of mental illness and psychiatry in 
general represent a perfect tool for Soviet psychiatrists to control 
non-conventional thoughts and behaviour.
The Soviet diagnostic system and the concept of mental illness
On the following pages, we will discuss in detail the main 
characteristics of the diagnostic system used in the Soviet Union.
Our main concern will be to answer the following question: Why do
Soviet psychiatrists and authorities label their dissenters as 
'schizophrenics' rather than 'neurotics' or 'personality-disordered' 
or consider them disordered at all?
In answering the above question, the present writer hopes 
to be able to throw some light on how the diagnostic classification 
'schizophrenia' is used for political rather than purely clinical 
reasons (if indeed there are specific clinical manifestations for 
schizophrenia).
In focussing on political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet 
Union, we do not necessarily imply that psychiatric practice in other 
countries is free from different forms of abuse (as already established 
in the introduction of this chapter). (For more detailed analysis 
of the psychiatric political abuse in many countries, see Cohen,
1987.) One justification for choosing to focus on the Soviet Union 
is that the practice of psychiatry for ideological and subjective
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reasons in this country is not only extensive in nature but has, 
in fact, been reported comprehensively by many psychiatric societies 
around the world. Furthermore, there is a special school of diagnosis 
that governs Soviet psychiatric practice. This was established by 
Andrei V. Snezhnevsky (the founder of the Moscow School of Psychiatry) 
and well-grounded by the late 1970's, mainly based on thorough research 
in schizophrenia.
Although the above scheme focuses on a model of schizophrenia, 
it incorporates very broad criteria of psychopathology which have 
the ability to accommodate a wide range of mental illnesses. The 
assumption behind the Soviet system of diagnosis is that schizophrenia 
has three different forms. A full account of these different forms 
(Snezhnevsky Course Forms) and their subtypes is presented in the 
following table:
Three course form s o f schizophrenia
COURSE FORMS
Continuous Periodic Shift-like
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(Adapted from Reich, in "Psychiatric Ethics", edited by Bloch and 
Chodoff (C) 1984, Oxford University Press, p.67.)
The most frequent diagnoses in the Soviet diagnostic system 
are psychopathy and schizophrenia, and three forms of schizphrenia 
are recognised as follows:
1) Continuous form: the illness develops and becomes increasingly
worse.
2) Recurrent or periodic form: in this form, the patient would
suffer from different acute episodes of illness, but after each 
episode, he would retain his health.
3) The shiftlike form: there are also acute phases, but the patient
in general progressively deteriorates after each phase of disease.
Each of these forms of illness varies in degree of severity.
"Sluggish11 schizophrenia (a subtype of the continuous form) 
is the most common label used with political and social deviants. 
Sluggish schizophrenia may be diagnosed even if the 'patient* does 
not show any recognised 'psychotic' symptoms. The same patient would 
not fit the DSM-III or ICD-9 definition of schizophrenia or mental 
disorder in general. (For more details, see Bloch and Reddaway, 1985.)
In the continuous and shift-like forms, the patient in 
the mild subtypes would be considered by a Soviet psychiatrist as
psychotic. However, if DSM-III were applied, the same patient would 
undoubtedly be viewed as either neurotic or mentally healthy. This 
comparison shows that the methods used by Soviet psychiatrists to 
interpret mild subtype symptoms differs crucially from those methods
applied in other countries, and this is a crucial problem in Soviet 
diagnostic practice. The problem arises when the individual is con­
sidered as having fallen under one of the above mentioned forms, 
even though he is totally free from any psychotic symptoms. That 
is because Soviet psychiatrists hold the belief that such an individual 
has "a life-long, genetically-based condition" (Holland in Reich,
1984, p.69). As Reich (1984) put it:
"Those Soviet psychiatrists really saw the 
patients as schizophrenic; or, to put it another 
way, the symptom created a category, first on 
paper and then, with training, in the minds of 
Soviet psychiatrists, which was eventually assumed 
to represent a real class of patients and which 
was inevitably filled by real persons." (p.71)
Another dangerous feature of the Soviet diagnostic criteria 
is the "seeming normality" criterion as it is called by the Soviet 
authorities. According to "seeming normality", a definition of 
schizophrenia doesn't necessarily imply the presence of "first rank 
symptoms" such as delusions, hallucinations, thought disorders, etc. 
Instead, such symptoms could - from the Soviet psychiatrist's point 
of view - exist theoretically in a way that does not cause a change 
in the patient's personality noticeable to others. This 'seeming 
normality' criterion - which in reality represents no more than a 
psychiatric excuse - appears to have the power and flexibility to 
include or to categorize virtually everybody under its umbrella.
What motivates the Soviet clinician to use this criterion, even though 
the abnormality of the 'case' does not manifest itself now, is that 
he (the psychiatrist) believes that the pathological indication of
the potential patient will be discovered in due course in the future.
Thus, the 'seeming normality' criterion seems to have the power of 
designating and interpreting any sort of behaviour as a sign of 'mental 
illness', even though there are no symptoms of abnormality, since 
for Soviet psychiatrists symptoms of 'mental illness' can exist theor­
etically but not clinically in patients (Professor Lunts in Bloch,
1984). As a result, the application of this criterion indicates 
its total failure to distinguish abnormality at all or to tell the 
difference between normal people and abnormal ones. The dividing 
line between the 'normal' and 'abnormal' individuals is absent and 
hence meaningless.
Besides 'seeming normality', there are other vague and 
very broad criteria which have been established in order to house 
and fit different sectors of people who are considered to be 'inconvenient' 
for the State (e.g. advocates of human rights, religious believers, 
persons who try to leave the Soviet Union, etc.) (Koryagin, 1984).
Examples of selected criteria which are mentioned in the diagnostic 
reports of the 'rejected' citizens are: "delusional reformism" or
"paranoid delusion of reforming society or of reorganizing the State 
or of revising Marxism-Leninism", "over-estimation of the personality", 
"poor-adaptation to Society" (Bloch, pp.335-336, 1984), "uncritical 
attitude towards his abnormal conditions", "opinions having a moral­
izing character", etc. (Bloch and Reddaway, 1985, p . 147; see also 
Merskey and Shafran, 1986).
Now, why do Soviet authorities use the above criteria or 
in general the concept of 'schizophrenia' as a means of controlling 
their dissenters? A related question would be, why do Soviet 
authorities employ "psychiatry" as a whole to perform the job of 
manipulating and supervising 'ill-fitted' and 'unsuitable' individuals?
Thomas J. Scheff (1971) provides a convincing argument 
concerning the above questions. For him "schizophrenia ... is a 
broad gloss, it involves, in no very clear relationship, ideas such 
as "inappropriateness of effect", "impoverishment of thought", 
"inability to be involved in a meaningful human relationship", "bizarre 
behavior" (e.g. delusions and hallucinations), "disorder of speech 
and communication", and "withdrawal"." (p.312)
Scheff goes on to argue that because of the broadness and 
vagueness of the above symptoms and because of the uncertainties 
of the definition of schizophrenia, schizophrenia may be used as 
a 'residual' term which might be applied, without serious thought, 
to those "residual rule breakers" whose deviant role is difficult 
to conceptualize in terms of specific definition. In fact, when 
defining a person as schizophrenic, such a definition in itself obscure 
rather than clarifies the reason why the person is called schizophrenic 
or the question of whether he really caused suffering to others or 
the social authority responsible for defining him as mentally ill.
That is because, as already discussed in the previous chapters, the 
term schizophrenic as a diagnostic label per se does not provide 
specific answers to questions such as how the 'disturbance' affects
a person's total functioning or whether he is able to manage, in 
spite of his suffering, his everyday affairs. Such labels do not 
describe the 'patient's' subjective experience or the content of 
his thought or disturbance.
The above arguments lead us to conclude that in any attempt 
to define abnormal mental functioning, clinicians must not base their 
assumptions or diagnosis on limited aspects of acts or hallucination 
but should take into consideration the total functioning of the indiv­
idual. Kanfer and Saslow (1973) illustrate the above point very 
well by stating that:
"The observation that a patient has hallucinated 
on occasions may be of importance only if it has 
bearing on his present problem. If looked upon in 
isolation, a report about hallucinations may be 
misleading, resulting in emphasis on classification 
rather than treatment." (p.334)
The above quotation suggests that a psychiatric examination 
must include a detailed description and evaluation of the patient's 
behaviour in relation to the various environmental factors. Moreover, 
the investigation must emphasize the importance of his present as 
well as his past experience and how such experience has a significant 
bearing on his total functions. Furthermore, the psychiatrist must 
be aware of the actual evaluative process that has led him to establish 
his view that the individual is mentally ill. That is to say, a 
central part in any psychiatric evaluation is to find out whether 
mental suffering is based on the individual's personal claim of distress
or simply on definitions by 'others' (e.g. family member, his colleauges, 
the police, the authorities, etc.) (Mechanic, 1967).
What actually happens in reality is that once a person 
is diagnosed as 'psychotic' this would carry with it a long-term 
implication even after discharge from the hospital. At the end of 
the day the 'patient' is in remission or, in other words, relapses 
are the expected outcomes of his 'disease'.
Another possible aim in the application of the concept 
of schizophrenia for political reasons is that once the psychiatrist 
designates a person as schizophrenic, there is no point in conducting 
a formal trial. In this respect, trials become a mere conventional 
procedure without any real chance for the 'schizophrenic' to defend 
himself because he is considered too sick to communicate his thoughts 
to others. In other words, his 'word-salads' and 'illogical thoughts' 
prevent him from being a 'full' rational agent.
Obviously, the concept of schizophrenia provides the Soviet 
authorities with a practical and legally justified tool for the control 
of political dissidents (see Koryagin, 1989). For that reason, psychiatry 
in the Soviet Union has been greeted by the authorities as a legitimate 
and proper enterprise for dealing with society's 'outsiders' (Ibid.,
1989). That is because psychiatry has the ability to "legitimize
and define the institution .....  in which only mentally sick individuals
are confined. Psychiatrists often assert that there are no normal 
people in mental hospital. Moreover, the public likes to be reassured
that only the sick are railroaded into the hospital" (Szasz, 1973, 
p.211). Another reason for selecting psychiatry to do the job, in 
Szaszian terms, of ’warehousing' political dissenters is the implicit 
international certification of psychiatry as a legitimate enterprise 
to diagnose and treat misfits - malfunctioning or, in other words, 
political misbehaviour as a sign of mental illness.
In fact, when examining the current diagnostic system used 
in psychiatry, one would soon notice that a central criterion of 
mental health on which the individual 'patient' is considered to 
be mentally healthy is 'social adequacy' or 'social adjustment' to 
the social norms or 'accurate reality testing' (Lazarus, 1975) or 
competency.
Consider, for example, the WHO definition of social psychia 
try (a branch of psychiatry) which emphasizes "fitting the individual 
for a satisfactory and useful life in terms of his own social environ 
ment" (WHO definition of social psychiatry in Schwab and Schwab,
1978, p.23).
Furthermore, social psychiatry's main emphasis is to supply 
the 'patient' with a set of well-defined norms which are "favourable 
to the maintenance of social adequacy" (Ibid., p.23).
Obviously, the current view of mental health professionals 
towards the individual who deviates from what society considers to 
be 'social fitness' is to consider him as abnormal. A possible
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consequence of the above attitude is the certification of new criteria 
in mental illness, such as ''political" criteria. That is to say 
that the concept of mental illness throughout psychiatry in general, 
receives "legitimacy" for its use in dealing with political 
misfits by defining certain activities as appropriate or inappropriate 
in terms of the standard political norms of a given society (Koryagin, 
1989).
Two questions which follow from the WHO definition are:
How does social psychiatry decide when an individual's behaviour 
does not completely or sufficiently fit with the society's norms?, 
and How much fitness and sound thinking does an individual need to 
be considered as mentally healthy? Moreover, one needs to know whether 
mental health professionals as a result have a moral and professional 
obligation to "... teach people the principles of mental hygiene, 
methods of sound thinking about themselves, and ways of coping with 
reality"? (Ellis, 1967, p.441).
In fact, the concept of fitness is much more tied to the 
view that the individual's personal attitudes and his subjective 
experience are considered to be not within the real context of society. 
Thus, the person is "not OK" because he lives in a context which 
society believes to be odd or bizarre in the circumstances.
Thus, the inclusion of socio-cultural factors in the 
psychiatric 'clinical' decision must not be overlooked. Fairbairn 
and Fairbairn (1987) h ave discussed the concept of fitness or adjustment
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and have stated that psychiatric practice is:
"... inherently repressive since it serves to
adjust people to society rather than adjusting
society to people." (p. 108)
The above quotation is relevant when discussing the situation in 
the Soviet Union. "Soviet authorities impose their own "beliefs" 
about psychopathology on an entire population by making the political 
system itself the agent of prevention and therapy" (Szasz, 1981, p.29).
Reactive Functional Disorder Model and the nature of Soviet 
psychiatric abuse
Throughout the following pages and with the support of case 
illustrations, our concern will be with the following issues: First,
selected case histories of Soviet political dissenters show that what 
Soviet psychiatrists are dealing with are perfectly normal people 
rather than what they claim to be "schizophrenics" (Koryagin, 1989).
A careful analysis is needed to examine the normality of such individuals. 
Secondly, the use of a broad rather imprecise diagnostic scheme and 
the combination of such a scheme with the medical model has caused 
many Soviet psychiatrists to view each individual ’patient’ with 
schizophrenic disorders as basically suffering from a genetic defect 
which carries life-long irreversible effects. Even if the individual 
does not display any sort of psychiatric symptoms, the Soviet psychia­
trists are perfectly capable of establishing that the person is genuinely 
’schizophrenic’ by the application of the so-called 'seeming normality* 
’excuse’ which was discussed earlier. The validity of such a scheme
will be examined by using case illustrations. Finally, the use of 
some terms in the Soviet diagnostic system such as, "overestimation 
of the personality", "poor adaptation", or "delusion of reformism" 
suggests that a person is mentally healthy if he fits himself to 
the conventions and norms of his society. Thus some Soviet psychiatrists 
adopt certain ’psychiatric* principles in their daily practice that 
largely reflect the political system in their country in which their 
psychiatric medical training is basically oriented towards changing 
an individual’s "maladaptive behavior" or his reforming delusions, 
etc., in order to re-adjust the individual within the society's stereo­
type or ideal methods of functioning.
The process of ’reforming’ individual behaviour usually 
takes place in an Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital (OPH, for short) 
or in a Special Psychiatric Hospital (SPH, for short). Once in a 
mental hospital, it is very difficult for the dissenter to convince 
hospital staff that he is actually and not only "seeming" normal.
As a result, the ’patient’ receives a long-term hospitalisation which 
is characterised by continuous psychiatric medication, alongside 
cruel and careless management (Holder, 1977; Koryagin, 1989). In 
fact, Soviet procedures in the diagnosis and treatment of political 
dissenters serve well to illustrate the empirical applicability to 
the RFD model. It must be clear that our main analysis of the political 
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union is basically applied to those 
psychiatrists who actually or to some extent believe in dissent behaviour 
as a sign of disease, and to claims that their methods of identifying 
such ’disease’ are reliable tools. The present writer is not concerned
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with the practice of some Soviet psychiatrists (core psychiatrists) 
who are deliberately misdiagnosing dissenters for specific ideological 
beliefs. (See, Bloch and Reddaway, 1985.)
Our concern is basically oriented towards the explanatory 
function of the RFD as a plausible alternative explanation of political 
dissent in the Soviet Union, an explanation which the present writer 
hopes would be relatively less open to abuse. In addition to other 
benefits of RFD, it can also tackle the problem of Soviet psychiatric 
abuse while remaining invulnerable to the kinds of abuse we see in 
the West. To illustrate the applicability of the RFD model as a 
possible alternative to tackling the problem of political abuse of 
psychiatric service in the Soviet Union it would be useful to discuss 
in detail the following case (cited in Wing, 1978, pp. 180-185).
The case is a Leonid Plyushch who was born in 1939 and 
graduated as an engineer mathematician. He designed a mathematical 
model of the biological system regulating blood sugar. His involvement 
in political activities against his country began in the form of 
writing different letters to different political bodies such as U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights. Plyushch's main concern was the democrat- 
isation of his country, the improvement of political trials and the 
rights of political dissenters. None of his colleagues considered 
him as abnormal. Instead, they all regarded him as a creative and 
responsible worker. His political activities caused him to be dismissed 
from his work.
After that, he became a founder of the Moscow group for 
the defence of human rights. Eventually, he was arrested in 1972 
for the charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". Two Soviet 
psychiatrists diagnosed him as suffering from "sluggish schizophrenia" 
from an early age. In 1973, he was sent to a SPH because, in the 
view of Soviet authorities, his political behaviour represented an 
"exteme social danger". He was put under anti-psychotic medication 
which caused deterioration of his intellectual-scientific interests 
and disturbance of memory, emotion and political interest.
Wing summarised a meeting at the Serbsky Institute in 
October 1973 at which Plyushch's case was discussed from the Soviet 
psychiatric point of view:
"From the age of 15, Plyushch was interested in 
politics and philosophy and decided to fight against 
the remains of imperialism in this country. He 
trained himself by 'training his will, fighting 
with his softness and ambition'. Aged 23, he 
graduated as a mathematician.
He decided, while studying, to reconstruct the 
Communist Party and reorganize the Komsomol. He 
thought he had outstanding ability. He had lots 
of new ideas about clothes and music, and was also 
preoccupied with thoughts about hypnosis. He 
believed that people could perceive thoughts through 
breathing. He wrote many manuscripts. He over­
estimated himself and thought he had solved problems 
of great importance for humanity. He sought to have 
followers, to be called 'Plyushchists' . He complained: 
'The head is pushed from its axis - I am becoming 
mental1.
After graduation, he became an engineer. His 
interests were in philosophy, psychology, telepathy, 
biology, and later he also became interested in the 
arts, literature, and the treatment of -stammering.
He was fussy and suspicious, and passive and 
indifferent at work. He lost his office pass and 
was reprimanded. He complained that he was deprived 
of his human rights and said the government wanted 
to kill people. His aim was to restore Soviet power.
His wife thought him normal but his mother thought 
him strange; he did not look after his children, 
his appearance or his clothes.
After his arrest, he was examined by a psychiatric 
commission on 14 July 1972. He was not anxious over 
the arrest, thought that there would be radical 
changes in the country which would prove his views 
on the world and his policies correct. He said he 
wished to accelerate the coming of democracy in 
this country by protesting, for the sake of communism.
On 7 September 1972 he had a further psychiatric 
examination. He did not try to establish his rightness. 
He did not regret that he was arrested and was more 
interested in the problem of integral psychology. His 
attitude to the future was indifferent. He showed 
no concern about his family. The conclusion of the 
commission was that he was suffering from schizophrenia, 
that he was not responsible for his actions and that 
he needed treatment in a general psychiatric hospital."
The above case shows clearly that the psychiatric hospital­
isation and diagnosis of Plyushch is not linked with his past and 
present effective functioning as a brilliant engineer-mathematician.
That is to say, the psychiatric definition of the above case is based 
on factors and variables that are completely separate from the individual's 
total psycho-social functioning. The psychiatrist in charge of Mr. 
Plyushch's case had set out to discover 'diseased' rather than healthy 
features in the case. As a result, the emphasis of the 'mental state 
exam' was directed towards finding specific marginal aspects of his 
life to support the presence of illness, i.e. the case history put 
great emphasis, for example, on Plyushch's interest in philosophy and 
psychiatry (which implies vulnerability to 'delusions'), rather than on 
his positive contribution to engineering for instance.
Plyushch's political activities were presumably considered 
by the Soviet psychiatrists as expressing grandiose delusions or 
'philosophical intoxication' or "reformist delusional ideas" (see 
Mersky and Shafran, 1986), diagnosis obviously based on a subjective 
unverified concept of abnormality. Such a view of abnormality is 
not related to the actual suffering of the individual or his actual 
level of functioning. This is because the definition of 'mental 
illness' is "left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms 
of adjustment that he employs. Usually, the use of the phrase 'mental 
illness' effectively masks the actual norms being applied" (Livermore, 
1968, p.80). In order to legitimize such non-psychiatric norms being 
applied on Russia's political dissenters, Soviet psychiatrists 
rationalise their decision by providing a medical psychiatric reason 
for it (for more details on the role of psychiatric rationale in 
justifying many non-medical norms, see Goffman, 1961) or applying 
the concept of 'sick role' in general.
In fact, the 'sick role' which derives from the medical 
model gives Soviet psychiatrists an approved authority to manipulate 
political dissenters under the guise of providing them with psychiatric 
treatment. Moreover, the sick role model justifies their intervention 
by discrediting the 'patient's' objections to psychiatric confinement 
and compulsory treatment. Psychiatrists' medical justification is 
that their patients are not fully aware that they are really ill, 
irresponsible, and in need of 'psychiatric specialized help' to restore 
their autonomy and their sense of responsibility. For such psychiatric 
prat itioners, the patient has a terminal and totally destructive
disease which is far beyond his abilities to avoid and for which 
he requires long term psychiatric treatment to reconstruct the defective 
abilit ies.
In addition, as we mentioned previously, there is a strong 
tendency among Soviet psychiatrists to explain the individual's 'social 
dangerousness' or 'delusional reformism' for example, as resulting 
from predetermined unspecified physiological factors rather than 
on functional grounds. Such a view gives little idea of how the 
patient who suffers from the above hallucinations, for example, in 
specific life situations, may well be able to function positively 
in other spheres which are essential for the fulfilment of basic needs. 
The above list of symptoms might represent a first-rank indication 
of schizophrenia, for example, only if they contribute negatively to 
the individual's psycho-physio-social functioning. If investigated 
as symptoms separate from the total working of the individual person­
ality, without providing any account of the patient's general ability 
to function in other areas of his life, such 'diagnostic' criteria 
would be meaningless and could result in sweeping the patient onto 
a "downward slide" which make him "unable to stop and climb back 
up again" (Szasz, 1987, p.43). And, as Szasz convincingly shows, 
once the individual occupies the role of mental patient, the process 
of "downward slide" would begin to work effectively.
A careful analysis of Plyushch's case suggests that the 
psychiatrist in charge has assumed that the patient's "anti-Soviet 
agitation and propaganda" and his "extreme social dangerousness" along­
side his over-estimation of his personality, reflects a hidden internal 
cause rather than external observable events (see, Merskey and Shafran, 
1986). As a re suit, even if Mr. Plyushch shows a significant improve­
ment in his total functioning, it would probably be interpreted as 
temporary and likely to be followed by a relapse because the patient 
is viewed by the professionals as vulnerable and weak with a relatively 
permanent diagnosis regardless of later functioning ("residual deviance") 
(Scheff, 1971). Thus, once the patient is diagnosed as 'schizophrenic', 
he is always considered schizophrenic thereafter, even if he returns 
to a normal state, as in the case of the 'periodic form' diagnosis.
Such emphasis on the inner explanation or the inner etiology 
of deviance leads to great difficulties in making the necessary obser­
vations of the manifestations of the illness. This is because inner 
explanations are vague and unspecified and hence difficult to verify 
or to control variables within an objective observation. Inner etiology 
might be the unresolved conflicts in the unconscious or a genetic 
defect that it is believed would be discovered in the near future.
It seems that using such a system of interpretation of inner causes 
has led many clinicians to presuppose different kinds of unverified 
causal explanations on the basis that such inner causes, although 
not actually present, are believed to be theoretically present.
That makes the psychiatric definition of any individual an irreversible 
act as no independent indices have yet been established in psychiatric 
screening methods.
Plyushch was diagnosed as having "sluggish" schizophrenia 
which presumes a long psychotic process from an early age. The presence 
of psychotic symptoms in this type is not a necessary condition for 
labelling someone as mentally ill. That is to say, the psychiatrist 
in charge worked on the assumption that there is something wrong 
with the individual that has its origin somewhere in the body. Thus, 
the notion that he acts 'as if' he were insane turned out to be the 
notion that he is 'really' insane. The above hypothesis is supported 
by a 'weak' hypothetical explanation rather than 'hard' psychopatho- 
logical symptoms. In this respect, it seems very important to remember 
that Robert Spitzer himself (the physician in charge of the developing 
of DSM-III) accepts the possibility that a person is mentally ill 
without the presence of 'psychotic symptoms'. In other words, it 
is enough to be a potential case or vulnerable to schizophrenia.
The concept of constitutional predisposition or vulnerability implies 
the notion of an inherent genetic weakness such that under certain 
circumstances, the individual will be more vulnerable to the disease 
class 'schizophrenia' (Zubin, Spring, 1977; and Kety, 1971).
Now consider the following case illustration of Mr. 0,
46 years old, ex-mental patient. The case was interviewed by the 
present writer in 1980. Mr. 0's family had admitted him to Psychiatric 
Hospital when he manifested certain philosophical and religious ideas 
such as: Marxism is the true faith because such ideology encourages
people to work more effectively than Islam. That is to say, his 
family and his psychiatrist were pre-conditioned to assume that such 
"phil osophical intoxication" would be followed by a possible relapse,
even though his philosophical thoughts were sound and reflected highly 
intelligible ideas. It must be made clear here that the criterion 
which was used to admit Mr. 0 was his vulnerability to relapse rather 
than an actual or real objective deterioration in his total functioning. 
As Laing in Siegler et al (1972) put it, the problem occurs in psychia­
tric practice when persons such as our case are labelled as 'schizo­
phrenic', for example, on the basis of "attaching a hypothetical 
disease of undiscovered pathology" (Laing in Siegler et al, 1972, 
p. 104). What happens in actual psychiatric practice is that most 
mental health professionals tend to give "undue prominence to deviances 
which may not have the connotation of illness when seen in the pers­
pective of the individual's current life pattern ..." (Coleman, 1967, 
p . 163).
When examining the current psychiatric situation in the 
Soviet Union, we will discover that many Soviet psychiatrists deny 
or ignore the importance of providing the patient's diagnostic sheet 
with information on how 'delusional reformism', for example, is relevant 
to the efficacy of his total performance (Bloch, 1984; Bloch and 
Reddaway, 1977; Wing, 1978). Instead, their main concern is to 
maintain, through psychiatric medication, conventional thought which 
meets social norms.
The psychiatric methods of interference in the individual's 
subjective thoughts and in his rights to make unique choices in life 
are viewed by Soviet psychiatrists as a humane 'treatment' of mentally 
diseased individuals. By holding on to such a belief and by practising
in hospital settings, such psychiatrists probably succeed in reducing 
their feelings of guilt arising from violating humanitarian principles 
and the constitutional rights of people with so-called 'mental illness' 
In fact, even the "right to treatment", Szasz (1984) argued, has 
become "a formidable new weapon in the psychiatrist's perennial struggl 
to oppress and control the mental patient" (p.96).
The vulnerability of the concept of 'mental illness' and 
the subjective nature of psychiatric 'symptoms', as we noted earlier, 
have played a central role in the function of Soviet psychiatry as 
a means of control of the individual's thoughts and behaviours.
A possible alternative would be viewing "mental disorder" as a Reactive 
Functional Disorder. In other words, the RFD is an alternative to 
the medical model.
The RFD model shares with some psychological theories (e.g. 
behaviourist, Gestalt, existentialist, etc.) and with researchers 
such as Szasz, Laing, Scheff, Leiffer, Skinner, Rogers, etc., the 
assumption that symptoms in themselves have no significant value.
What is important is the context and nature of the individual's major 
functions as perceived and experienced by the individual himself 
(with disclaimers for the seriously disturbed who do not or cannot 
acknowledge their own illness). The central aim in studying symptoms 
is to consider how such symptoms are relevant to the patient's present 
problem and his total life pattern. Mr. 0's occasional mild "philo­
sophical intoxication", presumably representing a form of paranoid 
delusion, might interfere little or not at all with his original
job as a successful merchant. However, the very existence of such 
phil osophical ideas might lead many psychiatrists to form a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia, for example. (See, Kanfer and Saslow,
1973.) That is to say that when judging the presence or absence 
of the phenomena described as 'mental illness', the clinician must 
not restrict himself to a single act or thoughts but to the total 
functioning of the individual.
In this context, it is important to consider the motivation 
of the function, the relative nature of the function, the development 
of the function, and the context in which the function occurs. As 
Coleman (1967) points out, the "... symptoms are considered to be 
pathological manifestation regardless of the context in which they 
appear" (p. 163). Moreover, the analysis of how the discrepancies 
occur between the patient's unique life pattern and the societal 
pattern of responses is another significant sphere of understanding 
the degree or level of disturbance in the individual's actual 
funct ioning.
The problem occurs when Soviet psychiatrists reply that 
it is not the reformist behaviour in itself which is troubling, but 
rather its occurrence in the 'context' of Soviet society, where it 
is meaningless, irrational and dangerous. Pushing the arguments 
further on, let us imagine a hypothetical situation where Mr. Plyushch' 
"philosophical intoxication" has resulted in a total rejection by 
him of all societal sections (e.g. his family, work, friends, official 
authorities, etc.). Homosexuals were once rejected by all members
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of their society, but nowadays have become a sexual 'preference' 
rather than a sexual 'deviation1. A woman who delivered an illegitimate 
child was once seen in Britain as suffering from a 'moral defect' 
and was rejected by her society and involuntarily hospitalised.
The same argument is applicable in the case of masturbation.
The crucial question which arises in this respect is: 
do the contexts in which the above cases and our present case, Mr. 
Plyushch find themselves have a crucial bearing on the acceptance 
or rejection of their behaviour?
In fact, the RFD model emphasises the centrality of the 
individual's past and present functioning as it is perceived by the 
individual (a detailed analysis of this point will be considered 
as the chapter progresses). The contextual nature of the individual's 
total functioning has a significant influence on any psychiatric 
definition. An individual might be defined as mentally ill either 
by his personal definition of what constitutes his total functional 
disturbance or by 'other's' claims. 'Other's' definition might 
reflect: 1) the nature of psychiatric diagnosis currently used in
specific context, or 2) the establishment's system of values where 
the psychiatrist works, or 3) the model of mental illness which the 
psychiatrist adheres to or 4) the state's own set of norms which 
has a significant feedback for any psychiatric definition.
Now, Mr. Plyushch could not be viewed as suffering from 
any total functional failure simply because he has been rejected
by the psychiatrist or perhaps by his wife. Such rejection if it 
occurs, might be the result of a plausible-sounding psychiatric 
rationalisation of his deviancy and must not be taken as a sufficient 
condition for labelling him as mentally ill. As Boorse in Edwards 
(1982) pointed out, even total rejection by everyone cannot in itself 
guarantee a pathological condition, though it might produce one.
It must be emphasized here that being rejected does not necessarily 
indicate 'abnormality' or 'disease* or confirm or validate Plyushch's 
own suffering. The black were rejected in the U.S.A. and are still 
rejected in South Africa but that does not make them schizophrenic.
No doubt being rejected by a wide range of societal sections 
could result in psycho-social functional failure and possibly physio­
logical failure (not being able to secure their living resources, 
etc.). One would wonder whether it is justifiable or humanistic 
to safeguard the individual from this total rejection by diagnosing 
him as 'schizophrenic' with its totally destructive consequences 
(compulsory admission, use of powerful drugs, the attribution of 
a sick role which might lead to a negative self-image of impairment, 
etc.). In any case, the individual has been rejected as a political 
dissenter before being admitted to the mental hospital, and, after 
being discharged, as an 'ex-mental patient'.
Now, although the RFD model may not lead immediately to 
the development of an effective method in dealing with the psychiatric 
abuse in the Soviet Union, it may at least provide the first step 
in that direction. In order to illustrate this point, it would be
useful to analyse the psychiatric intervention to which Mr. Plyushch 
was subjected in the light of the above model. In the case of Mr. 
Plyushch it is crucial to consider the totality of failure in both 
psychological and social function as a necessary condition for such 
intervention. If one considers Mr. Plyushch’s total level of function­
ing, it would be seen that this was not sufficiently disturbed to 
merit psychiatric intervention (see Koryagin, 1989). On the physio­
logical level, the above case did not show any disturbance in behavioural 
goals, considered to be vital in the maintenance of his life (e.g. 
he didn’t show any sort of eating disorders, sleep disturbance or 
physical activities that might endanger him or others).
On the psycho-social level, it is evident that the patient 
shows great awareness of his country's political situation and the 
rights of the disadvantaged. Moreover, he has made a significant 
scientific contribution within his work as a mathematician. His 
letters and conversation with the psychiatrist in charge - as reported 
by Wing (1978) was coherent and highly intelligible. His wife and 
friends regarded him as a normal individual with a great sensitivity 
to his country's problem.
A careful examination of Mr. Plyushch’s total level of 
functioning would reveal that his only problem is his adherence to 
specific beliefs and thoughts which are considered to be deviant 
from the traditional set of thoughts to which most 'normal' or 'sane' 
Russians adhere. Thus, the patient is abnormal because according 
to the Soviet diagnostic system, he is manifesting a "poor adaptation
to the social environment" accompanied by "social dangerousness" 
or "over-estimation of his own personality" which implies a delusion 
concerning his ability to reform society or, in other words, grandiose 
features. Diagnosing him as ’abnormal' or 'schizophrenic' does not 
mean necessarily that the patient displays an observable set of 
'psychotic symptoms' or, in Wing's (1978) own words, "technical 
evidence". Admitting Mr. Plyushch to the SPH was justified on the 
basis that he constitutes an 'extreme social danger' and on the basis 
that although he seems to be normal, in fact, there are genetic or 
organic factors that make his abnormality theoretically if not 
clinically present (see Merskey and Shafran, 1986).
The above concept of abnormality held by many Soviet 
psychiatrists has resulted in viewing the patient's thoughts and 
behaviour as incomprehensible or unpredictable or delusional and 
hence, abnormal. Not understanding Mr. Plyushch's thoughts and beliefs 
does not mean that his thoughts are wrong or delusional or dangerous 
and cannot be a sufficient condition for labelling him as 'abnormal' 
on the basis of a diagnostic scheme which does not fully express 
the uniqueness of each individual case and his ability to function 
in spite of his suffering. Moreover, such a scheme cannot fully 
estimate the nature and content of the individual's thoughts or 
behaviour yet regards thoughts which do not exactly match socially 
accepted political or social norms as irrational, and thus falling 
within the categories of psychopathological conditions.
The possible alternative would be to incorporate the concept 
of freactiveness' as a crucial factor in evaluating the disturbed 
function. Thus, instead of viewing Mr. Plyushch's political attitudes 
as a reflection of a 'disease' controlled by unknown genetic disturbance, 
the alternative would be to view Mr. Plyushch's "reformist delusional 
idea" (on the assumption that he is really suffering from such ideas) 
as a reaction or a process that occurs as a result of a continuous 
confrontation between the individual patient and external environmental 
events occurring outside him (Laing and Esterson, 1970).
The emphasis here is on 'abnormality' as related to the 
individual's major functions perceived by himself and not just to 
unspecified and ambiguous 'symptoms' that are generally claimed by 
others. The patient's own perception of his total functioning would 
give rise to the importance of his claim, which should be regarded 
as an appropriate and applicable determining criterion concerning 
the severity of the individual's problem and thus his need for psychia­
tric hospitalisation. What actually happens is that many political 
dissenters are admitted to psychiatric hospitals on the basis of 
'others' claims rather than their own claims. In many cases, psjychiatric 
hospitalisation or services "come into being not because the alleged 
patient wants or is willing to submit to it, but because someone 
other than the 'patient' claims that the 'patient' is mentally ill" 
(Szasz, 1984, p . 17). In support of Szasz's arguments, when Dr. Koryagin 
(liberal Russian psychiatrist) examined some political dissenters, 
he concluded that:
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"None of them sought medical assistance, their 
families did not ask for psychiatric help, their 
speech and behaviour posed no threat to anyone; 
nonetheless, they were all confined to psychiatric 
hospitals by force or by deception." ( 1985, p. 175)
Although, in general terms, the claims of others are decisive 
in practice - and in some central cases have to be - the importance 
of the 'patient’s 1 verbal or personal account of his suffering should 
also be taken into consideration. That is because the individual's 
own perception about his past and present functioning might possibly 
indicate that his present level of functioning, even though not fully 
effective, is much better than his past functioning which is far 
worse.
The emphasis on the importance of the 'patient's' past 
and present functioning as it is experienced by himself emerges from 
the following premise:
First, the individual patient is the ultimate expert in his total 
functioning. Thus, allowing the person's own assessment would give 
an indication as to whether he is really suffering or not and whether 
such suffering has a real rather than an attached hypothetical or 
theoretical negative consequence.
Others' own assessments, although subjective in nature, 
would be allowed in certain conditions, to enter our overall evaluation 
of the individual's suffering especially when his problematic behaviour 
represents a real or significant departure from the healthy norms 
in his society and might affect the well-being of others. One might
argue that in the Soviet context, reformist or dissent behaviour 
certainly has been dangerous both to the individual and to his friends 
and family. To defy the power of the KGB could be interpreted to 
mean that the 'patient' does not have a rational estimation of the 
possible tragic consequences of such confrontation and the possible 
negative outcomes on his family. However, many Soviet dissenters 
have only too rational an idea of the consequences of confronting 
the State but are prepared to sacrifice their own safety and that 
of their families on moral, spiritual and humanitarian grounds.
Throughout this chapter, we will try to look into the 
different ways in which behaviour is considered to be dangerous and 
how it is crucial to differentiate between a real irrational danger­
ousness and 'dangerousness' that is simply 'attached' by 'others' 
to discredit one's thought and values.
Secondly, an effective screening of the 'patient's' total 
functioning would be achieved through a mutual agreement between 
both the 'patient' and the psychiatrist on the methods of evaluating 
such total functioning. Surely this procedure is much more effective 
than comparing the functional ability of Mr. Plyushch, for example, 
to an 'average' or theoretical normal Russian citizen. The positive 
effect about such mutual agreement on the methods of screening is 
that the emphasis would be shifted towards evaluating the 'patient' 
as a unique person. That is to say that other's definition would 
be replaced or supplemented by the patient's own definition. As 
a result, the psychiatrist's diagnosis would not be based on whether
Plyushch had schizophrenia or not. On the contrary, such diagnosis 
would be established according to what both the psychiatrist and 
the patient agree on what constitutes the patient's past and present 
total functioning. The psychiatrist's decision, accordingly, would 
be directed towards specifying the main characteristics of Mr. Plyushch, 
for example, total functional activities in different spheres of 
his life.
Finally, to fulfil the above premise, the psychiatrist 
should be ready to accept the fact that patients, even if disturbed, 
are nevertheless prima facie autonomous. Accordingly, a rational 
autonomous diagnostic and therapeutic relationship is the central 
safeguard in any systematic procedure to differentiate between what 
counts as real suffering that is perceived or defined by the 'patient1 
himself and an artificial definition by 'others' who might have little 
or no understanding of and familiarity with the patient's past and 
present functioning (see Koryagin, 1989).
Now let us consider another case illustration in order 
to give a full account of the importance of the 'patient's' personal 
claim and the claim requirement principle in general which represents 
a central theme in the RFD model.
Mr. Pyotr Grigorenko's case (which was presented by Bloch 
and Reddaway, 1977, pp. 105-127) provides an excellent illustration 
of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union and the appropriateness 
of the RFD model in solving the problem. In 1927, when Grigorenko
was 20 years old, he joined the Communist youth league (political 
party). Two years later he became known as a distinguished and gifted 
student in "Kharkov Polytechnic Institute" for military science.
As a result, he was recommended by the authorities to a highly respected 
engineering post in an academic setting. He graduated there in 1934 
with distinction. Grigorenko had another distinctive degree from 
the military academy. During the Second World War, he served actively 
for a period of duty and as a result he was highly respected by the 
authorities. By 1959, he was upgraded to a major-general in the 
army with a prestigious academic post. He began to criticize the 
practice of authoritative persons in his work and their neglect of 
the human rights. In 1963 he established a political party in order 
to bring Leninist principles into light again. As a result, and 
with the effective help of the KGB, he was accused of anti-Soviet 
activities, then transferred to a psychiatric examining centre.
The psychiatrists in charge reached the conclusion that Grigorenko 
was suffering from a "psychological illness in the form of a paranoid 
development of the personality involving delusions, combined with 
the first signs of cerebral arteriosclerosis". He was certified 
as incompetent and thus meriting compulsory admission to SPH. The 
psychiatric decision was based on the following justification:
"His psychological condition was characterized by 
the presence of reformist ideas, in particular for 
the reorganization of the state apparatus; and 
this was linked with ideas of over-estimation of 
his own personality that reached messianic proportions.
He felt his experiences with emotional intensity and 
was unshakeably convinced of the rightness of his 
actions. At the same time elements of a pathological 
interpretation of his surroundings were observed, 
together with morbid suspicion and sharply expressed 
excitability." (Ibid., p. 107)
After spending approximately one year in SPH, he was re­
examined in 1965 by a group of psychiatrists who validated the above 
conclusions, but pointed out that he was no longer mentally ill:
"He is in remission, does not require in-patient treatment, and shows 
only features of sclerosis of the brain" (p. 108). As a result, he 
succeeded in gaining a discharge from the hospital, but was advised 
to attend the district psychiatric clinic periodically.
After his discharge, Grigorenko became more involved in 
active anti-Soviet activities, especially in the field of human rights.
His main concern was to free himself from the label which psychiatrists 
had attached to him, namely an "invalid of the second category".
According to this status of invalidation he might not be permitted 
to work again and he must show himself to the psychiatric clinic 
from time to time. The KGB put him under continuous forms of surveillance 
In May 1969, the KGB arrested him, he was beaten up and prevented 
from having any contact with his lawyer and his family. The KGB 
arranged to put Grigorenko under the care of psychiatrists. The 
first examining group of psychiatrists reached the conclusion that 
the patient must be considered as not suffering from any symptomatic 
behaviour. However, a second group of psychiatrists reached a different 
conclusion, which was much more acceptable to the KGB. They found 
him to be "suffering from a mental illness in the form of a pathological, 
paranoid development of the personality, with the presence of reformist 
ideas that have appeared in his personality, and with psychopathic
features of the character ..... Consequently, the patient must be
considered not responsible" (Ibid., p p . 112-113). Thus, he needed
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a compulsory treatment in SPH. The psychiatrist who wrote the above 
reports believed that Grigorenko's former level of positive effective 
psychosocial functioning "is a characteristic of a pathological develop­
ment of the personality" (p.113) and thus, he merely appeared to 
be normal on the theoretical level whereas clinically he was abnormal, 
and his disturbance would be discovered in due time. Finally, Grigorenko 
was admitted to SPH and considered not responsible. (For more details, 
see Reich, 1985; see also Merskey and Shafran, 1986; KOryagin, 1989.)
Obviously, the above patients, Mr. Grigorenko and Mr. Plyushch 
were admitted to mental hospital not because they were really motivated 
to be treated, but because the authorities defined their total life 
as unintelligible and unpredictable, thus as dangerous to the well- 
established political and social order of the country - therefore, 
meriting psychiatric hospitalisation.
These cases lead us to recall the principles of "claims 
requirement" as a possible safeguard criterion for protecting the 
individual's rights and for a relatively systematic procedure through 
which one could decide the degree of their functional failure (i.e. 
the severity of the patient's problem) with of course, the exception 
of severe psychiatric conditions where one would hardly expect self­
referral or acknowledgement of the patient's own disturbance.
As pointed out in Chapter 3, self-referral behaviour for 
a Kuwait patient, for example, might differ crucially from that of
a British patient. Generally speaking, self-referral might indicate 
that the functional failure is partial rather than total and this 
condition might be applied to the British patient. For a Muslim 
patient, however, where long-term suffering is considered to be an 
ordeal which brings expiation for sins and raises the patient to 
a higher rank among believers if he accepts the 'disease' with dignity, 
self-referral might possibly imply the presence of a significant 
functional failure.
In Kuwait, for example, the situation is aggravated by 
a negative attitude held by the public towards psychiatric services 
in general. Thus, when an individual applies for psychiatric help, 
in spite of all the negative consequences, this application per se 
is an indication that first, his suffering has become unmanageable, 
even if at the onset the problem had been only partial. Second, 
the patient who has voluntarily sought psychiatric help is much more 
likely to benefit from 'psychiatric treatment', because he is obviously 
motivated to improve. Thus, the individual personal claim for psychia­
tric help might possibly be taken as an additional important indicator, 
besides other psychiatric examination methods, of the severity of 
his disturbance in the three major functions.
Now, what about the patient who experiences total failure 
in his major functions but is unable, for various reasons, to apply 
for psychiatric help and is also perhaps causing suffering to the 
people around him? In such a case it would be justifiable for mental 
health professionals to consider the claims of the family or others,
but it must be strongly emphasised here that people working in the 
psychiatric field have a professional and moral obligation to validate 
such claims by, for example, engaging in field research visits to 
the patient's home and work environment. Such visits, accompanied 
by a careful and systematic observation would give the mental health 
professionals first-hand experience of the patient's actual ability 
to function and would be a sufficient criterion in deciding whether 
the patient is really suffering from total or only from partial 
functional failure. Of course, writers such as Thomas Szasz would 
react negatively to any possibility of accepting the 'others' claims 
and would consequently suggest that no one must be sent or in Szasz's 
own terms, dragged to a building called a 'mental hospital' against 
his will unless he committed a crime. For Szasz, in a free society, 
the psychiatrist does not have the right to diagnose someone who 
does not want to be diagnosed. (After Dark, a TV interview with 
Thomas Szasz, 1988.) However, Szasz's argument seems to ignore the 
fact that there are specific psychiatric conditions where one must 
allow for certain exceptions.
Now, what are the exemptions of the "claims requirement" 
principles? These could be listed as follows:
First, apparent aggressive behaviour:
The psychiatrist has a professional obligation to accept the 'others' 
claims when the 'patient' is showing demonstrable physically violent 
behaviour towards himself or the others. (It's worth mentioning 
here that there is a section in the British Mental Health Act, 1983, 
where the police can pick up a person from the street if there is
’evidence' of an "urgent treatment need" or if the person 'appears' 
to the police as suffering from some sort of mental illness. (See 
Section 136 of the Mental Health Act (1983). But one must bear 
in mind that in many cases, aggressive behaviour is a mere reflection 
of the pressures put on the patient to admit himself to a mental 
hospital. Moreover, the committal procedures (within the police 
force or the hospital) could be the cause of the patient's aggressive 
behaviour. Therefore, a careful analysis of the nature, the context, 
the intensity, and the duration of the individual's aggressive behaviour 
is a necessary requirement for a reliable validation of the other's 
claims. Furthermore, if one has to base one's definition of mental 
illness on 'irrational violent behaviour', it must be clear that 
there is compelling evidence in many parts of the world, indicating 
that the hospital staff is much more aggressive and violent than 
the mentally aggressive patients themselves. As a result, the 'patient's 
violent behaviour might be a rational response to the staff's aggressive 
attitudes or conduct.
Secondly, psychopathic deviation:
Psychopathic disorders are expressed by abnormally aggressive or 
seriously irrational behaviour. The question which arises in this 
respect is: how to draw a line between the rational or normal
aggressiveness and the irrational. A dissenter who hijacks a plane 
with the aim of emigrating from the Soviet Union is unlike a person 
who kills haphazardly in a crowded street. Thus, the RFD model accepts 
both the claim of the individual patient himself and others' claims 
bearing in mind that accepting the others' claims must involve the 
following:
1) noticeable and persistent evidence of the seriously aggressive 
behaviour;
2) bizarre violence, i.e. violence which lacks a purposeful or under­
standable aim ('sane' rather than 'mad1 violence, Rack, 1982).
What needs to be stressed here is that people may manifest violence 
at specific times in their life and in a justified response to certain 
situations but not in others. Such purposive violence, in many instances, 
must be dealt with not by the psychiatric institution, but by other 
judicial channels (see Szasz, in After Dark programme, 1988). That 
is to say that 'a purposive' violence committed in pursuit of a robbery, 
for example, would be a suitable case for the police rather than 
psychiatrists. Many research papers, however, showed that being 
mentally ill does not mean necessarily a high potentiality for violence 
(see Scheff in Townsend, 1978). The problem stems from the fact 
that identifying mentally ill individuals with dangerousness or unpre­
dictable violence depends mainly on the popular and generally stereotyped 
attitudes towards the definition of 'mental illness' as synonymous 
with irrational violence or bizarre killings, etc.
Finally, people who manifest a clear indication of total 
functional failure. In such conditions, significant 'others' claims 
are more likely to take precedence over the individual's personal 
claim. It must be emphasised here that the above exemptions do not 
necessarily minimize or weaken the basic premises underlying the 
application of the individual's verbal or self-report principles, 
if one bears in mind the fact that the above exemptions do not represent 
a majority of cases in psychiatric daily practice.
Now, when trying to apply the claims requirement principles 
to the Soviet context, we would discover many problematic issues 
regarding the individual's personal claim. Mr. Grigorenko's case 
is an excellent illustration of the above issues. It seems from 
the psychiatric examination of Mr. Grigorenko that the authorities 
are not willing to accept his claim under any circumstances. Thus, 
the patient is for them, even when discharged, "in remission". This 
means that even if Grigorenko shows perfect functioning in the future, 
he is still considered vulnerable to relapse and his claim cannot 
be accepted due to his vulnerability. So, "The patient is in remission" 
is a term which is used in the Soviet Union as a means of leaving 
the door open for another admission to hospital (revolving door phenomenon). 
The Soviet psychiatric authorities are presumably refusing to validate 
the 'patient’s' claim on the basis that he is irresponsible, does 
not know his own best interests, suffers from illogical thoughts about 
his country, and thus is dangerous to himself and others. One might 
have a rational discussion with the psychiatrist in charge of the 
case in order to get a clear picture of the clinical reality of the 
above case. But what actually goes on in Grigorenko's case and many 
other cases is that the KGB is the final authority in deciding the 
acceptance or the refusal of claims or even in deciding the kind 
of diagnosis.
The KGB refused the opinion of the first group of psychiatrists 
who examined Grigorenko because they (the psychiatrists) reached the 
conclusion that "the patient must be considered as free from any 
symptoms of mental illness" and thus able to make a valid claim on
his own behalf. Another group of Soviet psychiatrists reached another 
kind of result, which was much more acceptable to the KGB. This 
group believed that Grigorenko was mentally ill and suffered from 
a pathological interpretation of his surroundings. Thus any future 
claims from the patient were invalid because, again, he was considered 
to be in "remission". Now, the Soviet authorities, in order to 
invalidate the individual's claim, usually use the concept of schizo­
phrenia rather than the "psychopath" class. A careful analysis of 
the term "psychopath", especially the paranoid psychopath (which 
is the most commonly used term), as it is expressed in many textbooks 
of Soviet forensic psychiatry, would reveal that Soviet psychiatrists 
define the paranoid psychopath as:
"... a disorder of personality, congenitally 
determined or acquired early in life. The abnormal 
features may, however, manifest themselves at any
time in life........ Their projects and plans
usually reveal the narrow range of their interests
and knowledge ..... In the forensic context the
paranoid personality can usually evaluate external 
reality and govern his actions and is thus declared 
responsible. Exceptionally, the condition is so
deep ..... that it constitutes a mental illness in
which the patient is then declared not responsible." 
(Felinskaya in Bloch and Reddaway, 1977, p.243)
Thus, diagnosing a person as a ’psychopath' does not 
necessarily lead the authorities to discredit his claim completely. 
Grigorenko and many dissenters receive the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
rather than psychopathic deviation because the case histories of 
Grigorenko and others show perfect functioning. Their case histories 
show no sign of psychopathological indications that usually correspond 
to any psychiatric definition of the psychopath or psychotic
conditions in general. In fact, most of them have shown during their 
childhood a successful ability to communicate, leadership, good grades 
at school, "independent judgments and determination in overcoming 
difficulties" (Klose and Koryagin, 1985, p. 175). Thus, placing Mr. 
Grigorenko in the category of "schizophrenia" rather than "psychopathic 
disorder" implies that his "mental" condition misrepresents his capacity 
to evaluate the world around him realistically. In other words, 
he is out of touch with reality, therefore his claim is invalid.
Now, one might argue that Grigorenko's reformist ideas 
would lead to negative consequences in terms of disturbing the estab­
lished order in society and causing discomfort to those surrounding 
him, hence, ultimately, to himself. Accordingly, it is legitimate 
to argue that he is 'suffering' and in need of 'psychiatric'treatment'.
In fact, although the RFD model places a great emphasis 
on the centrality of how the disturbed behaviour receives different 
forms of interpretation, the analysis of the interpretation process 
requires further consideration. Included in such a consideration, 
is whether the context alone in which the problematic behaviour occurs 
is a sufficient condition for judging the abnormality of behaviour? 
Grigorenko's case provides a good illustration of how the contextual 
nature of behaviour needs to be reconsidered, especially when one 
takes into account the political abuse of psychiatry in many parts 
of the world.
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In both our cases, and in many other cases, the people 
around the dissenters do not have any impression that they are really 
'insane*. Moreover, different groups of psychiatrists believe that 
political dissent per se is not the same as mental illness, but they 
are "too conformist to refuse to participate when called upon" (Bloch 
and Reddaway, 1985, p . 160). The dissenter's past and present 'mental 
efficiency* does not indicate any abnormality. In fact, most of 
them (as in Grigorenko's case) were more likely to adhere to their 
political beliefs even after being discharged from the mental hospital, 
which implies the presence of an unshakeable and consistent system 
of values. It must be emphasized here that most of the dissenters 
(our case is not included) who spent a long-term confinement in mental 
hospital, and who were interviewed |by Dr. Koryagin (a liberal Soviet 
psychiatrist) refused to accept the psychiatrist's definition of 
their former opinions and behaviour as representing symptoms of 
'schizophrenia'. This is presumably because most of them believed 
that they were railroaded into OPH or SPH (including our case), for 
no reason other than their thoughts were different from those of 
the 'average' hypothetical person. In other words, they didn't regard 
themselves as 'mentally ill' (see Klose and Koryagin, 1985).
The above discussion highlights the nature of psychiatric 
interpretation. The RFD model throws light on two forms of interpret­
ation: 1) an interpretation that standardly implies a meaning different
from the individual actual functioning. This kind of interpretation 
is currently used by people other than the individual himself such 
as psychiatrists, family, etc., 2) the individual's interpretation
of his own functioning. This kind of interpretation standardly reflects 
how the individual perceives and experiences his total functioning.
Again, 'homosexuality' provides us with a good example 
of the nature of the interpretative process in psychiatry and its 
implications. In the past, the psychiatrist who used the term 
'homosexual* implied that the affected individual is sexually unfit 
or there is something the matter or wrong with him or incapacitated, 
etc. (Farrell, 1979).
At present, the term 'homosexuality' gives a different 
standard implication, i.e. a preference rather than a psychosexual 
disorder. Thus, what mental health professionals are dealing with 
are interpretations which have a relative nature and a different 
set of implications.
Now, what is the relationship between the interpretative 
process of a given behaviour on the one hand and the patient's claim 
on the other hand? Furthermore, how does the inclusion of the above 
issues into the RFD model contribute to solving psychiatric abuse 
in the Soviet Union?
In answering the above question, let us again consider 
the previous two cases, Plyushch and Grigorenko. Both cases were 
viewed by Soviet authorities as manifesting dissenting behaviour 
which standardly implies the meaning of deviance, social misfit and
hence, 'diseased* individuals. The problem is that, as already men­
tioned in previous chapters, the interpretation of the individual 
suffering as 'abnormal' would have a long-term consequence even if 
the patient is fully cured. For Soviet psychiatrists, the fully 
cured 'patient' seems 'normal', acts as if normal, but in fact, is 
abnormal. It seems crucial to remember here that the above practice 
is not exclusively related to the Soviet psychiatrist. In the DSM-III 
for example, the recovered schizophrenic patient would be viewed 
as being "in remission" rather than being fully cured.
Now, let us examine how psychiatric interpretation works 
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A careful examination of the above table will lead us to 
the conclusion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make any 
sort of matching between the 'symptoms' interpretations of the 
individuals on the one hand and the Soviet authorities (psychiatrists), 
on the other. In the Soviet Union, it is not the labelled individual 
or their social reference groups who consider their behaviour as 
manifesting distress or a sign of 'abnormality', but the KGB and 
some groups of psychiatrists who make the diagnosis and provide the 
treatment.
Now, if we imagined that all Soviet citizens were totally 
convinced that 'political dissent' is a form of 'disease', the question 
arises: Can we accept the possibility that 'political dissent' is
a real 'disease' and thus Plyushch and Grigorenko must be viewed 
as 'abnormal' individuals?
To answer the above question, consider the following story 
of the American psychiatric system. Roughly 100 or 150 years ago 
before the American Civil War around 1835 or 1840, there was a medical 
paper published and widely accepted in the medical literature about 
mental disease called "Drapetomania" (drapetes, runaway + mania disease) 
(Blakiston's Gould Medical Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1979, p.409).
This disease was basically applied to black slaves who 
tried to escape from slavery in Mississippi and Louisiana to North 
and Canada. The 'slaves' who wished to be free were diagnosed as 
suffering from 'Drapetomania'. This 'disease* was in the medical
285
dictionaries until nearly twenty years ago when it was taken out 
in embarrassment (Thomas Szasz, After Dark, 1988).
Clearly, the definition of such ’disease* reflects the 
kind of values and attitudes that were held by many Americans at 
that time towards the genetically determined or inheritance inferiority 
of blacks. Now, was the total rejection of the blacks at that time 
a sufficient condition for defining their ’will to be free’ as 
"Drapetomania”?
In answering the above question, one must bear in mind 
the following two points:
1) What are the ’real’ motives which bring about or cause the 
psychiatric labels of blacks?
2) How does the individual get the label or the definition in the 
first place?
Surely, the definition of the black as suffering from some 
sort of genetic defect is coloured by political and social policy 
towards them (cheap labour, for example). That is to say that the 
psychiatric definition in the case of blacks is basically a political 
attempt which reflects the desire of a particular group rather than 
a scientific and objective endeavour.
Another possible reason for labelling the black 06 
cultural or popular stereotyped attitudes towards the black as someone 
who is violent, simple-minded, emotional, etc. What follows from
such an image is that blacks are viewed as more vulnerable to disease 
or irresponsible acts such as escaping from their masters. Thus, 
the "powerful effect of expectations” (Townsend, 1978, p. 116) and 
popular stereotypes towards the black might possibly act as a guideline 
for clinicians to shape the symptoms of 'Drapetomania* or mental 
illness in general (Scheff, in Townsend, 1978).
Nowadays, when the values and attitudes of American's 
society have changed, blacks are beginning to be viewed as 'normal' 
individuals. What does that mean? It simply means that, if 
'Drapetomania' is a true disease with a clear-cut pathological indic­
ation, no new 'values' would affect the presence or absence of the 
disease. By contrast, many HIV positive patients have been rejected 
and discriminated against in their work, etc. Now, if society changes 
its values and attitudes towards AIDS patients in terms of accepting 
rather than rejecting them, would that motivate the pathologists 
to take out HIV disease from the medical dictionaries? Surely not. 
Whether there is total rejection or total acceptance towards the 
AIDS patient, no one could deny or ignore the reality of such disease, 
i.e. clear-cut pathological manifestation. This means that the 
diagnosis of mental illness is determined in many instances by moral 
or political values which are, in many cases, irrelevant to the 
individual's actual suffering. Thus, total rejection of a mentally 
ill individual cannot always be taken as exclusive evidence that 
the society is right and the 'patient' is wrong. Another factor 
that needs to be considered beside the contextual nature of any given 
disturbed function is whether the individual is really suffering
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or whether his suffering is attached or assumed by others. This 
will lead us to emphasise the importance of which individual receives 
the label in the first place. In most British mental hospitals, 
for example, there is an over-representation of Afro-Caribbean groups 
who are more likely to be involuntarily hospitalised, sent to locked 
wards, and receive ECT (see Fernando, 1988). The process of their 
admission goes like that:
"... no-one goes to a psychiatrist unless they are 
'mad', and no-one is designated 'mad* unless they 
are violent. A person who is mentally disturbed
but not violent is not 'mad' .11
(Rack, 1982, p. 171)
For many British psychiatrists, being Afro-Caribbean means that the 
patient is presupposed to ” ... look and act in a bizarre way" (Ibid., 
p. 117) or in a violent way and hence to be vulnerable to schizophrenia.
No matter whether the violence in question is mad or sane violence, 
once the black is brought to the hospital by the police, the psychiatrist
in charge is pre-conditioned to assume the worst by the label schizo­
phrenia which the person carries with him. The psychiatrist expects 
to see a schizophrenic rather than someone who might have schizophrenia. 
Now, is the over-representation of Afro-Caribbeans (or Indians or 
Pakistanis) in mental hospitals a sufficient indicator that they 
are 'really* schizophrenics, for example?
Certainly not, if one bears in mind that most of them are 
identified or admitted through the police. Thus, new research is 
studying Afro-Caribbean communities in the hope of discovering how
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such people receive the label 'schizophrenia' in the first place, 
rather than of discovering any specific pathology in this group.
Knowing the pathways through which a person receives a psychiatric 
definition would illuminate the factors that govern societal acceptance 
or rejection of any group of peoples.
It must be re-emphasised in this respect that we do not 
undermine the importance of the contextual nature of any given disturbed 
function. The problem on a large scale is that such contextual inter­
pretation must be considered in relation to the individual's actual 
functioning, the reality of his suffering and how he receives the 
label.
It must be stressed here that the individual's suffering 
cannot be defined simply by the dangerous consequences of reformism, 
for example, in the context of a police state.
The motivation to succeed in life can cause suffering due 
to the presence of certain negative consequences such as conflicts 
with people, anxiety, ignoring family duties, etc. Suffering in 
this context cannot be considered as a negative symptom or indication 
of mental disturbance or irrationality. The suffering of Soviet 
political dissenters will surely be alleviated if the political 
situation in their country improves. Similarly, the suffering of 
the individual who is striving for success will disappear when he 
fulfils his aims. This leads us to the following conclusion; if the 
individual's suffering can respond positively to change in his social
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or physical environment then there is no real suffering (see Culver 
and Gert in Brown, 1985). The most important element in any form 
of suffering is "... the attitude we take toward suffering, the attitude 
in which we take suffering upon ourselves" (Frankl, 1988, p. 114).
What we need to emphasise as a result of the above discussion 
is the need to draw a line between "... what a society considers/should 
consider sufficiently autonomous and what the same society considers/ 
should consider sufficiently defective in autonomy" (Laor, 1982, p.221).
Now, let us relate the above discussion to Mr. Plyushch's 
and Mr. Grigorenko's theoretical abnormality. The RFD model believes 
that both cases could be viewed on the following basis: First, both
cases show in their past and present history a total functional effect­
iveness. A necessary requirement for the application of the RFD 
model is that the individual's total and not just partial functioning 
must be disturbed. Neither case manifested even a partial function 
failure.
Secondly, both cases show a significant total functional 
failure when looked upon within the psychiatric interpretation attached 
to their total functioning. The RFD model, on the other hand, would 
view both Plyushch and Grigorenko, when considering their own personal 
interpretations and when taking into account their past and present 
performance, as effectively functioning in all major functions.
Now, one might claim that their concern for rights and 
freedoms shows 'responsibility' is a Western political claim. Such 
concerns might, in the context of a police state, be the height of 
irresponsibility. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that there could 
be a society where individual autonomy was strongly disvalued and 
felt to be threatening. Advocating freedom would certainly seem 
irresponsible here.
Our response to the above argument begins by the following 
question: "How do we distinguish between autonomous and non-autonomous
behavior?" (Murphy, 1982, p.333; see also Leor, 1982), or how do 
we differentiate between a totally responsible act and a partially
responsible one? In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
give a logical answer to the above questions because:
"... one would still, in establishing the 
conditions of autonomy, be establishing moral 
conditions in labeling and naming some 
conditions impediments and others as legitimate 
grounds of choice." (Ibid., p.334)
Now, could we consider the political dissenter's beliefs 
as not wholly responsible and hence irrational? Brown (1985) provides 
us in his article "A critique of three conceptions of mental illness"
with a convincing argument by stating that our
"... beliefs are arrived at and shared not on the 
basis of evidence or argument but by virtue of 
psychological and social factors involving our 
membership in or exclusion from various social 
groups and practices. Indeed those beliefs most 
often cited as delusionary are of just the sort
least amenable to evidential warranty and most 
likely to fall under sub-rubrics as religious, 
mystical, political, or metaphysical, but not 
under those of biological, medical, sickness, 
illness, or disease. There seems little, there­
fore, in the beliefs themselves, however crazy, 
to warrant the designation of sick or diseased, 
except that some or even nearly everyone may 
reject them as contrary to evidence, good sense, 
current views, or community consensus, and none 
of these considerations seems at all like those 
that would be adduced to determine the presence 
of a physical illness or disease." (p.559)
What is wrong with Soviet psychiatric practice is that 
political beliefs and the dissenters' sense of responsibility is 
taken to imply, for example, as forms of 'chronic hypomania' (a form 
of illness) in which the patient "... liked dealing with people and 
organising different activities" (Moroz in Merskey and Shafran, 1986, 
p.250) and in addition, they are motivated to:
"Inventing and improving plans, the patients were 
fully engulfed in work, did not rest on weekends 
and holidays, and could talk only about their 
'hobbies' because other topics seemed boring to 
them. The patients were firmly convinced that 
their activity was interesting for everybody and 
did not allow any irony regarding their work. In 
some cases the content of over-valued ideas was 
outside their main occupation."
(Moroz in Merskey and Shafran, 1986, p.250)
What we conclude from our previous discussion is that the 
belief per se, whether a moral or political one, is not a sufficient 
condition for labelling a person as mentally ill. (This point will 
be elaborated later in this chapter).
For those who emphasise the moral centrality of autonomy, 
the conclusion is clear:- whether a given society values or disvalues 
the principle of autonomy or the individual sense of responsibility, such 
an ethical principle must nevertheless always be respected and promoted 
in clinical practice. The only exceptions are in a severe psychiatric 
condition where there is a clear indication of a temporary defective 
in autonomy and where the individual’s behaviour represents a 
significant threat to himself and to the well-being of others.
Thirdly, if we believed that both cases according to their 
own perception or interpretation - have a significant total functional 
failure, the RFD model would strongly emphasize the concept of 
"reactiveness" of the disturbance. Adherence to the concept of 
reactiveness would lead to the view that the 'abnormality' in both 
cases, rather than subsisting inside the persons, is in fact, a 
reaction to external causes which occur outside them. Thus, the 
emphasis would be on the events that occur in the environment rather 
than on a mentalistic or genetic internal explanation.
Finally, it was well-documented from the case histories 
of many political dissenters including our two cases, that none of 
them cause suffering to others or have feelings of 'distress'.
This leads the RFD model to emphasise the importance of the individual's 
own estimation of the "degree of suffering" as a central criterion 
in deciding whether the 'patient' needs to be hospitalised or not.
Most political dissenters create a positive meaning through their 
suffering (helping others, sacrificing their futures for the sake 
of others, interests, etc.). They may well suffer, but it could
be rational and meaningful to do so. Frankel (1988) expresses 
throughout his book "Man's Search for Meaning" the above point very 
well by stating:
"Man's search for meaning is a primary force in 
his life and not a "secondary rationalization" 
of instinctual drives. This meaning is unique 
and specific in that it must and can be fulfilled 
by him alone; only then does it achieve signif­
icance which will satisfy his own will to meaning. 
There are some authors who contend that meaning 
and values are "nothing but defence mechanisms, 
reaction formations and sublimations". But as 
for myself, I would not be willing to live merely 
for the sake of my "defense mechanisms", nor would 
I be ready to die merely for the sake of my 
"reaction formations". Man, however, is able to 
live and even to die for the sake of his ideals 
and values." (p.99)
When the degree of suffering, however, becomes severe, 
as a result of a continuous contradiction and inconsistency between 
the individual's subjective meaning of his suffering and the socio­
professional interpretation (see Laing in Delbaum, 1972), it is likely 
that such situation would place the sufferer into a long-term 
disadvantage status in which meaningful suffering becomes protracted 
to the point of loss of meaning which could cause the person a total 
functional failure.
Clearly, the applicability of the RFD model is restricted 
basically to functional failure as it is perceived by the individual 
himself. A crucial question in this respect is why we should consider 
the individual's personal interpretation of his total functions as 
more valid and reliable than the interpretation of others.
As we have mentioned in previous chapters, psychiatrists 
are basically dealing with feelings, emotions, memory, subjective 
experience, conscious and unconscious desires, conflicts, insight, 
thoughts, etc. The content and frames of their judgments are centred 
on whether the above feelings and desires are appropriate or 
inappropriate, reasonable or unreasonable, intelligible or inintellig- 
ible, real or out of touch with reality, bizarre or sound, efficient 
or inefficient. Psychiatrists' instruments are not developed to a 
degree where they can detect subjective experience and feelings in 
an objective and systematic way. We are not dealing with a well- 
established biological system with specific measurable functions 
that can be identified by physical methods. This has led writers 
such as Boorse in Edwards (1982), for example, to base their view 
of mental illness on internal malfunctioning. For Boorse, there are 
mental functional norms, not identical with biological norms, but 
plausibly viewed as working on a similar basis. Kendell's studies 
( 1975) led him to assume that mental disease can cause survival and 
reproduction problems. Kendell's model served well to support 
Boorse's basic arguments of the similarities between mental and 
biological functions. Unfortunately, the problem is still there. 
Plyushch's political 'attitudes', for example, might be perceived by 
Boorse as representing a disturbance in his mental functional forms 
that can be understood as relatively similar to biological dysfunctional 
forms. Such kinds of beliefs are likely to increase the person's 
chances to be under the scrutiny of the KGB's own standards of evalu­
ation and hence to be sent to SPH or to prison which might cause him 
a general deterioration in his physical and psychological health.
The KGB procedures might increase his chances of mortality. Yet, 
Plyushch's political or ethical attitudes are not disease.
Again, what mental health professionals are dealing with 
is a unique subjective condition in the context of society, rather 
than internal mental functional norms or psychological machinery 
that have a specific statistical norm and identified boundaries.
It is not a matter of causing mortality or reproduction problems 
that make the case a psychiatric one. "Man is not fully conditioned 
and determined, but rather determines himself whether he gives in 
to conditions or stands up to them" (Frankel, 1988, p. 132).
What we conclude from the above discussion is that the 
individual's own assessment of his life must be taken as a valid 
insight when trying to make sense of the subjective content of his 
behaviour. As Flew in Hasker (1977) argues, the diagnosis of mental 
illness must be based on conditions that inhibit capacities and must 
be "regarded by the patient as in itself and by his standards bad"
(p. 119) and not by the social authorities standards. In reality, 
however, one cannot ignore the fact that there are certain severe 
forms of 'mental illness' where the patient's own subjective standard 
requires psychiatrists diagnosis. Fortunately, not all psychiatric 
conditions represent a severe defect in the individual's reasoning 
abilit ies.
Let us for a moment sidestep the above arguments and try 
to see whether there is any possibility of establishing a value-free
view of ’dissenting1 behaviour or mental illness in general.
One cannot escape the fact that the individual's personal 
values, subjective experience, and his cognitive pattern have a crucial 
bearing on defining the reality of his suffering. Most mental health 
professionals are afraid to admit that their definition of mental 
illness is not totally an objective process or free from prejudgment 
thoughts concerning what constitutes an ideal functioning. Instead, 
the definition is essentially a social process. 'Schizophrenics' 
in Kuwait society, for example, go undiscovered for many years because 
the family's toleration standards for impaired behaviour are greater 
than in Britain for example, where the vocational and familial demands 
are greater than in developing countries. In fact, the more the 
patient has strong family relations, high social and work status, 
the more 'negotiation' would be conducted before deciding to label 
him as schizophrenic, for example (Strauss and Carpenter in Townsend, 
1978). Thus, the family attitudes, the individual's social status, 
and society's norms might contribute significantly in shaping the 
psychiatric definition or view of a given individual.
It is evident by now that it is very difficult to conceive 
a sharp dividing line between personal moral values and symptoms 
per se as an objective element. In other words, one cannot easily 
divorce or separate subjective experience and values from the disturbed 
condition in itself as something objective. Moreover, current psychi­
atric diagnostic tools have not yet reached a degree of sensitivity 
that can isolate such personal and subjective values. That is not
to say that the present writer is completely in agreement with Szasz's 
argument that psychiatry is completely governed by moral and ethical 
values.
Many distinguished authorities (Lewis, 1953; Farrell,
1979; Kendell, 1975; Laing, 1960; Szasz, 1987; Leiffer, 1969;
Scheff, 1970) have found that it is difficult if not altogether impossible 
to establish a value-free procedure in the definition of personal 
and subjective values. The present writer agrees with the above 
authors that it is very difficult to adopt a view of mental illness 
that implies a standard method of dealing with every individual patient 
regardless of the content of his political, moral or idiosyncratic 
attitudes towards himself or his society or social group.
The RFD model emphasizes the view that to consider someone 
as 'mentally ill*, his total motivational and cognitive abilities 
must deteriorate to the point where they impair the individual's 
well-being. The total functional failure must interfere with the 
individual's optimal functioning, survival and his own maintenance. 
Accordingly, any total disturbance in the individual's major function­
ing, especially the physiological one, which can cause a negative 
outcome in relation to his survival and well-being, might be inter­
nationally recognized but not necessarily value-free.
Consider a mother who kills her only baby or a person who 
pours gasoline over his old father and sets him on fire. Both cases 
will be recognized as 'patients' in almost all societies simply because 
at first sight their behaviour violates standard values.
Surely, dissenting behaviour per se does not necessarily 
violate standard values in all societies in the same sense. What 
actually violates the standard values of nearly all societies, however, 
is the nature of Soviet psychiatric interpretation which is attached 
to the content and frame of the dissenting behaviour. Such Soviet 
psychiatric interpretation is not basically tied to the underlying 
process of 'schizophrenia' which as mentioned earlier can be established 
in recognisable though distinguishable varieties, in all societies.
It is in an illegitimate sense that Soviet psychiatric 
interpretation represents underlying values and beliefs in Soviet 
society, as Szasz claims on many occasions.
When examining the Soviet context, it seems clear that 
the psychiatric interpretation or values that are basically held 
by main-stream or 'core' psychiatrists differs crucially from that 
of the 'average' psychiatrists and the general public.
To solve the above problem, the present writer proposes 
the following criteria for deciding the normality of the Soviet 
dissenters:
First, individuals must manifest a total functional failure in the 
form of violent behaviour or high potentiality for loss of control, 
or self-defeating behaviour that has negative consequences on the 
individual's own survival or that of others.
Secondly, the individual's verbal or personal claim if appropriate, 
must be to the effect that his present conditions and symptoms placed 
him at a disadvantage or limited his total functional effectiveness.
Thirdly, where relevant, 'others' claims or 'third party' claims 
must rely on demonstrable abnormality. In that case the 'patient' 
must be presumed to be 'not patient' until certain basic evidence 
(case history) and detailed investigation about his actual total 
functioning are carried out. That is to say that the presence of 
'first rank' indication of total functional failure is a necessary 
condition for labelling somebody as mentally ill.
In all cases, it must be emphasized in the case of Soviet 
political dissenters that bizarre thoughts or attitudes alone, as 
do not standardly imply, when considering the individual's total 
functional effectiveness, deviation, incapacitation or mental illness.
In this respect, the present writer is strongly in agreement 
with Szasz ( 1984) when he emphasizes the importance of "voluntary 
psychiatry" or "contractual psychiatry" or "psychiatric relations 
between consenting adults" (p.25).
That is to say that apart from the excluded cases already 
discussed, the individual who is suspected to be mentally ill should 
prima facie be completely free to enter a mutual agreement with the 
psychiatrist. Such mutual agreement between the 'patient* and 
'psychiatrist' is basically centred around what a valid or real inter­
pretation of the individual's total suffering should be. Moreover,
such psychiatric interpretation should take into account what different 
mentalistic terms such as delusion, out of touch with reality, halluc­
inations, seeming normal, etc., imply when used in everyday language.
Such mutual awareness of the meaning implied in current psychiatric 
terms, and of the social or familial feedback in shaping the content 
and frame of the psychiatric definition, would -surely maximize the 
insight into the basic features and process of the disturbed condition 
as something 'objective'. A detailed account of the role of mutual 
agreement between psychiatrist and patient in any diagnostic or thera­
peutic relationship will be discussed in Chapter Six.
Summary and Conclusions
The politicalization of psychiatry in the Soviet Union 
has become a systematic state policy that represents an obvious violation 
of universal human rights, a serious offence against medical ethics, 
and misemployment of professional knowledge and skills (Koryagin, 1989).
Soviet psychiatrists and authorities adopt a view of mental 
illness that is fundamentally based on the ideas and research of 
Andrei V. Snezhnevsky (the founder of Moscow School of Psychiatry) 
which led, in the 1960's to the creation of a special diagnostic 
system.
Snezhnevsky's understanding of mental illness prescribed 
for the Soviet psychiatrists a 'monochromatic vision of psychopathology' 
in which there is little chance for a second opinion (Reich, 1985, p.245).
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The most common diagnosis in the Soviet's diagnostic scheme 
is either psychopathy or schizophrehia. Three forms of schizophrenia 
are currently in use in the Soviet's psychiatric daily practice: 
continuous form, recurrent form, and shift like form. The most frequent 
diagnosis is "sluggish" schizophrenia and that is due to the power 
of such criteria to accommodate individuals on the basis of 'non- 
psychotic* symptoms.
According to the Soviet system of diagnosis, a schizophrenic 
can be classified to one of the three forms mentioned above, with 
the assumption that each form has a pre-determined genetic factor (Reich, 
1985).
The concept of schizophrenia and the concept of mental 
disorder in general have continued to raise many theoretical, philo­
sophical and clinical problems for mental health professionals.
The vulnerability of the concept of mental illness to abuse and the 
traditional and well-established relationship between 'mental' labelling 
and the process of invalidation of the individual patient are the 
most important negative moral features of the concept of mental illness 
(see Koryagin, 1989). These problems are discussed throughout this 
chapter in connection with the problem of psychiatric abuse and with 
special reference to political psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union.
It has, by now, been extensively documented that some Soviet psychiatrists 
deliberately use their professional training for political rather 
than medical purposes, i.e. they apply the concept of 'schizophrenia' 
to perfectly normal people (ibid., 1989). Other psychiatrists might
unknowingly misapply the concept of 'schizophrenia*. Two main reasons 
explain the ill-use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. First, the 
nature of the political system of the Soviet Union and, second, the 
nature of the Soviet definitional system which facilitates the grounds 
for categorizing dissent behaviour as deviant and abnormal, hence 
meriting psychiatric intervention (Ibid., 1989). It seems that dissenting 
behaviour - according to Soviet socio-political perception - is genuinely 
symptomatic behaviour which makes not only the KGB officer but even 
psychiatrists themselves believe that dissidents are in reality 'mentally 
ill’ individuals. That is to say, labelling dissenters as 'ill' 
individuals is based largely on what is usual and expected in the 
society. In this respect, psychiatrists represent ’the establishment' 
in the Soviet social and political system and their main duty is 
to make sure that citizens are conforming to such a system.
Thus, Soviet psychiatrists' clinical decisions in terms 
of dissenters are determined by the criterion of non-conformity.
In recent years, attempts have been made to liberalize the Soviet 
political climate, leading to an announcement by the Soviet Union 
on January 4 1988 that it was introducing a new policy which will 
make the psychiatric commitment of "a patently health person a criminal 
offence" (Psychiatric News, 1988, p.3).
In fact, many Western and Soviet human rights activists 
are sceptical that the above policy will bring real reform, because 
(1) The main figure behind these reforms is the Minister of Health,
Yevgeny Chazov, who is known for his approval and rationalization 
of past Soviet practice.
As Ellen Mercer, director of APA's Office of International Affairs 
has pointed out, Soviet authorities "have a long record of signing 
agreements but not living up to them" (Ibid., p.3).
In the opinion of Soviet psychiatrist, Anatoly Koryagin,
"Violation of the laws [by the authorities] in the Soviet Union 
is an everyday occurrence and has nothing to do with what is 
in writing. They will continue to do whatever they want, and 
the people have no recourse if the State maintains that there 
has been no violation" (Ibid., p.3).
The new reforms may not be retroactive, so those dissenters 
who are confined in (SPH) or (OPH) may not be able to benefit 
form the advantages of such 'new laws'.
The real purpose of these reforms, as Koryagin (1989) argues, 
is
"... to reduce the question of misuse of psychiatry 
in the Soviet Union to isolated instances. To mention 
only individual cases where psychiatrists have misused 
their professional position or where the police have 
done likewise would suggest there has never been any 
appearance in the West of former victims of Soviet 
misuse ..." (p.337)
According to these recent reforms, Soviet authorities have released 
some political dissenters, but:
"... these releases are very carefully timed, one 
person at a time, the aim being to extend this process 
of release for as long a time span as possible, so 
that those who monitor the process will have the 
impression that the situation in the Soviet Union is
improving - literally from day to day. So you have 
someone released today, that is fine, someone released 
next week, even better, a week later, better still, so, 
whether you like it or not, there is a general 
impression in the minds of those who watch these things 
that there is progressive development. You must bear 
in mind that those who are released from psychiatric 
hospitals are not exonerated or rehabilitated, in 
either a social or diagnostic sense. They leave the 
hospitals branded as psychiatrically ill; they can be 
put back the very next day. If the government were 
really liberal in its aims, there would be nothing to 
stop them from releasing everyone like that immediately, 
and saying "Yes, an error was committed, we admit this.
It will not be repeated again". What is happening is 
just what you could call a carefully calculated release 
of hostages, and every release gains an enormous amount 
in propaganda value. Recall how dissidents have been 
released from prison or exile; there was myself, there 
was Sakharov and Begun, and all this was done bit by 
bit, not at once. And every time a known dissident was 
released, the Western reaction quite obviously was,
"Look, things are improving, they've released such and 
such". If the Soviet authorities really wanted to 
improve things, they would release all these prisoners 
and publicly apologise. That really would be an improve­
ment - but we have not seen it yet."
(Koryagin, 1989, p.339)
Obviously, the recent reforms in Soviet psychiatric practice, 
whatever its purposes, are a clear admission of the unsuitability 
of the existing diagnostic model and the need to consider the individual's 
actual functioning. Throughout this chapter, the RFD model has empha­
sized the need to consider both the individual's actual functioning 
and the nature of psychiatric interpretation attached to it in determining 
the nature of the disturbed functioning.
This chapter has also made an attempt to show how the RFD 
model might provide some guidelines for dealing with the problem 
of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union. One of these guidelines
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is that mental illnesses are identified on the basis of a total 
disturbance in the individual's major functions (psycho-physio-social 
functions). Second, the disturbance is the result of a continuous 
interaction between the individual and external rather than internal 
factors (the concept of 'reactiveness'). The emphasis here is on 
external observable events rather than on unspecified and ambiguous 
internal events.
Thirdly, the importance of the individual's verbal report 
or of his personal claim is crucial in protecting his rights and in 
deciding the severity of his disturbed functioning. It was further 
agreed that the important principle in any psychiatric definition 
of the individual's assumed problem is to be fully aware of the content 
and frame of the functional failure and of the role of the third 
party in the final psychiatric definition.
Fourthly, the validity of a diagnosis of disturbed functioning 
must depend on a diagnostic acknowledgement of the degree of total 
failure (whether partial or total failure) and of how such failure 
is related to the individual's own survival and well-being.
Finally, we have stressed the importance of promoting and 
encouraging a self-referral approach and a contractual relationship 
between the 'patient' and psychiatrist that is based on a mutual 
agreement between them as to what should constitute normal or abnormal 
functioning. That is to say, there should be a mutually agreed definition 
and both parties must work towards stated well-defined goals.
If we apply the above guidelines to Mr. Plyushch and 
Mr. Grigorenko, for example, we see that both patients have the right 
to provide a personal claim or account or interpretation about their 
own suffering, if they are assumed to be suffering. Both patients 
are believed to be perfectly normal when considering their actual 
total functioning as it is perceived by the individuals themselves 
and by their social groups (such as their families, their colleagues, 
relatives, etc.) rather than via the psychiatric interpretation of 
their attitudes. Neither of them, when viewed under the RFD model, 
merited psychiatric hospitalisation.
CHAPTER SIX 
THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
VALUE-FREE OR VALUE-LADEN
THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
VALUE-FREE OR VALUE-LADEN
1 . Introduct ion
One of the most provoking subjects that confront mental 
health profession is the conceptual analysis of mental illness which 
continues to stimulate many controversial questions. These relate 
to the reality and nature of mental disturbance, the methods used 
for diagnosing mental conditions and the moral implications of 
labelling people as 'mentally ill'.
Psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers 
have responded to the problems of defining mental illness in several 
different ways. Their main concern has been either to base evaluations 
on the concept of 'value-free' objective methods, as applied in 
physical medicine (clinical universalism) , or to retain the medical 
model and reject mental illness for not conforming to it.
Unfortunately, the problem of objectivity and of establishing 
a complete value-free theory in psychiatry has not yet been resolved 
convincingly. This is due to the following reasons: firstly, many
writers consider physiology or the general methods used in medicine 
as their only paradigm in any discussion of the concept of mental 
illness. Secondly, although some writers adopt a more moderate stance 
by accepting the importance of psychological factors alongside the
validity of the 'medical model', others evaluate psycho-social factors 
as the only important paradigm in any discussion concerning the 
practice of the psychiatric profession (e.g. Szasz, 1961 and 1987;
Laing, 1960 and Leiffer, 1969, Scheff, 1971). A third group is 
mainly represented by labelling theorists such as Goffman, Lemert, 
Scheff, etc.). Labelling theory not supported by recent empirical 
studies and such a school of thought does not provide a conceptually 
clear account of how to define or identify people with mental symptoms 
or how to treat patients who actually suffer from mental disturbance. 
Such a theory, nevertheless, provides a moral account of mental illness. 
For labelling theorists, the need to protect human rights and the 
respect for the dignity of the individual as an autonomous agent 
outweighs the need to adhere to a concept of mental illness and 
psychiatry in general. Moreover, they highlight the moral negative 
outcome of labelling people as mentally ill and the negative conditions 
in psychiatric hospitals. They consequently hold the belief that 
involuntary hospitalisation must be abolished.
This chapter is going to pose the following questions: 
first, is the medical model itself really value-free? Second, how 
valid and applicable are recent attempts to establish a value-free 
model of mental illness? The chapter also outlines how the Reactive 
Functional Disorder approach to mental illness demonstrates the 
impossibility of establishing a value-free model of mental illness 
and the need for a different perspective in dealing with human 
experience and findings.
In the outline that follows, the RFD will be contrasted 
with medical and non-physical models. The proposed alternative (the 
RFD) will be grounded in purely psycho-social factors. Such factors 
are obviously incapable of any standard application of a value-free 
account. But the RFD does not seek freedom from such factors. Instead, 
its main purpose is to be systematic rather than totally objective 
in our conception of the psycho-social factors. The model will consider 
mental illness as representing a total failure in the individual's 
major psycho-physio-social functioning. To identify and define such 
total failure, there must be present a total disturbance of the 
individual's motivational and cognitive abilities which underline 
his psycho-social functioning (such a total disturbance would presumably 
be so clear and so radically different from the health normal function­
ing that can be relatively easy to identify in many contexts, not 
necessarily value-free towards any contextual interpretations in 
any given culture). Throughout the following pages, we will consider 
a detailed description of how a moral perspective represents a basic 
development in any attempt to define mental illness. As we have 
already established in previous chapters, RFD represents a morally 
preferable approach to the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness 
not necessarily a major conceptual advance over the DSM-III.
In the following chapter the terms 'systematic' or 
'conceptually clear system' will refer to procedures that are 
aimed basically at maximizing the actual complaints or the observable 
symptoms of the individual patient and minimizing the effects of 
irrelevant subjective factors (e.g. third party claims).
The term 'objectivity', however, would basically refer 
to a value-free method and highly constructed forms that basically 
rely on independent testing indices.
A detailed acocunt of what we mean by 'objectivity' in 
general will be discussed as the chapter progresses.
The Medical Model: Value-Free or Value-Laden
The 'medical' or 'disease' model has gained its validity 
by the unique features of its research methods which centred around 
specific organic dysfunctions. The contribution of this model in 
disclosing many facts regarding the organic basis for many fatal 
diseases gives the medical model a very special status among other 
helping professions as reality-based and therefore highly objective. 
This has led many health professionals to apply the medical or 
biological model used in general medicine to psychiatry. This has 
meant that the principles and procedures which proved to be highly 
effective in dealing with organic cases are also employed in the 
diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric conditions (Guze, 1977).
Now, before criticising the application of the medical 
model to psychiatry as a necessary criterion for attaining a neutral 
perspective of mental illness, let us first examine the present 
limitations of the medical or disease model. A careful analysis 
of this model would reveal that in medical practice, the physician 
often bases his primary diagnosis of a given organic condition by 
relying on the patient's personal report. Consider, for example,
hypertension, asthma, epilepsy, etc., physical diseases which reveal 
themselves as altered functions, not structures. Thus, definition 
of disease almost always depends on the form of the altered function 
(e.g. weakness) rather than on the actual contribution of physio- 
chemical factors (Roth and Kroll, 1986).
In fact, most indications of physical disease involve the 
patient's subjective estimation of his disturbance as to whether 
he feels some sort of weakness, pain and suffering as the crucial 
symptoms of physical illness. The duration, area or location and 
severity of the pain and suffering are basically concluded from the 
patient's subjective construction of his perception and the doctor's 
personal judgement of the patient's pain starting point and how the 
patient responds to his illness (Ibid., 1986). Blood pressure and 
blood cholesterol, for example, vary largely from one society to 
another. Thus physical conditions have their idiosyncratic and 
relativistic aspects (Ausubel, 1974). In fact, cultural norms, values 
and social judgements play a considerable role in physical medicine. 
This is because the kind of societal norms and values influence the 
definition of the public's health concern, priorities of health 
services, and physicians' attitudes towards health in general. In 
Kuwaiti society, for example, people are very concerned with issues 
of fertility, and medical practice puts a great deal of emphasis 
on promoting fertility within the general population. In a different 
culture, such as Britain, for example, there is considerable concern 
about over-eating, obesity, drug-taking (Shaval, 1981). AIDS and 
venereal disease, on the other hand, are considered by some doctors
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in Kuwait as reflecting the moral deficiency of the patient who is 
considered as irresponsible, bad and dirty. The present writer's 
communications with doctors in Britain has also revealed that some 
of them refuse to treat patients with AIDS. Some patients and 
prisoners who suffer from AIDS have been mistreated by hospital staff 
during their stay at the hospital or have been put in very isolated 
cells in prisons. This shows that the physician's concept of what 
constitutes appropriate procedures for dealing with a particular 
'disease' might be heavily loaded with subjective values and personal 
moral orientations.
When the medical model is applied to psychiatry, the problem 
becomes even more complicated. This is because:
"Theories about real physical disease are all 
about actual biological events which are 
generally agreed to impair function or shorten 
life."
(Laing, 1983, p.41)
Thus, an application of the disease concept to psychiatry 
would be deceptive and confusing in that it promotes the meaning 
that the 'affected' individual has a specific defect which was caused 
by specific physiological dysfunction and that his problems can easily 
be diagnosed and cured. Thus, to use Laing's own words, "disease 
theory is not the best strategy to adopt" (Ibid., p.4 1).
A detailed analysis of the consequences of the application 
of the medical or physical model in psychiatry will be presented in 
the following pages.
314
3. The Validity of Internal Explanation in Psychiatry
MWe must abandon the medical model of human 
behaviour and allow psychiatry to die because 
the medical model does not fulfil our needs. 
Medicine is adequate for understanding human 
tissues but we need a model for understanding 
human issues."
(Torrey, 1974, p.200)
The above quotation shows clearly the uncertainty among many 
health professionals towards the application of the medical model of 
internal causes to psychiatry. It is, however, debatable whether 
the best course of action would be to "allow psychiatry to die". It 
is true that a theory which accepts biological explanation as the 
basis for the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric patients is 
bound to suffer from a number of fundamental limitations. The biggest 
problem is that psychiatrists are dealing with moods, feelings or 
"count qualities" (Laing, 1983). Moreover, as Laing points out:
"We live by comparisons, similarities and 
dissimilarities, equivalents and differences 
which are forever devoid of objective content. 
We can never repeat an experience in the way 
we can an objective experiment."
(Laing, 1983, p . 12)
and
"We cannot understand ourselves or others if 
we subtract our motives and intentions. But, 
objectively, there are no intentions. 
Objectively, an act becomes a thing.
(Ibid., p.28)
Although Laing shows convincingly the subjective nature of psychiatric 
conditions which suggest and require a different context of research,
that does not mean that we need to lose sight of the need for a 
systematic and a reliable procedure for studying such conditions.
In this connection, the present writer's proposal for the possibility 
of establishing a systematic approach for studying conditions described 
as mental illness will be discussed later on in this chapter.
Our main concern here is not with the organic or disease 
model in itself, but with the attempts of many psychiatrists to ground 
their interpretation of individual experience and subjective feelings 
by assuming that these are analogous to physical events and therefore 
easy to understand. The point which is being made here is that we 
have to allow for considerable differences between physical and mental 
illness. It is true that there are, as many psychiatrists claim, 
certain chemical and neurological changes associated with or cause 
some forms of mental illness. But that does not place mental illness 
on the same footing with medical disease. As Torrey (1974) puts 
it:
"There are chemical and neurological components 
to all activities of the brain. Each thought, 
wish, memory or impulse has a chemical or neuro­
logical component. (p.39)
Such chemical components in themselves, however, are not 
in themselves sufficient for the interpretations of human thoughts 
and behaviour by analogy to organic dysfunction. The danger of making 
any sort of analogy between psychiatric interpretation and organic 
interpretation is that it reinforces the belief that it is:
"... not necessary to demonstrate that a patient 
has a brain disease in order to gain credence 
for the claim of having discovered one; it is 
enough to postulate it and to claim that the 
'chemical' method enables the specialist in 
mental disease to diagnose it."
(Szasz, 1987, p.89)
When examining the 'clinical methods' used by mental health 
professionals, including psychiatrists, it becomes clear that such 
methods (e.g. classification, observation, psychological testing) 
are not fully adequate in providing sufficient information about 
organic dysfunction. In practice, "psychiatrists never touch their 
patients" (Torrey, 1974). Therefore, no claims concerning organic 
dysfunction in psychiatry could ordinarily be clinically grounded. 
However, the limitations of the disease model when applied to psychiatry 
should not prevent the researcher from trying to solve the problem 
of understanding the concept of mental illness. One of the central 
questions addressed by the researcher should be: what criteria need
to be employed in order to formulate a value-free model of psychiatric 
definition of mental illness? and if we are unable to find any, 
we will have to face the question: must we formulate a value-free
model? In the following pages we will try to examine some of the 
recent contributions in this area and show that some of these attempts 
have used the physical or disease model as a basic reference for 
obtaining a more neutral or objective conception of mental illness.
We will argue that in the present state of knowledge in psychiatry, 
where there is a significant lack of biological correlation to the 
nature and content of the individual motivation and experience, the 
disease model is not a suitable account of conceptualising the 
individual psychological machinery.
4. Mental Illness as a Value-Free Concept
Most mental health professionals are fully aware that the 
symptoms of mental illness are to a large extent culturally specific. 
The very nature of the concept of mental illness, which is highly 
judgemental, promotive and normative, creates important limitations 
to the understanding and treatment of such conditions. Thus it would 
be extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish 
universally acceptable, value-free criteria for the conditions desc­
ribed as mental illness.
The problem is basically centred around the concept of 
mental illness itself. The very use of that concept would create 
an attitude and method of practice that is fundamentally puzzling 
and unspecific. That is because the language used by mental health 
professionals can build up and shape their perceptions and behaviour 
towards the methods of studying mental phenomena. That is to say 
that once mental health professionals use the term 'mental' they 
would as a necessary consequence assume that there is something wrong 
inside the patient's mind rather than outside him (see Sarbin, 1967). 
Thus, the very use of the term 'mental' would:
"... not only constrain further descriptive 
elaborations of the conduct under observation, 
but also indirectly restrict alternatives to 
action."
(Sarbin, 1967, p.447)
Although the above discussions suggest the considerable 
difficulties involved in conducting research in the concept of mental
illness along the lines of a value-free model, many writers have 
attempted this.
Lewis ( 1953) initiated these attempts by presenting the 
following criteria for the definition of mental illness:
1. The patient feels ill (subjective datum).
2. His functioning is deteriorating in some way (objective datum).
3. He has symptoms which follow a recognisable clinical pattern 
(topological datum).
For Lewis, the above criteria apply to both mental and physical 
disorders.
The efficiency of psychological functioning is decided 
by social criteria. For Lewis, social values and norms must not 
be introduced into any process of judging the presence or absence 
of mental illness because they imply disapproval and value judgements 
Thus he states:
"Deviant, maladapted, non-conformist behaviour 
is pathological if it is accompanied by a mani­
fest disturbance of some such function ..., for 
illness to be inferred, disorder of function 
must be detectable at a discrete or differentiated 
level that is hardly conceivable when mental 
activity as a whole is taken as an irreducible 
datum. If non-conformity can be detected only 
in total behaviour, while all the particular 
psychological functions seem unimpaired, health 
will be presumed, not illness." (p. 118)
The above quotation emphasises the importance of focusing 
on the person's total performance in any attempted definition of
the individual's presented problems, in the same way as in internal 
medicine where the disorder of any given function must be examined 
in the light of the total working of the body. Thus:
"If the disturbance of part-function is without 
influence on his conduct, or falls within certain 
categories which we regard as 'normal', we do not 
infer 'mental illness' from their presence."
(Lewis, 1953, p. 114)
For that reason, Lewis excludes from the category of mental illness 
cases of psycho-neurotics, people with personality disorders or 
mentally defective individuals. This is because, although the above 
conditions might involve certain difficulties in adaptation and adjust­
ment to social demands, due to bizarreness of impulse or character, 
it would be inappropriate to consider individuals with such problems 
as menta 11^ ill in the absence of clear evidence of psychological 
disturbance. The question which needs to be addressed here is on 
what basis personality disorder can be distinguished from psychological 
disturbance. Simply on the basis of static state versus temporary 
or dynamic occurrence? If so, can Lewis defend this distinction?
In fact, the concept of functional impairment for Lewis would surely 
include mental defect. The point is that functional impairment, 
unless otherwise specified could be congenital and static. Yet Lewis's 
criterion of psychological disturbance as distinct from personality 
disorder (psychopathy) seemed to require a dynamic (temporary) occurrence. 
This split did not fit.
Lewis points out that it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to develop a practical method for the identification of impulse
dysfunction or psychological dysfunction. However, he suggests that 
in an analogy to the 'biological disadvantage* which may be taken 
as an indication of 'physical dysfunction', social maladaptation 
or non-conformity under certain circumstances and statistical frequency 
may be taken as positive criteria for the presence of 'psychological 
dysfunction' which can be applied to personality disorders. Lewis's 
claim of the "adequacy of adaptation" criterion must be intended 
as objective. Thus, according to Lewis, a condition can be considered 
as a personality or pathological disorder only if there is a signif­
icant disturbance in thinking (such as delusions) or perceptions 
(hallucinations) or in the emotional state (anxiety). Such disturbance 
would deviate from the ideal social expectations and has statistical 
frequency alongside pre-morbid personality development. Moreover,
Lewis suggests that the designation of a case as one of mental illness 
could be based on the individual's intrinsic subjective distress.
A careful analysis of the argument put forward by Lewis 
would reveal the following points: firstly, Lewis believes that
the concept of mental illness and mental functions in general might 
be understood if we accept the medical interpretation of how biological 
disadvantage might be caused by 'physical dysfunction , as offering 
a valuable criterion in this respect (see Schwab and Schwab, 1978,
p. 121).
Secondly, Lewis is prepared to define a person as mentally 
ill on the basis of 'recognisable medical patterns' as well as his 
intrinsic suffering but not on the basis of an interaction between
the individual and his social environment. The question which needs 
to be addressed here concerns what can be considered as 'recognisable 
medical patterns'. Finally, although Lewis rejects social norms 
as a criterion for determining the presence of mental illness, he 
does, however, accept social norms as an important factor in the 
estimation of the 'efficiency' of psychological functions. In practice, 
it seems, however, that accepting social values as an evaluation 
factor for the efficiency of psychological functioning will inevitably 
lead the clinician to base his diagnosis on value judgements, in 
terms of, for example, the kind of social elements that count as 
effective for the estimation of psychological efficiency.
A further attempt to develop a definition of mental illness 
has been made by Spitzer and Endicott (in Spitzer and Klein (eds.),
1978) .
Spitzer and Endicott conceptualise mental illness merely 
as a subset of medical disorder, best conceived of as a generalised 
impairment in the functioning of the individual. However, they do 
not specify what functions of the individual need to be disturbed 
for the disorder to be identified as mental illness. It is true 
that they emphasise that "a wide range of activities need to be affected 
if one is to avoid an a priori decision as to what areas of human 
activity are basic or essential" (p.23). It could, however, be argued 
that specifying what areas of functioning need to be disturbed would 
be more productive than leaving the clinician to consider every aspect 
of behaviour as 'essential' or 'basic' functioning. In this case,
even going for a walk in the street might be viewed as a basic 
disturbance in the individual's cognitive functioning which has led 
him to 'wander away'. Furthermore, there is a difference between 
crude references to aversion and a reasoned and defined account of 
certain brain mental function suggested by (though not elaborated 
in) Boorse ( 1976), as we shall see shortly. Spitzer and Endicott 
try to solve the above problem by stating that a function would be 
considered to be a sign of illness if it causes•'subjective distress' 
'disability' or 'disadvantage' in dealing with some aspect of the 
physical or social environment. The question which Spitzer and his 
colleagues do not answer is: What if the individual manages despite
his 'disability' or 'distress' to live within the standards of his 
society (even though his behaviour might not be fully accepted by 
this society)? Another related question is how many of these three 
elements must be present in order to be able to define an individual 
as mentally ill. In actual practice, "it is easy to judge them so 
that one or more (of these criteria) are present or absent, as the 
classifier desires" (Szasz, 1987, p.55). Moreover, Szasz goes on 
to argue, when considering the three elements specified by Spitzer 
as essential for the identification of mental illness, that the 
psychologist can "attribute distress to aoijt/vLng he wants to: for
example, he may infer distress from smoking and not being able to 
stop, or from being able to stop but wishing to smoke" (p.55).
If we consider a second criterion, 'disadvantage', Spitzer 
claims that being disadvantaged must be the result of 'distress' 
and 'disability'. Accordingly, a single Kuwaiti woman who has an
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affair with a man would be considered to be in a 'disadvantaged position'. 
That is because such behaviour would be condemned as extremely immoral 
in Kuwaiti society. Or, as Moore, puts it:
"If one were to keep extending such examples, 
one would include all seriously immoral or 
illegal acts as leading to painful consequences 
in all cultures and thus to disadvantage and 
all dispositions to such activities as medical 
disorders."
(Moore, 1984, pp.213-214)
Thus Spitzer would presumably be content to place the above- 
mentioned case in the category of mental disorder even if the woman 
in question does not show any signs of 'distress', 'disability' or 
'disadvantage'. This would be because for Spitzer she would be vulnerable 
to 'disorder'. As mentioned in previous chapters, being in a vulnerable 
condition implies the presence of an inherent unspecified genetic 
'weakness' which interacts with stressful events in the person's 
life and which eventually produces disease. Such a view of vulnerability 
presupposes the theory of a 'residual' disease with a permanent vulner­
ability to a different attack in the future (Zabin and Spring, 1977).
As a result, Spitzer has created a special category in DSM-III to 
accommodate such cases. This criterion incorporates "conditions 
not attributable to a known mental disorder" (Spitzer and Endicott,
1978, p . 31).
In addition, if the Kuwaiti woman's 'pathological' relation­
ship with her lover responds well to 'technical intervention',
(presumably psychotherapy or medication or indeed punitive sanctions),
then such a response is taken by Spitzer to show that we are dealing 
with an 'abnormal' case. It is obvious that such an assumption does 
not stand up to close scrutiny. The fact that 5 mg. of Mogadon could 
help a person who has not slept for two days, does not make temporary 
sleep disturbance a 'disease'. One could cite many such examples 
to refute Spitzer's claims.
The medical terminology used by Spitzer, such as 'clinical 
intervention' or 'clinically significant* symptoms carries with it 
the basic assumption held by Spitzer and his colleagues in the APA 
task force for DSM-III, namely that "mental disorder should be defined 
as merely a subset of medical disorder with primarily behavioural 
manifestations" (p. 16). However, Spitzer himself admits that "most 
of the mental disorders represent syndromes rather than disease since 
rarely is the etiology or underlying process known" (p.29). Though 
of course being unable to classify a condition as a 'disease* does 
not mean it is not a medical disorder.
In conclusion, Spitzer and Endicott*s attempts to establish 
a definition and a set of criteria for the diagnosis of mental disorder, 
based on the medical model and universally applicable, is simply 
not convincing. The writers' desire to establish a 'scientific' 
and 'objective* value-free model of mental disorder confines them 
to the methods used in physical medicine (e.g. diagnosis, classification, 
prognosis, independent testing procedures, etc.) that are basically 
oriented and designed to discover certain organic failure inside 
the body rather than to detect the subjective experience, for example
"... the successful application of the criteria 
for medical disorder to that subset termed 
'mental disorders' demonstrates the appropriate­
ness of the medical model as applied to mental 
disorders."
(Spitzer and Endicott, 1978, p.38)
The use of these methods in physical medicine does not 
necessarily entail that similar methods will work when applied to 
psychiatric conditions. That is because when evaluating any psychiatric 
condition, the evaluator needs to measure the 'patient's' personal 
traits. The tests which are used by the psychologist, for example, 
could be a personality (such as M.M.P.I.) or I.Q. test. The scores 
on both kinds of test must be interpreted according to certain 'healthy' 
norms of adjustment. A healthy score must show how the individual's 
total behaviour deviates from the requirements of adequate 'normal' 
functioning within a specific social system. The problem with such 
procedures is that they are basically related to the psychiatrist's 
view of what constitutes normal functioning or proper adjustment 
to society. But clearly, such procedures are not independent from 
the patient's unique past history, his social context, and the familial 
or work environment. Furthermore, establishing a final diagnosis 
in psychiatry is an endeavour that cannot be divorced from the 
psychiatrist's personal view of what constitutes proper adjustment 
and the society's general definition of mental health norms. Perhaps 
the following quotation from Scott (1971) would explain how the lack 
of appropriate testing methods in psychiatry which are independent 
from the observers or the society's norms might cause many method­
ological and definitional problems:
"If the stability of the larger social system be 
regarded as the final good, or if human development 
be seen as demanding harmony in relation to that 
social system, then such an assumption would appear 
basic and defensible. But one is still impelled 
to consider the possibility that the social system, 
or even an entire society, may be sick, and conformity 
to its norms would constitute mental illness in some 
more absolute sense." (p. 19)
The above discussion of the lack of independent testing 
procedures in the mental health profession does not undermine the 
importance of such methods. Psychological phenomena cannot be reliably 
examined without the use of methods that are contextually dependent 
and based on subjective mutual agreement between the psychiatrist 
and the patient, i.e. agreements on the significance of life events 
that are related to his present problem. Thus one is compelled:
"... not to talk about a 'case' in psychiatry 
- rather we try to assess functional impairment 
in specific situations as viewed by different 
professional groups in the community." 
(Lindemann in Scott, 1971, p.9)
It must be re-emphasised that establishing a 'diagnosis' 
in psychiatry must be the result of a professional definition as 
well as the patient's personal account. However, it must be acknowledged 
that Spitzer and Endicott have made a major contribution to the under­
standing of the importance of 'subjective' distress (that acknowledged 
by the individual himself) and 'disability' (which implies an impediment 
in "functioning in a wide range of activities" (Ibid., p.23) in differ­
entiating between 'disorder' and 'normality'. For them it is necessary 
to distinguish between intrinsic distress, when the individual
recognises his suffering and the need for professional help on the 
on hand, and the 'illness* label which can be applied to the social 
misfit or non-conformist and which does not necessarily, though of 
course may, indicate subjective distress, for example, the recognition 
of homosexuality.
Peter Sedgwick in Edwards ( 1982) take a different stance 
on the possibility of establishing value-free methods in psychiatry.
For him "there are no illnesses or diseases in nature" (p.50) but 
happenings or incidents which occur before the construction of the 
human social meaning, to which, later, people ascribe their own social 
meaning by labelling them as disease. Thus, illness and disease 
criteria represent nothing but an arbitrary social evaluation. The 
definitional process of illness, Sedgwick maintains, begin when, 
first there are natural events or, second, there is a specific functional 
failure that is intelligible when considered within certain norms 
or values that are held by a given society. Thus:
"An attribution of illness always proceeds from 
the computation of a gap between presented 
behaviour (or feeling) and some social norm.
In practice, of course, we take the norm for 
granted, so that a broken arm would be no more 
of an illness than a broken fingernail unless 
it stopped us from achieving certain socially 
constructed goals." (p.54)
Thus the definition of bodily illness is only a mirror of the insignif­
icant or under-valued phenomena. Consequently, the clinician needs 
to 'medicalise' moral values rather than illness per s e . Sedgwick
presents the following example to illustrate the above position:
"The blight that strikes at corn or potatoes
is a human intervention, for if man wished
to cultivate parasites (rather than potatoes
or corn) there would be no 'blight' but simply
the necessary foddering of the parasite crop." (p.50)
Accordingly, one can invoke:
"... a unitary perspective on physical and mental 
illness so long as a common structure of valuation 
and explanation applies over the whole range of 
disorder of the person." (p.55)
According to the 'whole range of disorder of the person' 
or the 'whole individual' criteria, mental illness would be viewed 
by Sedgwick as falling within the disease or body state medicine 
and not as something different from physical medicine. In his article 
Sedgwick has used the concept of disease and illness interchangeably. 
That is because he has already merged the terms 'disease' and 'illness 
For him both conditions represent a human invention.
Sedgwick's position is very similar to that taken by 
Kendell (1975) when he claims that mental illness meets the same 
criteria of physical illness, i.e. increased mortality, reduced 
fertility, etc. As a result, Kendell argues, mental illness is 
merely an expression of physical illness.
By now, it has become obvious that Sedgwick subsumes mental 
and physical conditions together (as evaluative conditions).
Sedgwick's contribution to the role of social judgement 
in labelling a condition as 'disease' or illness is significant in 
that it highlights the subjective factors (e.g. cultural norms) 
involved in the designation of human conditions as 'disease'. It 
is, however, rather difficult - in relation to some clear-cut organic 
cases - to establish clearly the role of socio-cultural norms in 
labelling physical conditions as 'disease'. To do so with respect 
to certain psychiatric conditions seems to be a great deal easier. 
Consider, for example, the act of suicide. In traditional Japanese 
culture, the Samurai who commits suicide is considered to have done 
the honourable thing. In Kuwait, however, a person who commits suicide 
is viewed as 'unmuslim1 and mentally disturbed because he has violated 
the Quran and the will of Allah for which he will go to hell. For 
that reason, very few individuals in Kuwait commit suicide. In addition, 
most of the Kuwaiti Bedouin women who suffer from depression, complain 
mainly of the somatic condition (headache, sleep disorder, lack of 
appetite) and ignore or deny the emotional aspect of their problem.
A simple explanation for this situation is that women in Kuwait are 
not expected to complain because complaints of an emotional nature 
are considered as a sign of inefficiency or an inability to cope 
with familial duties or even as an indication of psychiatric disorder.
To take the comparison even further, if a British person claims that 
the MI5 are watching him through the screen of his T.V., he would 
be a plausible subject for psychiatric intervention, whereas a 
primitive African who believes in magic power would be considered 
normal. Similarly, acts of self-mutilation can sometimes be a fully 
accepted part of a particular cultural context and as such, perfectly 
normal behaviour.
Thus, certain psychiatric conditions can be seen as 
'manufactured1 by the social value meaning people attach to them. 
However, for Sedgwick, both physical and mental illness imply an 
awareness and understanding of what is supposed to be an alternative, 
preferable state of norms and values. In the absence of such values 
or 'normative alternative', the presence of lesions or- subjective 
feelings will not necessarily lead to the labelling of certain 
conditions as 'illness'. Accordingly, psychiatry and physical medicine 
resemble each other in that their definition includes the identification 
of norms and values. Therefore,
"... mental illness can be conceptualised 
just as easily within the disease framework 
as physical maladies such as lumbago or T.B."
(p.56)
Thus Sedgwick draws our attention to the fact that both physical 
and mental illness can be seen as a valid reflection of social value 
judgement, and that they both represent an arbitrary, socially-received 
label. This is because both physicians and psychiatrists are con­
ditioned by social norms and values in their evaluation of the 
significance of 'illness' or 'disease'. One problem with this argument, 
however, is that it ignores the fact that - with respect to certain 
well-established medical conditions - the judgemental accuracy and 
degree of reliability of physical conditions is still a great deal 
more obvious than in the case of psychiatric conditions which are 
not totally free from values. Moreover, Sedgwick provides little 
evidence for his contention that there is a common structure of 
valuation and explanation for medical and physical illness. Furthermore
Sedgwick does not take into account the meaning or the significance 
of illness for the 'ill' individual and how illness influences his 
career (Treacher and Baruch, 1981).
Finally, Boorse in Edwards ( 1982) proposes a distinction 
between the terms 'disease' and 'illness'. For him a 'disease' is 
'an internal state' which represents either an impairment in normal 
functional ability below typical efficiency, or else, an impairment 
caused by 'environmental agents'. Accordingly, 'disease' represents 
a 'biological fact' since the 'functional organisation' typical of 
the species is 'value-free' (p.30). And since the concept of mental 
illness is heavily loaded with society's moral and social values, 
it would be more appropriate to explore the concept of 'mental disease' 
rather than that of 'mental illness'. Disease, Boorse maintains, 
becomes an illness only if it is serious enough to be incapacitating 
and therefore undesirable and meriting special treatment. The problem 
with mental illness, Boorse argues, is that it is difficult to define 
in terms of biological facts, because feelings, beliefs and experience 
or mental causations need also to be considered in the definition 
of the concept. Mental disease, on the other hand, must be character­
ised in terms of functional dysfunction and must be understood on 
the same principle as disease in physical medicine, in that both 
mental and biological dysfunction could cause survival and reproduction 
problems (in this, Boorse clearly adopts Kendall's position).
Moreover, the concept of a functional state and a mental 
causal process are in an early and undeveloped state similar to the
beginnings of early physical medicine. The development of the idea 
of mental functions could take a similar course to that of biological 
functions in physical medicine. That, however, does not mean, Boorse 
argues, that mental functioning is determined by physiological function 
ing. The causal laws of mental function are not reducible to causal 
laws of neural function. Thus, for Boorse:
"If the mentalistic vocabulary is not neuro- 
logically definable, there will be no way 
to reduce the causal laws of the mind to the 
causal laws of the body. If so, the distinction 
between conditions that receive one kind of 
causal explanation and those that receive the 
other may be a permanent one, justifying an 
autonomous science of mental health." (p.34)
The above quotation shows that Boorse is completely rejecting the 
identity or design theory (which views mental function as manifestations 
of brain events). But Boorse does not deny at the same time, the 
need for some sort of analogy between mental functions and physical 
or neural functions.
Boorse justifies his position that mental events do not 
necessarily equal neural events by the following example:
"Not the desire for a lobster dinner, but 
Smith's desire for a lobster dinner as felt 
between 4 and 5 pm on 13th February 1975, is 
claimed to be identical to his being in some 
neural configuration during this period.
The distinction is crucial, for if types of 
mental states are defined by their functional 
properties, type-type identify statements are 
unlikely to hold. If Smith's current neural 
state is a desire for a lobster dinner, that 
is probably not because of any anatomical
feature, such as its containing a lobster­
shaped nerve net. Rather, on the view we 
are considering, it is because of the 
motivational role this state plays in producing 
a search for a seafood restaurant or other 
lobster-obtaining behaviour." (p.33)
Accordingly, given 'motivational1 roles (motivation to 
function in certain ways) might be caused by different neural systems 
in different people. Therefore, the basic characteristic of mental 
disease is mental causation which is not equal to physical events 
or neural causation.
A crucial point against Boorse is his view that unspecified 
mental dysfunction should be studied in the same way as medical dys­
function, as if the limits and the degree of mental dysfunction are 
well-established, while he suggests Freud's psycho-analytical theory 
as the best available approach to the study of 'inner' mental life.
For Freud, inner mental functions could be examined or 
revealed throughout the analysis of dream content, insight or self- 
knowledge, hypnosis, active listening, unconscious forces, transference, 
interpretation, etc. (see Bloch, 1982, and Hartmann, 1973). The 
psycho-analytical view of mental functions or mental system (e g o j  
id, superego) is largely based on Freud's medical training which 
led him to use the functional concept in physiology and applied it 
in studying the mental system (see Hartmann, 1973). The only difference 
between Freud's 'mental functions' and 'functions' in general physio­
logy is that the former is largely or totally derived from subjective 
and unverified testing procedures. Functions in general physiology,
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however, can have realities that are largely independent from the 
observer. The problem is (dxcjz Freud created such mental functions 
rather than discovering them (see Skinner, 1973).
The crucial question is, how do we accurately detect the 
disturbance in Freudian mental functions? For the psychoanalysis 
school, meta-psychological investigations are appropriate for 
identifying mental functions. That led psychoanalysis to consider 
the unconscious system as a proper area of examination. Their 
methods of examination would undoubtedly be based on a comparison 
between the analyst's insight and the patient's reality-testing.
What if both concepts of the problem contradict each other? (see 
Hartmann, 1973). Freud and his followers escape the above dilemma by 
claiming that their 'patient's' mental functions have some sort of 
'actual unreality' and must be transformed into "physical reality" - 
presumably the reality of the analyst (for more details see Szasz in 
his article "The Lying Truths of Psychiatry", (1979).
B.F. Skinner (1973) provides an excellent conclusion of the 
present status of the psychoanalytical view on inner mental 
functions:
"Human behaviour is in a state of flux and under­
going changes that we call "processes", but what 
is changing in what direction when we speak of, 
for example, an effective process? Psychological 
"organization", "mental system", "motivational 
interaction" - these all imply arrangements, or 
relationships among things, but what are the things 
so related or arranged? Until this question has 
been answered the problem of the dimensions of the 
mental apparatus can scarcely be approached." (p.190)
Indeed the psychoanalytical model lacks a clear or accurate 
methodological procedure to determine mental functional norms. It 
seems that even in the future, it would be illogical to assume that 
a systematic account of the definition of mental functions could 
be attained through the analysis of the patient's past experience 
or unresolved inner conflicts. Although one cannot deny the importance 
of the individual's past experience in the identification of his 
mental functions, such experience provides the clinician from any 
school of psychology with a causal link between the patient's symptoms 
and previous psychological events. The only problem with the psycho­
analytical school is that they have placed a causal link on the 
unconscious level which implies a 'psychic determinism' (see Bloch, 
1982). As a result, no matter how the patient behaves, there are 
always sexual or aggressive impulses which are always considered to 
be 'irrational' hidden in the 'id' or unconscious system. How then 
would a value-free model of 'rational' or 'irrational' repressed 
experiences or desires be attained? (see Lavin, 1985).
Clearly, therefore, the psychoanalytical approach cannot 
yield objective mental function in the sense which Boorse's account 
requires.
Boorse escapes the conflicting moral issues which are 
centred around the concept of mental 'illness' by restricting his 
argument on the distinction between mental 'illness' and mental 
'disease' with special emphasis on the 'disease' concept (ibid., 1985). 
His model is clearly built on the strengths of the medical or physical
model. That is to say that Boorse implicitly analogises from a 
disease in the biological system of the body (such as the heart), 
to a disorder of the mental functioning.
Mental processes can be examined, Boorse maintains, not 
by observable behaviourable disturbance, but through the psycho­
analytical approach which is best suited to account for internal 
malfunctioning. (The psychoanalytical model was also criticised 
in Chapter three, see Skinner in Moore, 1984, and Skinner, 1953.)
Now, even if we accept that mental processes can be ’species- 
uniform' does that mean that such processes are independent of contextual 
effects? Boorse does not provide us with an adequate answer to this 
question. A further important question is how the 'inner mental 
process' might contribute to the establishment of a context-free 
model in psychiatry? Boorse provides no sufficient answer for the 
above question. That is because he does not provide us with an organ­
ised systematic science of inner mental functions and dysfunctions.
One might be tempted to agree with Boorse when he states
that:
"Deviance from every considerable standard is 
not a necessary condition for mental disorder."
(p.39)
Yet deviation from a social or residual rule is a central criterion 
in deciding the normality of any given individual, whether mental 
health professionals like it or not. Moreover, professional judgement
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of whether any particular mental process or function is appropriate 
or inappropriate raises many questions regarding the validity of 
using ’objective' methods in the definition of mental disease. The 
question which needs to be addressed here, is whether Boorse's 
'objective' mental functions are identifiable. In fact, Boorse has 
given us a provisional conditional thesis, not yet a categorical 
one. The medical model might still have something to be said in 
its favour. We might, for example, be able to distinguish mental 
causes or aetiology for different forms of behaviour for instance.
Boorse, however, does not provide such an account.
What Should a Value-Free Model of Mental Illness Be?
A Proposed View from the RFD
By now it has become clear that attempts to establish a 
value-free or objective method for the study of mental illness have 
mainly been built on the strength and validity of the biological 
model (Lewis, 1953; Spitzer and Endicott, 1978; Boorse, 1982;
Klein, 1978). It has also become clear that neither the psychoanalytical 
approach nor the medical model can be productive in resolving the 
problem of objectivity in the evaluation of mental illness. This 
is because of the complexity of psycho-social factors with which 
the clinician has to deal in psychiatric practice, for example, the 
etiological significance of past events, traumatic experiences in 
early life, etc. The 'inner' explanation of mental dysfunction con­
ceptualises the mental activity of the individual in the same way 
that the biologist conceptualises physiological function, i.e. as
predetermined. Thus there is no room for individual uniqueness or- 
for the individual's ability to contemplate himself and his actions 
or for the individual's ability to evaluate his past experience and 
to exercise control over his future. Again this depends on how specific 
mental functions turn out to be.
Alternatively, if we accept the argument that mental dysfunction 
must be understood in terms of biological dysfunction, or that there 
are identifiable brain mechanisms for such functions, we have to 
bear in mind that the design of psychiatric treatment is crucially 
different from the standards that applied in physical therapy.
In psychiatric practice, the therapeutic efforts are basically oriented 
to control the symptoms (reduction of anxiety, for example) and psycho­
therapeutic methods such as rational-emotive therapy or behaviour 
modification or client-centered therapy or family counselling are 
directed towards improving personal effectiveness and social adaptation. 
However, such goals are closely tied up with the individual's basic, 
cultural norms and values. (For more detail on the psychiatric models 
of illness and their treatment approaches, see Alanen, 1984.) In 
Kuwait, for example, the high value goal of psychiatric treatment 
is the removal of undesirable symptoms. In Britain, on the other 
hand, helping an individual to gain insight has a higher value, while 
attitudes to psychiatric practice in a country like the Soviet Union 
are rapidly changing. Therefore, it would be difficult if not impossible 
to believe that physical and psychiatric methods of interpretation 
are similar, or that most cases of mental disorder, especially neurosis, 
can be detected within certain recognisable clinical patterns. Mental
illness or disorder, however, can be identified only in relation 
to therapeutic goals in different cultures, so that there can be 
no mental disease of the type Boorse proposes, i.e. there cannot 
be mental functions which are objectively disturbed. In reality, 
there is the danger of a loss of insight when the concept of mental 
illness is conceptualised in analogy to inner biological dysfunction.
What mental health professionals are often diagnosing and treating 
in the everyday practice are values and subjective suffering that 
do not have any sort of analogy to physiological dysfunction. Committing 
suicide as a result of a broken marriage is crucially different from 
committing suicide as a result of an infection of the central nervous 
system by the HIV virus in an AIDS patient which would eventually 
affect his rationality. Surely the former case needs a different 
kind of interpretation from that of the latter one. Or as Laing 
puts it convincingly:
"Psychiatry tries to be as scientific, impersonal 
and objective as possible towards what is most 
personal and subjective. The disordered sleeping 
treated by the psychiatrist has to do with what 
are our most personal and private thoughts and 
desires."
(Laing, 1965, p. 146)
Thus, an abnormal mental state when examined in terms of objectivity 
or in analogy with 'pathological inner agents' appears as unintelligible 
(Bandura, 1974). But, it may be objected, such 'pathological inner 
agents' may yet be discovered - some have been. Our classification 
of mental states do not currently reflect this kind of aetiology 
(still in the descriptive level). Our classifications and definition
of mental inner states would presumably have to be redistributed 
if such inner agents were discovered. But this does not make the 
disease dysfunction hypothesis completely 'unintelligible'. Perhaps 
biological or inner 'disease' agents could explain the 'content' 
of many mental dysfunctions such as: thoughts, intentions, beliefs,
motives, emotions, reasoning, etc.
In response to this argument, the validity of "inner" 
pathological agents cannot be attained from the application of methods 
that are used in the 'disease' model in general medicine. If future 
neurological research could establish a clear-cut evidence of causal 
contribution of inner mental states, we should be clear about the 
intelligible scope of such causal mechanisms. That is to say that 
even a clear physiological evidence of inner psychological conditions 
is not sufficient to provide a convincing account of the unique content 
of any psychiatric condition. It might, however, suggest certain 
neurological contribution to the frame of the psychic condition.
In fact:
"... one could not suggest a general type of 
neurophysiological correlate for phobias of carts 
or for compulsions to wash one's hands, but one 
could suggest a type of organic cause for phobia 
in general or for compulsion in general, allowing 
that what a phobia is of or what a compulsion is 
to do is not a matter of physiology. But one 
need not suggest this, for one could hold that 
even phobias and compulsions in general have no 
physiological disorders in common to them, and 
are thus purely functional."
(Stevenson, 1977, p.40)
This leads us to conclude that the problem is basically 
related to confining a physicalist interpretation to physiological 
conditions and extending such interpretations to psychological con­
ditions as well. The extension of physiological interpretation to 
subjective psychological states would be illogical "... since the 
terms have different truth conditions and implications11 (Clarke,
1980, p. 160).
A simple reply to the writers who try to reduce the 
individual psychological functional disturbance to biological inner 
agents is that one needs to develop precise criteria for the 
identification of mental illness before any reductionist attempt.
"We must have criteria for distinguishing the mentally ill from the 
merely unusual or disfavoured" (Stevenson, 1977, p.40).
At the present time we do not seem obliged to consider 
the notion that mental inner states are meaningfully correlated with 
the norms of explanations or interpretations that are used in the 
medical model, as representing anything better than a logical error.
At the present state of our knowledge, mental causation seems meaning­
less and unintelligible when conceptualised within the biological 
model. Labels are important because they lead to certain implications 
and connotations which shape the attitudes and behaviour of the 
professionals in charge. Thus, the disease model, as Bandura (1974) 
believes, is:
"... misleading because there are no infected 
organs or psychic disease entities that can be 
identified as causal agents. The psychic 
conditions that are assumed to underline 
behavioural malfunctioning are merely an abstrac­
tion from the behaviour." (p.70)
Bandura's argument is convincing in respect to many psychiatric 
dysfunctions like, for example, compulsion, phobia, anxiety state, 
etc. Perhaps at a sufficiently general level, mental functional 
disturbances will resist being dismissed like this. However, this 
requires a great deal of philosophical clarification that has yet to 
be carried out.
Now, is there a possibility of having a value-free model 
of mental illness?
In answering this question, let us for a moment recall what 
we previously mentioned about cases such as Mr. M, who was raped at 
the age of 8 and then developed different forms of obsessive anxiety 
reactions towards his eating behaviour, fear of being infected by 
AIDS or of having run someone over on the road, etc. Cases such 
as Mr. M or Mr. D ’s spending behaviour and many other cases would 
be a good illustration of the way the medical or disease analogy 
of mental illness is applied and the consequences of such application.
Now, let us imagine a hypothetical situation where Mr. M 
is arrested by the police one evening while searching for the body 
of the person he imagined he had run over. During the investigation 
procedures conducted by the police, Mr. M admits to his fears and
the police eventually refer him to the mental hospital for a decision 
on whether he is mentally disturbed or not. If Mr. M were to be 
examined by a psychiatrist who held the same views as Lewis for example, 
he would undoubtedly state that Mr. M had symptoms which conform 
to a "recognisable clinical pattern" and which were the expression 
of a partial disturbance in his physio-psychological function. Someone 
like Spitzer, on the other hand, might offer two solutions: either
the patient is distressed, suffers from a disability and is thus 
in a disadvantaged state characterised by a generalised impairment 
in his major functions. Or, even if the patient did not show distress 
and disability at the time of investigation, he could nevertheless, 
be affected by the disease in time to come.
The position of someone with Sedgwick's views would maintain 
that Mr. M's mental disturbance is no more than an arbitrary social 
evaluation or human invention. But how useful such principles are 
for the screening of mental illness is a question to which a psychiatrist 
of this particular school of thought has no answer.
A psychiatrist persuaded by the views of Boorse, on the 
other hand, might view the patient's mental dysfunction as something 
that could cause survival and reproduction problems, therefore Mr. M's 
mental problem should be examined within the same methods of physical 
disease. For that purpose, Boorse suggests, psychoanalysis as the 
best alternative to study the patient's inner mental functions.
(Boorse's main thesis here is that all diseases have comparable under­
lying descriptions and physical disease is only one subset of disease.)
The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that it 
is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish a definition 
of the patient's subjective unusual experience in "nomologic form"
(Max Weber in Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987). Such a universal or 
'independent* check on the individual's experience can only be under­
stood, in Max Weber's term, in "an ideographic form". That is because 
of the particularity and the uniqueness of the 'truth' of the person 
(Gorovitz and MacIntyre in Runions, 1984).
It must be emphasised that 'clinical' psychiatric judgement 
is not directed or referred to the patient's mental dysfunction, 
but as Gove ( 1982) argues correctly, such clinical rationale is basically 
established on the patient's overt behaviour. Thus, the illness 
is the behaviour. Such criticism of "inner mental dysfunction" does 
not discredit the search for a stipulative and clear conceptual analysis 
of mental illness. What mental health professionals need is to be 
fully aware of the consideration or the process that led them to 
define a person as mentally ill, and of the importance of the fact 
that they are dealing with a person who has some sort of disorder, 
not someone who _ijL ’disordered'. Thus the totality of the person's 
psycho-social dimension of his suffering as conceived by himself 
must be considered as a central element in any psychiatric clinical 
judgement.
Pushing the argument further, let us imagine (what in fact 
is true for many Kuwaiti psychiatric patients), that Mr. M had actually 
come to terms with his suffering and pain because he considers his
condition as a sign that God loves him and has selected him among 
many others to test his acceptance of God's will. Thus, the Quran 
states that:
"Never is a believer stricken with discomfort, 
hardship, illness, grief or mental worry that 
his sins are not expiated for him."
Thus, for Mr. M  and many other individuals who experience 
mental anguish, suffering is an opportunity to face misfortune with 
patience - this being a favourable act towards God who tests a person's 
patience as a sign of faith.
Now, how could a value-free model of mental illness be 
established that is capable of judging Mr. M  in Kuwait as well as 
a Mr. M in Britain with the same degree of objectivity and reliability? 
Boorse, for example, evades such questions by sidestepping the conceptual 
and moral problems attached to the concept of mental illness. Instead, 
he tries to show how mental functions can be evaluated and understood 
in a relatively similar method to function in the physical state.
If one considered that the 'disease' model when applied 
in psychiatry might not create insuperable conceptual and practical 
difficulties, Boorse's distinction between illness and disease could 
offer a suitable account. But Boorse's account can be extended from 
physical disease to mental disease only if we give an 'independent' 
account of mental functions and this Boorse fails to do, as he envisages 
the psycho-analytical approach as a representative for his model.
Such a model (the psycho-analysis) is already value-laden as discussed 
previously.
Spitzer, on the other hand, solves the problem by providing 
us with vague terms such as vulnerability, unspecified mental disorder, 
etc. Sedgwick's system of evaluation claims applicability to both 
physical and mental illness, but does not give any useful insights 
of how such a system can be applied in reality.
Thus, one is compelled to question the possibility of 
applying one exclusive approach of 'objectivity' or 'neutrality' 
in dealing with such a complex and controversial concept as mental 
illness. What in fact is needed in any discussion of the concept 
is to examine the possibility of:
1. establishing independent functional activities that are unrelated 
to the structure of interpretation used in physical medicine 
(Eysenck, 1969);
2. using a systematic method that is specifically designed and 
appropriate to accommodate the complexity of mental phenomena, 
i.e. without requiring interpretation via some set of values 
or other;
3. adopting a systematic pattern in the identificafcoon of some of 
the central features of psychiatric disturbance which takes the 
following into account:
- the individual's call for specialised help;
- the reasons and motivational patterns that the individual 
himself attaches to his actions (Moore, 1984);
a special insight into the factors which determine the 
evaluative content of psychiatric definition; 
examining the possibility of having a relatively systematic 
view of mental illness within a context-dependent approach.
The points listed above will be discussed in considerable detail 
throughout the rest of this chapter.
How the RFD Conceptualises the Possibility of a Context- 
Independent Approach to Mental Illness
Now it is necessary to discuss the RFD proposal as an 
alternative view of mental illness which takes into consideration 
the limitations that are previously mentioned. For the sake of argument, 
let us recall in short what we previously mentioned about the basic 
features on RFD approach. For an individual to be diagnosed as suffer­
ing from RFD, he must be in a state where there is a temporary 'total' 
functional failure on the integration level on both the physiological 
and psycho-social function and this failure must be the result of 
external rather than internal biological reactive process.
The RFD model places a central emphasis upon the importance 
of the individual's total rather than partial functional failure.
Moreover, a crucial element in any definition of the adequacy 
of the individual's psycho-social functioning is his motivational 
and cognitive system that underlies such functions.
One of the basic criteria, mental health professionals 
use in judging the normality of any given individual is whether his 
actions are motivated or not, or the degree of plausibility or 
intelligibility of his motivations. Another central scale which 
is relevant to the motivational criteria is the nature of judgement, 
understanding, insight, the degree of awareness and perception which 
the individuals attach to his behaviour and which constitutes his 
cognitive system.
Champlin in Brecher ( 1987) provides us with a very good 
illustration of the above argument by stating that:
"Wild, far-fetched or absurd suspicions do not 
of themselves guarantee mental illness; but 
the situation changes if they are so senseless 
that they have to be seen as insane suspicions. 
Extreme, unprovoked violence is not by itself 
enough to betoken the psychopath; his behaviour 
has to be seen as insanely violent. He throttles 
the man in front of him in the queue at the bus-stop. 
When asked to explain, he says "The bus was coming 
and it was nearly full. I was fed up with waiting 
in the cold so I told the man in front to step 
aside. He refused so I pushed past. He resisted 
and we began to fight; as the bus approached I 
squeezed his throat until he stopped struggling.
Then I got on the bus."
An insane degree of violence was used, given the 
object achieved. I think that if he was in the 
habit of resorting coldly to such extreme, unprovoked, 
pointless violence, he could not but be mentally ill." 
(p.64)
Thus, it is crucial, in this respect, to analyse what kind of motive 
or reasoning the individual attaches to his disturbance. Research 
findings cited in Taylor and Brown ( 1988) show clearly that people 
in a depressive state, with low self-esteem, have a more balanced
and realistic evaluation of their present and future life. 'Normal 
people', on the other hand, may possess an unrealistically positive 
view of themselves and an exaggerated belief in their ability to 
control their environment as well as an over-optimistic view of the 
future.
Clearly, any analysis of the motivational and cognitive 
context of an individual's major functioning would reflect the 
individual's unique experience, his methods of interpretation of 
life events, the nature of his disturbance and the reasons he attaches 
to his actions. Unfortunately, many health professionals do not 
consider the motivational and cognitive dimension underlying the 
disturbed function as a meaningful and valid interpretation of the 
individual's total personality or his subjective needs. This is 
because the nature and content of personal motivation, meaning and 
cognitive process is extremely complex and thus vulnerable to many 
different contextual influences. The clinician, therefore, finds 
himself in a situation where the traditional methods of understanding 
and interpretation are not entirely adequate and contextual influences, 
e.g. occupying the role of a patient and the disturbance of his 
previous social role, being in a mental hospital, the clinician's 
personal system of interpretation, etc., eventually outweigh the 
individual's personal motives and reasons. (For more detail, see 
Rosenhan, 1975.) Thus to see symptoms, i.e. bizarre thoughts:
"... is not to see neutrally ... We cannot help 
but to see the person in one way or other and 
place our constructions and interpretations on
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his behaviour, as soon as we are in a relation­
ship with him."
(Laing, 1960, p.32)
The point Laing is making here is that individuals are very obviously 
bound by context. Function "occurs against background, but this 
background is not something neutral; rather it is also to be taken 
under intentional description" (Pinckard, 1976, p. 167). What is 
more, motives and functions are purposefully related even when certain 
kinds of function appear as if irrational or unmotivated and hence 
deviant (consider Mr. D's spending behaviour, for example).
Thus, there is a crucial difference between saying that 
X is a schizophrenic and saying that X is motivated to behave in 
a certain way. The first instance is a case of labelling which does 
not really explain what is wrong with X. In the second example we 
are analysing the motivation behind the function, something which 
might help make the patient's private suffering more accessible to 
the clinician's understanding. After several attacks, for example, 
most schizophrenic patients develop a certain pattern of motivation 
in terms of coping strategies which are crucial in protecting the 
patient from further relapses. Most schizophrenics learn after several 
attacks to come to terms with their suffering and a degree of with­
drawal, as well as with the nature of thoughts and language that 
might cause misinterpretation of the patient's cognitive behaviour.
Such coping tactics are largely linked to the cultural or societal 
conception of mental illness (Townsend, 1978).
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Thus, the individual's interpretation of his methods of 
functioning and how they relate to his motivation and his cognitive 
system is very important for the design of viable methods of studying 
the individual's malfunctioning.
Now what can an awareness of the motivational-cognitive 
dimension of individual functioning contribute to the design of an 
appropriate method for defining mental illness? Or, to put it in
another way, how can we assess the individual in a way that acknowledges
the influence upon him of his context?
Before answering the above questions, it is necessary to 
define in detail what we mean by 'objectivity' in general. The 
definition of 'objectivity' as is stated in Blackiston's Gould Medical 
Dictionary (fourth edition):
"... pertaining to an object or to that which 
is contemplated or perceived as distinguished 
from that which contemplates or perceives."
( 1979, p . 931)
'Objective sign' was defined in the same dictionary as:
"... a sign which can be detected by someone 
other than the patient himself." (p.931)
In Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 'objectivity' was 
defined as:
"... being an object, phenomenon, or condition in 
the realm of sensible experience independent of 
individual thought and perceptible by all 
observers: having reality independent of the mind
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. ..: expressing or dealing with facts or
conditions as perceived without distortion by 
personal feelings, prejudices or interpretations."
( 1983, p.814)
Clearly, the above definitions of 'objectivity' leave little doubt 
that the application of 'objectivity' in studying the concept of 
mental illness is difficult if not altogether impossible.
As already established in the previous chapters, the 
psychiatric definition of 'mental illness' is based on the categoris­
ation and organising of the lay commonsense perceptions and everyday 
observations towards what constitutes 'madness'. In many cases, 
the psychiatrist tries to rationalise and express the lay conception 
in a more logical sense. Thus the psychiatric concept of many forms 
of mental illness is to develop and organise stereotype attitudes 
towards people's lives and behaviour. In other words, the definition 
of 'mental illness* is a conceptual grouping or configuration rather 
than an objective fact (Fernando, 1988). That is to say that no 
psychiatrist can deny that his definition of mental illness is largely 
based on signs that are detected not by 'doctors' but by someone 
other than the doctors, i.e. police, relations, etc. Moreover, the 
psychiatric definition is not independent from individual thoughts 
and facts that are shaped by "personal feelings, prejudices or inter­
pretations" (Webster, 1983, p.814). Thus, when speaking about object­
ivity in studying the concept of mental illness, one must be careful 
not to take the paradigm of biological disease and then complain 
that mental illness does not fit into this model. In any discussion 
of the concept of mental illness, one must take into account the
contributions of several different causes, as expressed by the individual 
himself. The psycho-social dimension, as Skinner in Blumberg ( 1976) 
points out, cannot be reduced to a representation of minds, i.e. 
to a mentalistic explanation, rather it must be observable in terms 
of behavioural manifestation. Or, as Boorse (1982) argues, mental 
events cannot be reduced to neural events. This is because in psychiatry 
we are dealing with motivation and context-dependent systems of thoughts 
and values. Accordingly, one cannot escape the fact that the clinician's 
essential tools should be interpretative - for instance, the patient's 
'explanatory model' (Kleinman in Fernando, 1988). Such methods get 
further away from the goal of an 'objective' and value-free understand­
ing of mental illness.
On the conceptual level, the RFD model accepts the limitation 
outlined above in that it is based on the assumption that as long 
as we are dealing with illness, we are actually dealing with human 
experience. The content of human thoughts or experience is essentially 
a matter of interpretation of the patient's own description. Therefore 
we cannot possibly evaluate or measure the patient's own values without 
reference to society's values, the clinician's values and the context 
of cultural norms in general.
Therefore, any attempt to introduce 'objectivity' into 
a science of illness will fail if we try to remove these values or 
to act as if these values are irrelevant to the individual's illness.
If 'objectivity' means independence from values, there 
can be no objective science of subjective meaning and experience.
That is because the content of that science is always interpreted 
in the light of some values. Thus, all the attempts to introduce 
the medical model fail, if they are intended to describe illness.
Therefore, the RFD model in addressing mental illness does 
not seek freedom from values or subjective experience. Its main 
strength lies basically in explicit recognition of the inherence 
of values in illness and the fact that no description of that illness 
is available which is independent from either the patient's inter­
pretation of his own experience or society's values, and the clinician 
interpretation of the patient's behaviour.
However, this does not mean that we cannot be systematic
in our methods of investigation, or have a relatively clear 'objective
method whose basic aim is to maximise the facts relevant to the 
disturbed conditions per se and to minimise the effects of extraneous 
subjective factors (for instance, the clinician's prejudices and 
beliefs) that have little bearing on the individual's total disturbanc 
That must be done through the 'patient's' explanatory model which 
must be given priority over that of the psychiatrist's definition.
In psychiatry our main topics are feelings, perception
and subjective meaning. A sufficient understanding of the individual' 
life and his unique experience require an understanding of what the 
individual is, the role of context - dependent variables in shaping
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his total functioning, and the kind of reasoning the individual 
attaches to his total functional activities. The importance of 
'reason for action' is that it implies a system of motivation and 
cognitive patterns (a set of beliefs and desires) that can be used 
to explain the behaviour in question.
Different people ascribe different reasons and meanings 
to their actions and context-dependent variables play a considerable 
role in the definition of the system of beliefs and desires that 
must be incorporated in any form of reasoning. To act in a highly 
disturbed manner on some occasions should not necessarily lead to 
the assumption that such a disturbance is systematic or even influential 
over subsequent behaviour.
"The fact that they (the mentally ill) act 
inappropriately today, does not mean that 
their behaviour was equally dysfunctional 
yesterday or that it will be so tomorrow."
(Ellis, 1967, p.445)
The above discussion highlights the central issues in any 
proposal to define the concept of mental illness objectively, namely 
the role of understanding and interpretation of the motivational 
and cognitive patterns underlying the individual's total functioning. 
Such understanding cannot be achieved without a sufficient method 
of interpretation that is appropriate to psychiatry's subject matter. 
Before discussing the alternative model of RFD proposed in this 
chapter, we must define what kind of objectivity we are looking for.
Surely not the kind of objectivity suggested in the previous 
definitions or by the previous writers. It is a fact that the World 
Health Organisation's study, for example, supports the hypothesis 
that schizophrenia is found all over the world. It seems that this 
kind of study, alongside a high rate of mortality and diminished 
fertility among many schizophrenics, supports Boorse's main arguments, 
as we mentioned previously. Before answering the above arguments, 
let us state very clearly that there are certain forms of mental 
illness where a total failure is very severe, even though temporary, 
and follows a stabilised or episodic course of deterioration. There 
would be a strong probability that such total disintegration in the 
motivational and cognitive level would be relatively immune or resistant 
to social context. However, universal 'immunity' for other acute 
psychoses is unproven, and the findings of cross-cultural psychiatry 
are contradictory, vague and have failed to isolate a single cause 
or factor that has a significant bearing on most of the conditions 
described as 'psychoses' (see Rey et al, 1987, and Baskin, 1984).
To illustrate the above, consider the following two cases:
The first case was interviewed by the present writer and concerns 
a Philippino servant working for a Kuwaiti family. She had been 
with them for three years when, suddenly, one early morning she took 
a knife and killed two of the children and the grandfather while 
he was praying. The patient believed she was a prophet from the 
Philippines on a religious mission to save Philippino girls in Kuwait 
from what she considered to be a life of degradation (some female 
servants in the Gulf States have been victims of sexual abuse).
The patient believed that spilling Kuwaiti blood was the only way 
to redeem the crime committed against her fellow country-women.
Thus, she firmly believed that she had carried out a noble religious 
act and was perfectly satisfied with her actions.
The second case concerns a young man who killed his wife 
after finding her in bed with another man. Such an act (killing 
an unfaithful wife) is considered morally justified in Kuwaiti culture 
- in fact it is the only acceptable way to act in order to preserve 
the honour of the family.
With respect to the first case, there would be little doubt 
among mental health professionals across the world about making a 
diagnosis of 'paranoid schizophrenia'. This is because there is 
obviously a total, severe negative social consequence (killing) which 
would appear to be relatively immune to receiving different inter­
pretations in different cultures. To the psychiatrist, the woman's 
motivational and cognitive processes appear to be totally inappropriate, 
thus resulting in the act of irrational killing.
The problem which mental health professionals face with 
such a case is that if her delusion had been of a paranoid nature 
(e.g. that the family were conspiring to kill her and she needed 
to get them first), clinicians might be obliged at least to check 
out her story - to try and falsify fcheir claims concerning their probable 
intentions. In the case of prophesy - as in our example - there 
is nothing to check that we could possible understand. The patient's
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claims, when considered within their proper context, are 'insane' 
delusions, pointless, and lack a meaningful content. The woman's 
beliefs fail to "rationalise" the action precisely because they lack 
any valid criteria of interpretation.
However, some writers such as Laing would assert that 
although the patient's actions appear to be irrational, the same 
cannot be said of her motives. The woman's motivation for killing 
is consistent with her awareness of the distressing situation of 
her fellow women in Kuwait. In this light, the set of beliefs and 
desires motivating the killing is intelligible when one considers 
those beliefs from the patient's explanatory model. For many psychia­
trists, the motives of the patient and the reasons she attached to 
her actions do not fully rationalise the act of killing. Thus, her 
total behaviour seems unintelligible which renders the definition 
of 'mental illness' appropriate.
It might be that there are certain degrees of consistency 
between the woman's motivation for killing and her cognitive system, 
i.e. awareness of her fellow women in Kuwait. Such a consistency 
could only be attained when her delusional system is free from those 
religious or moral principles that contradict the common sense norms 
in a given society. If such moral or religious beliefs do not justify 
the actions which resulted from them, clinicians would be more vulner­
able to define such beliefs as an indication of mental illness.
In fact, the whole concept of mental illness derived its main 
definitional properties from the norms of adjustment that each society
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applied. In the first case, both the act of prophesy and the act 
of killing represent a radical deviation from the Kuwaiti norms of 
adjustment which render the case suitable for psychiatric definition.
The problems arise, however, not from such clear-cut cases, 
where the actions do not fully justify the motives, but from many 
borderline conditions in psychiatric daily practice where the deviation 
from the norms of adjustment or psychiatric 'average* or hypothetical 
normal individuals is not totally clear. In such conditions, one 
must be fully prepared to face the following question: "adjustment
to what, adjustment to whose standards?" (Beilin in Scott, 1971, p.9).
Until mental health professionals reach the stage where 
such questions could be reliably answered, one must be fully careful 
not to ascribe the definition of mental illness on the basis of 
'arbitrary' norms of adjustment.
In the second case, there is a strong correlation between 
the act of killing and the cultural norms of Kuwaiti society on the 
one hand, and the motivational and cognitive patterns of the individual 
on the other. Killing, in such circumstances, is perceived as a 
perfectly acceptable act of 'morality' in Kuwaiti society, and the 
motivation of the individual in this case is to promote the ethical 
principles of his society as well as to preserve his own self-esteem. 
Thus the act of killing is considered to be the logical solution 
to any serious breach of morality.
Obviously, the same act would receive different consider­
ations in different societies, i.e. some societies would view the 
act of killing in such circumstances as a psychopathic deviance, 
while in others it would be considered as anti-social and in still 
others as a perfectly understandable reaction to the violation of
social and moral norms, as in our case. Thus in all cultures there
exist clear-cut expectations for functioning in certain contexts.
The young Kuwaiti man who killed his wife and who, presumably, might
kill a second wife in the same circumstances, and so on, would probably
be considered in many cultures as suffering from a disruption in 
his major social functioning. The inability to comprehend the motiv­
ation behind the killing would probably lead to a diagnosis of mental 
disorder.
Thus, whenever there is a major disruption or radical 
change in the psycho-social functioning of the individual alongside 
a total disturbance in the motivational and cognitive patterns under­
lying psycho-social functioning (as in the Philippino*s case), then 
the frame (though not the content) of the disturbance can plausibly 
be held to be invulnerable to specific contextual variables. 
Sufficiently severe disorder, then, is not "merely" a matter of 
cultural or social judgement, as regards its general form. The precise 
content of a given individual's disordered experience, however, clearly 
is still partly determined by its context (see a study by Rey et 
al ( 1987) on the psychiatric identification of severe events).
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In less severe cases, or when there is only a partial
failure, the problem would take another dimension. That is to say
that establishing a cross-cultural definition of the individual's 
suffering becomes highly difficult due to the underlying consistency 
of motivational and cognitive patterns driving the individual's total 
functioning. Such patterns are comprehensible and intelligible to 
the individual himself in the cultural context within which he operates. 
This means that the clinician needs to be highly familiar with the 
social and cultural context of the 'patient' in order to establish 
an appropriate diagnosis. Partial functional failure is highly 
dependent on social variables because of the presence in the individual 
of a coherent pattern of motivation that is closely tied to his personal 
and social context. In fact, even in a severe form of mental disturb­
ance it would be extremely difficult to escape the context-dependent 
nature of personal motivation, and a number of philosophical and 
theoretical questions need to be posed regarding the hidden nature 
of beliefs in, for example, the delusional system of paranoia or 
schizophrenia. One philosophical consideration which needs to be 
taken into account is the fact that the psychiatrist cannot and does 
not stand apart from the person he is observing. "The psychiatrist
is committed to some picture of what he considers to be reality"
(Szasz, 1973, p. 19), and he interprets the problems of the individual 
according to his own beliefs. In addition, the psychiatrist's socio- 
ethical orientations and the school of thought he belongs to will 
also influence his ideas and his definitions of the patient's problems.
3 6 2
"Psychiatrists thus cannot help but work 
out an image of humankind - a theory of 
the person - as they go about their more 
mundane tasks."
(Moore, 1984, p.4 19)
Thus, the inter-subjective understanding of individual suffering 
and the a priori nature of psychiatric definition threaten any serious 
attempt to establish objective, cross-cultural methods in defining 
mental illness. Jaspers, in Slavney and McHugh (1987), outlines 
the dilemma by stating that:
"... understanding any particular, real event 
has to remain more or less an interpretation 
which only in a few cases reaches any high 
degree of complete and convincing objectivity. 
The fewer these (objective data) are, the less 
forcefully do they compel our understanding; 
we interpret more and understand less." (p.37)
From everything said so far, it would appear that the inter­
pretative nature of psychiatric definition of mental phenomena must 
be the central theme in any discussion concerned with subjectivity 
or objectivity of psychiatric explanation. How, then, can the problem 
be overcome?
The RFD model presented here suggests the criterion of
a contractual relationship between psychiatrist and patient. Such
criterion can be defined as an explicit agreement between the psychia­
trist and the patient on the following points: first, mutual agreement
between both parties on the factors that have a bearing on the definition 
of the problem. A third party's conception of the problem would 
be considered as an additional source of reference if and only if
the causal links are not very clear or the patient's personal reports 
of his suffering appear inconsistent or irrelevant to his present 
problem. Thus, a third party account would be viewed as a source 
of validation or as a useful informant that might help in identifying 
additional contributory factors in the individual's present disturbance 
Secondly, the psychiatrist's interpretation must be fully accepted 
by the patient. Finally, the patient's personal conception of his 
problem, the way he perceives himself, and the motives and rationale 
he attaches to his suffering are the most valid and reliable factors 
in defining the problem in question (the patient's explanatory model). 
For this reason, the RFD model emphasises the importance of the patient 
own perception of his suffering and his motivation in calling for 
professional help.
Rogers (1951) realised the centrality of the individual's 
own judgement when he stated that our problem as mental health pro­
fessionals is that:
"We fail to see that we are evaluating the
person from our own, or from a fairly
general frame of reference but that the
only way to understand his behaviour
meaningfully is to understand it as he
perceives it himself, just as the only
way to understand another culture is to
assume the frame of reference of that
culture. When that is done, the various
meaningless and strange behaviours are seen
as part of a meaningful and goal-directed
activity. There is no such thing as random
trial and error behaviour, no such thing as
a delusion, except as the individual may
apply these terms to his past behaviour." (p.494)
In fact, many writers (Laing, 1983; Szasz, 1987; Scheff,
1967; Ellis, 1967; Rogers, 195 1, etc.) have emphasised the importance 
of the individual's own perception of his suffering as the most valid 
and meaningful frame of reference for 'reality' as perceived by the 
patient himself. In any attempt to establish a systematic and conceptua 
clear definition of individual functional impairment, one must be 
clear whether the definition is based on a shared interpretation 
agreement between the 'patient' and the psychiatrist, or, for example, 
on the claims of a third party.
Before discussing the importance of a shared responsibility 
in psychiatric definition, let us first give a more detailed account 
of the significance of the individual's own perception of his problem. 
The individual's judgement, although important, is not necessarily 
the only significant criterion in all situations. A third party, 
or significant 'others', such as family members, the police, friends, 
etc., may provide additional points of view, but again not necessarily 
the most reliable ones. Different judgements, therefore, carry 
different weight. However, it is the individual himself and the 
way he perceives and experiences his total performance in the three 
major functions that must be accorded the utmost importance. For 
it is the individual himself who perceives a given situation as distress 
ing and as bound to affect his functioning, by correlating and assessing 
the similarities and differences between his feelings and those of 
others, or by taking into account the way he felt and behaved towards 
certain problems in the past which proved to be effective in handling 
the situations (Scheff, 1967). In this way, the individual's self­
description and the clinician's observations together would help 
to provide sufficient data about the central features of the disturbance 
(Jaspers, 1923). Such information would contribute in maximising 
the 'objective' facts of the disturbance and minimising the subjective 
and irrelevant ones. The individual's claims or self-description 
should be the most crucial element in the psychiatric definition 
of his problem, particularly when one considers that the major tool 
for diagnosis in psychiatry is the interview. Therefore, it seems 
only natural to emphasise the importance of individual perception 
as possibly the best source of information about the problem. This 
is because the only person who knows why the patient is behaving 
ineffectively, or what his functional disturbance consists of, and 
what he is doing to maintain the status quo, is the patient himself.
He is the only one who can accept his disturbance or refuse to live 
with it (Ellis, 1967).
One must admit, however, that there are certain psychiatric 
cases where the patient's total functional failure is so extreme, 
even though temporary, that it might affect the validity of what 
the patient says. In those instances, one must allow for the following 
two alternatives: (i) either to accept the patient's personal assess­
ment or self-referral in conjunction with those around him, or 
(ii) 'significant others' might be given precedence over the patient's 
personal claim. In other words, the RFD model, with respect to 
certain psychiatric cases, accepts an obligation to consider the 
patient's own evaluation as a merely additional, secondary criterion 
for deciding the significance of his total suffering.
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Now, how can the patient's claims and self-descriptions 
be taken as a basis for establishing a systematic account of mental 
illness?
In trying to answer the above question, we shall provide 
a brief account of what kind of methodical procedures we are looking 
for and of the role of interpretative agreement between the patient 
and the psychiatrist. A possible resolution of the above dilemma 
would be the introduction of a morally systematic approach rather 
than a conceptual one in the definition of the concept of mental 
illness.
The Concept of Mental Illness:
The attractions of 'objectivity' or the demand for a 'morally 
advanced perspective' - do we really have a choice?
From the analysis offered above, it has become clear that 
the psychiatric definition of mental illness is based largely on 
social factors which play an important role in the definition of 
concepts such as appropriateness and rationality in terms of individual 
suffering. But this, as Reidbord (1986) argues in his article 
"Inappropriate Objectivity in Psychiatry":
"... is no disgrace to the field, for as Aristotle 
noted, we do not require the same proof in 
oration that we do in mathematics. Psychiatry 
undoubtedly falls in between, and is strengthened 
or weakened according to the cognisance we grant 
to our own biases." (p. 134)
As we noted earlier in this chapter, many researchers have 
tried to find an 'objective* value-free definition of mental illness 
by assuming a causal and deterministic view towards mental illness 
as in the 'disease' or 'medical' models. In reality, we cannot escape 
the fact that:
"... the failure of our understanding and treatment 
of mental illness is not in the hands of science 
alone. It depends ultimately on the valuation we 
place on human existence and human experience ... 
Whatever course we adopt, we shall be making a 
number of value judgements of which we may be 
more or less aware and these will include social 
judgements about what kinds of behaviour we are 
going to count as acceptable and what as pathological, 
judgement of what constitutes happiness and effect­
ive living, judgements concerning what aspects of 
behaviour we should suppress and what we should try 
to understand."
(Carni and Smail, 1969, p. 173)
The above quotation states clearly that the role of valuation and 
understanding are central elements in any psychiatric definition 
of mental phenomena. Both the descriptive and explanatory processes 
are incorporated in the interpretative process in psychiatry (Ingleby, 
1981). Moreover, these quotations emphasise the role of non-clinical 
factors in the psychiatric definition of mental illness, i.e. social 
criteria rather than objective ones (symptoms alone).
For that reason, the RFD recognised at the moral level 
the vulnerability of the patient to non-clinical judgement (social 
definition) of non-conformity that is based on societal and familial 
values. Therefore the RFD model insists that we ought to make the 
patient's own values central as they are expressed in his own account
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of his experience or illness. That is to say that we must replace 
the dominant position given to social values with the dominant role 
of patient's values and we must define our diagnostic procedures 
with this changing priority in values in mind. The RFD's main emphasis 
is to re-interpret such claim of 'objectivity' and to put the patient's 
values and autonomy on the centre rather than society's values.
Autonomy is the justification for the RFD model. The patient's 
decision in the light of his own reason and preferences without undue 
constraint must lie at the very base of psychiatric practice. As 
a result we will be able to avoid the risk of different forms of 
psychiatric abuse which we discussed earlier, i.e. clinical and 
political abuse.
This preference for the patient's values over society's 
values is in itself a moral preference, not a conceptual revision 
of DSM-III. It is grounded in a moral preference for the ethics 
and values of self-government or self-control as a central moral 
principle. Therefore the RFD model does represent in this respect 
a moral advance over DSM-III (in moral terms).
Being able to make a choice of this kind does not imply 
that psychiatry totally lacks a systematic procedure. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to look for scientific 
methods in the area of experience and feelings, or to deny the presence 
of values. Irresponsible parenting, for example, may or may not 
be taken as a cause of anti-social deviation and such behaviour may 
not count as a basic personality characteristic (Blackburn, 1988).
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That does not mean that we are not able to have a systematic approach 
in the definition of mental illness that is based on both interpretation 
and self-description methods. Certainly one cannot ignore the effects 
of context, meaning and purpose of the individual's functiqns in 
any given methods of interpretation, unless, as Boorse (1981-1982) 
suggests, it is possible to confine ourselves to functions so fundamental 
and pervasive as to be counted 'natural' to our species. Impairment 
in such 'natural' functions would be understood as a 'disease' (leading 
to illness if severe enough to be incapacitating, undesirable, etc.).
But such functions are too general to be of use in understanding 
individual experience. It seems therefore that the only possible 
account for establishing a relatively systematic and reliable inter­
pretation approach in psychiatry is to assume a systematic symptom- 
interpretation approach based on the individual's personal account 
of his disturbed functions. In other words, instead of establishing 
a context-independent definition of the individual's subjective 
distress one must consider an approach or method which is equipped 
to suit and accommodate the diversity of psychiatric variables in 
an individual's background. A method that can be described as 
'systematic' must be viewed as individually centred if it takes into 
consideration the diagnostic agreement between the patient and the 
psychiatrist as in itself a valid representative procedure. Thus, 
the above approach or method would be comprehensible only in terms 
of a mutual agreement on the content and meaning of psychiatric 
interpretation between both the patient and the psychiatrist.
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The following conditions need to be fulfilled in order
to maximise the validity of the above approach and to minimise the
influence of irrelevant factors:
1. The patient must be aware of a total breakdown in his major 
funct ioning.
2. The patient himself must seek specialised help.
3. The clinician and the patient must enter an agreement which is 
characterised by shared responsibility on the contents and purpose 
of psychiatric interpretation. The main features of such an 
agreement can best be summarised by the following quotation from 
Rogers (196 1) :
"The client is freely able to express his feeling 
in its complete intensity as a 'pure culture' 
without intellectual inhibitions or caution, with­
out having it bound by knowledge or contradictory 
feelings; and I am able with equal freedom to 
experience my understanding of their feeling, with­
out any conscious thought about it, without any 
type of diagnostic or analytical thinking, without 
any cognitive or emotional barriers to a complete 
'letting go' in understanding." (p.202)
When the individual and the psychiatrist enter a relationship 
where there is a 'complete letting go in understanding' between 
each other, a relatively high degree of agreement on the main 
features of the disturbance would be attained.
4. Both the patient and the mental health professionals must agree 
throughout the interpretative process on the content, meaning 
and purpose of the disturbed functions.
5. The interpretation of the functional failure must be viewed as 
a probability or a possibility rather than as a predetermined 
fact (Walker, 1985; Torrey, 1974).
Thus, the absence of any preconceptions about the functional 
failure of the individual will result in an active participation 
by both parties in the exchange of ideas about the individual and 
how he perceives his social environment as well as his motivational 
and cognitive processes. As a result, the clinician would gain a 
more meaningful perception of what appears as irrational and the 
content of the disturbance would be more intelligible. In this way, 
the interpretative agreement between patient and clinician can be 
viewed as an effective ’letting go' procedure which would facilitate 
a genuine participation and a mutual understanding on the central 
features and contents of the individual's disturbance.
Diagnostic decision, therefore, is likely to identify with 
the patient's, rather than with society's, perspective. As a result, 
the content and meaning of the individual's total failure would be 
more comprehensible to the psychiatrist. This would be achieved 
when both the psychiatrist and the patient engaged in a mutual frame 
of reference and understanding to the main feature of the disturbed 
funct ion.
Thus one is able now to conceptualise an account that is 
merely a preference among competing values, an approach that is substit­
uting the patient's values for society's values. That does not mean 
that the above approach is totally 'free' from the values of society. 
Indeed, the patient's own values will not be totally independent 
of society's values. One cannot escape the fact that to understand 
the patient's values, one must make a reference to the context of 
society's values.
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The emphasis on the patient's own values, however, would 
be justified on the grounds that such values are those which are 
considered by most members of society as being 'out of touch with 
reality' or 'bizarre' or deviations from what one considered to be 
standard values.
In fact, when we make the patient's values central, rather 
than society's, that is a moral rather than a conceptual preference 
or choice. In reality, one cannot dispense with society's values 
as a frame of identification and reference - that is in fact a logical 
constraint. Without this frame of reference, diagnosis would be 
in a conceptual vacuum - chaotic and idiosyncratic, in fact bizarre 
and meaningless itself. We recognise any forms of 'disorder' only 
by having available to us some "order" with which to contrast it.
On the moral and perhaps the conceptual level, nevertheless, 
the patient's values when dealt with by the clinicians as highly 
indicative and relevance to the patient's present problems, this 
will eventually help the clinician to isolate specific factors or 
attitudes that have great bearing on the causation of the problems 
as conceived by the patient himself.
Again, to isolate such factors the psychiatrist has to 
rely heavily on an interpretation method alone. It might be argued, 
however, that such a method in psychiatry represents a 'weak' form 
in comparison to the well-established methods of internal medicine. 
However, interpretation is a basic tool for psychiatric reasoning
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and mental health professionals have little choice but to accept 
its validity. Thus we are not dealing with one universal view of 
RFD that can be applied to all contexts. Instead, different individual 
cases might be involved in different levels of psychiatric interpret­
ative agreement and therefore need different diagnoses. Each diagnosis 
is a reflection of the context and purpose of the disturbed function 
and is relatively free from institutional norms or the clinician's 
subjective view. Moreover, the definition represents the logical 
conclusions of what both the patient and the psychiatrist have agreed 
upon. Therefore, patient 'A' is likely to receive a different diagnosis 
from patient 'B' even though both 'A' and 'B' share the same 'symptoms'. 
As patient 'A' and patient 'B' have a different system of values 
and different motivational and cognitive systems, their total functional 
failure would have a content which is unique to each one of them. 
However, despite the differences in the two cases, they would both 
enter in a 'psychiatric interpretative agreement' with the health 
professional in charge of their cases, and they would both have to 
agree on the validity of the psychiatric diagnosis of their suffering. 
Accordingly, the psychiatric diagnosis for patient 'A' and patient 
'B' would be considered as a valid description of what both cases 
have agreed upon during the process of 'psychiatric interpretation'.
As a result, the psychiatric diagnosis would be more representative 
and the data collected would be viewed as reflecting the variables 
which affect the major functioning of patients 'A' and 'B'.
In actual psychiatric practice, of course, one cannot deny 
the fact that there are individuals who suffer from severe and chronic
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disorders which result in a complete breakdown of their cognitive 
and motivational systems. In such cases, there exists an ethical and 
professional obligation on the part of mental health professionals 
to accept either a temporary 'active-passive' relationship until the 
disorganisation of the individual's cognitive and motivational 
system becomes less severe (Irwin, 1985), or a type of relationship 
where the "patient remains relatively but not completely aloof while 
the physician gives greatly of self" (Friedlander, 1982, p.1716).
As we noted earlier, there are a few cases in psychiatric 
practice where the form of severity of functional failure is 
relatively unquestionable in almost any context. In such cases, the 
total breakdown of the individual's cognitive and motivational 
system make his condition relatively easy to identify in almost all 
contexts, i.e. indiscriminate killings, chronic and severe 
aggressive behaviour, etc. Thus many studies have shown that 
psychiatrists are likely to have a far higher level of agreement on 
the diagnosis of major psychotic disorders than on the diagnosis of 
neurotic disturbance (see Rey et al, 1987). The problem is that not 
all psychiatric cases represent a severe and chronic functional 
failure. Moreover, even in the few such cases one cannot ignore the 
effects of context on the content of disturbed functions, especially 
if the total functional failure appears unintelligible or ambiguous. 
In such cases, when the context might determine the results, the 
clinician needs to relate the symptoms to an interpretation of the 
context which would help him to make sense of the symptoms presented 
to him.
In conclusion, what we are looking for is a shared respons­
ibility model in the form of an autonomous contractual relationship 
between both the patient and the psychiatrist. This kind of relation­
ship, as Szasz (1972) puts it convincingly:
"... implies that a patient might set himself 
goals at variance with the values of his therapist; 
the patient may change in ways not specifically
intended by the therapist, and indeed contrary to
the therapist's personal preference." (p.255)
In other words, a type of ideal patient-psychiatrist relationship 
must be the kind suggested by Friedlander (1982) when the patient 
gives greatly of self but the physician enters only slightly into 
the patient's personhood" (p. 17 16).
This type of relationship can facilitate the conditions 
for both parties (patient and psychiatrist) to debate and agree in 
consultation on what constitutes an acceptable psychiatric interpretation 
of the presented problem.
The present writer believes that such form of participation 
by both the patient and the clinician in the formation of psychiatric
definition would minimise the effects of preconceived and predetermined
evaluation. Thus, it seems possible to believe that procedures based 
on mutual interpretation rather than on notions of cause, etiology 
or symptoms could create an international perspective on how a systematic 
working method of psychiatric intervention could be enhanced through 
the involvement of the patient in the psychiatric definitional process.
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Future goals, consequently, should be directed towards 
establishing an international perspective on the importance of shared 
responsibility and participation between patient and psychiatrist.
An universal recognition of the validity of such procedures of inter­
pretation is the only hope for the safeguarding of the individual's 
right to an appropriate diagnostic account of his suffering in any 
psychiatric (diagnosis) method.
Conclusion
There is a strong temptation among many psychiatrists, 
especially the organic ones, to ignore the role of cultural and social 
factors in the definition of the concept of mental illness. Such 
a perspective does not take into consideration the patient's personal 
philosophy based on his socio-ethical background. Such attempts 
to define the concept of mental illness "carry the weight of biological 
law" (Lazarus, 1975, p. 175).
However, the reality of "biological law" as something which 
is basically related to physio-chemical criteria alone must be examined 
carefully. Such belief in the absolute determination of physio-chemical 
factors would consequently lead to dismiss the importance of emotional 
humanistic factors implied in the practice of medicine in general 
and the genesis of disease in particular, which eventually dehumanizes 
the practice of medicine.
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An objective or value-free definition of the concept of 
mental illness would not, on the other hand, necessarily do away 
with the pejorative connotation and promotive nature of being mentally 
ill which is somehow inherent in the concept of illness itself.
What is more, even if one accepts the possibility of establishing 
a value-free definition of extreme forms of mental illness, such 
as schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, etc., one cannot ignore 
the fact that there are a great number of marginal cases where causal 
laws are too complicated to trace. It has to be accepted, therefore, 
that a definition of mental illness in such cases is bound to be 
highly tenuous.
The present writer believes that recent attempts to establish 
a value-free definition of mental illness are based more on a hypo­
thesis than well-established facts. What mental health professionals 
need to address is the moral consequences of being defined as mentally 
ill. Thus, instead of trying to find commonality of cause, mental 
health professionals need to direct their efforts towards finding 
a commonality of outcome in the consequences for the individual of 
being labelled as 'mentally ill'. In other words, mental health 
professionals need to address themselves to the moral and ethical 
problems of defining individuals as 'mentally ill'.
The objective or value-free perspective in Sarbin's (1967)
words:
"... may be formualted as the question, what
criteria should be employed to deprive a man
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of his liberty, his civil rights, his capacity 
for self-determination, and so on?11 (p.452)
Although the problem is not in itself to do with finding
a 'proper* definition of the concept of mental illness, it has, never­
theless, much to do with the moral consequences of such a definition. 
Such consequences would differ from one context to another. A Kuwaiti 
patient, for example, would accept a psychiatric definition that 
he is incompetent, within the framework of the Islamic tradition 
of accepting what happens to one as inevitable, or resigning oneself 
to the environment. Such a view, however, might be unacceptable 
to someone brought up in the egalitarian and individualistic tradition 
of Western culture which gives centrality to the idea of competency 
as :
"... reflecting our commitment to struggle 
against and control the environment, to act against 
events or to make them happen, to transform them 
in accordance with our needs."
(Lazarus, 1975, p.21)
In this chapter, the present writer has tried, through 
the RFD model, to accommodate a range of diverse issues centred round
mental illness as a value-free concept. The RFD model can best be
summarised as resting upon the following conditions which are seen 
as necessary for the proper application of the concept of mental 
illness to a given individual:
1. There is a total failure in the individual’s major psycho-bio- 
social functioning.
2. The individual admits to feeling 'ill*.
3. The individual seeks professional help.
It was further argued that even in the clear-cut psychiatric 
conditions where there is a total failure in the individual's major 
functioning, accompanied by a severe disturbance of the individual's 
motivational and cognitive abilities, one cannot view such conditions 
as totally immune to social and cultural factors. Indeed, mental 
health professionals cannot dispense with contextual influences as 
a frame of identification and references or the subjective psychiatric 
interpretation of the patient's system of values.
The RFD model also emphasises the importance of the 
individual's own description of his disturbance as a necessary condition 
for entering into a shared interpretative agreement with the psychiatrist. 
Both the patient and the psychiatrist should come to a mutual acceptance 
of the diagnosis of the problem of functional failure. Thus, the 
agreement reached is likely to reflect more appropriately the shared 
perspective of patient and psychiatrist, and it would then seem possible 
to argue for an 'all-context' application of the psychiatric model 
of patient participation to the definition of the concept of mental 
illness to the extent that "co-operation" and "shared participation" 
would be understood to mean the same thing in different contexts.
It has become clear that the 'biological' or 'disease' 
model cannot provide a satisfactory answer to notions such as 
'participation' and 'interpretation*. Moreover, even if science
succeeded in doing so, it would be difficult to imagine that questions 
such as whether the manifested function is appropriate or inappropriate, 
reasonable or unreasonable can be solved by physical medicine alone.
The question which needs to be addressed here is not whether 
we can claim any success in making an analogy or a distinction between 
psychiatry and internal medicine, but how such an analogy or distinction 
can contribute to establishing a more constructive method for the 
formulation and understanding of the concept of mental illness from 
both a professional and a moral perspective, or of how mental health 
professionals respond to people who are 'objectively diseased'.
CONCLUSIONS
It was suggested in Chapter one that psychiatric services 
in Kuwait are in a state of moral crisis. The development in 
psychiatric services in Kuwait in recent years shows that mental 
health professionals have not travelled far beyond the walls of the 
old ’asylum’. It was shown that the diagnostic process and the 
management of psychiatric patients in Kuwait is lacking in sound 
clinical judgement and ignores the individual patient as a prima facie 
moral agent who has the right for self-definition and autonomous choices
In trying to establish the hidden factors that lie behind 
psychiatric abuse, we discussed in Chapter two the limitation and 
weakness of the concept of mental illness which render the concept 
vulnerable to abuse. It was argued that the current definitional 
systems in psychiatry, as mainly represented by DSM-III, although 
providing clinicians throughout the world with a single definition 
of mental illness, are not used consistently by all countries in 
their practice of psychiatry. Moreoever, such a single definition 
of mental illness does not prevent many mental health professionals 
from using their subjective or personal impressions in reaching the 
psychiatric diagnosis. As a result, certain clinical, terminological, 
and moral limitations arise.
In Chapter two, it was established that human problems are 
too diverse and complicated for any definitional system in psychiatry 
to conceptualize. It was further argued that the negative
382
outcome of a psychiatric diagnosis outweigh in many instances the 
value of such definitions.
In Chapter three, we proposed a functional approach to 
the concept of mental illness. This approach was called the Reactive 
Functional Disorder (RFD). The RFD model highlights the vulnerability 
of the concept of mental illness to psychiatric abuse and the 
importance of the concept of totality in studying functional disturbance 
and in reducing the problem of psychiatric abuse. The RFD emphasises 
'abnormality1 as related to specific functions as they are perceived 
and experienced by the individual himself, and the importance of 
viewing human problems as a reaction towards external pressures rather
than as residing inside the individual. In that respect, the RFD account 
emphasises the importance of a context-dependent interpretation of 
the content of any psychiatric symptoms.
The RFD approach puts a great deal of emphasis on promoting 
the patient's right for self-determination and self-definition.
These aims would be established through the application of a rational, 
autonomous and contractually-based psychiatry. Such contractually- 
based psychiatry can be generalized in all contexts. Accordingly, 
the content and frame of most psychiatric problems would have a great 
validity and be highly reflective of the patient's actual suffering.
In addition, the RFD approach emphasizes the meaning the 
'patient' ascribes to his psychiatric problems. The meaning which 
the individual attaches to his suffering is considered to be an
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important qualifier, as important as the general question of context.
The individual patient may well suffer, but it could be rational 
and meaningful to do so.
In fact, giving precedence to the patient's values and 
the meaning he ascribes to his problems over social values is a moral 
rather than a conceptual choice. In reality, one cannot dispense 
with social values as a frame of identification and reference. Without 
such a frame of reference, diagnosis would be in a conceptual vacuum 
- chaotic and idiosyncratic, in fact, bizarre and meaningless itself.
We recognize any form of psychiatric disorder only by 
having available to us some 'order' with which to contrast it. On 
the moral and perhaps the conceptual level, nevertheless, the patient's 
values, when dealt with by the psychiatrist as highly indicative 
and relevant to the patient's present problem, will help the psychiatrist 
to isolate specific factors that have a great bearing on the individual's 
problem.
The RFD model incorporates the patient's own judgment of 
the degree to which his major functions have deteriorated. This 
reference to the patient's own interpretation represents a crucial 
step away from the dangerous reliance, in the DSM-III model, upon 
the psychiatrist's subjective or personal experience.
In Chapter four, we established the fact that although 
Thomas Szasz takes an extreme attitude towards the concept of mental
illness and considers psychiatry as completely governed by moral 
values, he has nevertheless, contributed to promoting many central 
ethical principles in the practice of psychiatry. Szasz’s arguments 
on the vulnerability of the concept of mental illness to abuse, and 
on the moral outcome of psychiatric terminology and the need for 
contractual psychiatry, have directed psychiatric practices and 
research towards a more careful consideration of the limitations 
and weaknesses of the concept of mental illness. Furthermore,
Dr. Szasz’s writings have prompted and encouraged concern for 
the patient's right to self-government.
In Chapter five, we established that the political abuse 
of psychiatry in the Soviet Union has become a systematic state 
policy. Such political abuse is largely based on a concept of 
mental illness and a diagnostic scheme (founded by Snezhnevsky) 
that can accommodate many normal individuals under its umbrella.
Many political dissenters have been diagnosed as 'sluggish 
schizophrenics' on the basis of non-conformity rather than on the 
basis of clear objective symptoms. In this chapter we have also 
made an attempt to show how the RFD model might provide some 
guidelines for dealing with the problem of psychiatric abuse in 
the Soviet Union. One of these guidelines is that mental illnesses 
be identified on the basis of a basic and total disturbance in the 
individual's major psycho-physio-social functions. A second is 
that the disturbance be the result of a reactive process towards 
external rather than internal factors. Thirdly, we stressed the 
importance of the individual's personal claim of his suffering as 
a possible indicator for the severity of his disturbed functioning.
Throughout this chapter, emphasis was placed on the importance of 
being fully aware of the content and frame of functional failure 
and the role of the 'third party' in the final psychiatric 
definition. Fourthly, we drew attention to the importance of 
encouraging a self-referral approach and a contractual relationship 
between the 'patient' and psychiatrist that is based on a mutual 
agreement between them as to what should constitute normal or 
abnormal functioning. If we apply those principles to political 
psychiatric dissenters, it would become clear that most of them do 
not suffer from any forms of psychiatric conditions.
Thus, the RFD account, when applied theoretically to case 
analysis, highlights the problems of Soviet psychiatric abuse, while 
remaining invulnerable to the kinds of abuse we see in Western 
countries.
In the final chapter, it was established that it is very 
difficult to construct value-free methods for conceptualizing and 
dealing with mental phenomena. It was argued that attempts to 
establish an objective account of mental functions have not so far 
succeeded in showing that there are systematic or organized accounts 
of inner mental functions, in other words, in understanding the 
content of the psychiatric disturbance.
It was shown that the disease model is not altogether 
appropriate when applied in psychiatry. It was also argued that 
confining ourselves to a physicalist's interpretation of physiological
conditions and then extending such an interpretation to psychological 
conditions is not a profitable method for explaining psychiatric 
disturbance. That is because human behaviour and experience rather 
than organic pathology should be the main interest in psychiatric 
investigation. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of the possibility 
that neural functions in the body could be related to or identical 
with mental functions. However, this does not mean that we cannot 
be systematic, even if not totally objective, in our view of many 
forms of mental illness or human suffering in general.
One cannot deny that an individual's problems must be defined 
and classified in order to identify them and help the individual.
What mental health professionals also need to do, however, is to 
address themselves to the moral and ethical consequences of 
diagnosing or classifying individuals as mentally ill.
A central question, therefore, is not whether we can 
claim to make an analogy or a distinction between psychiatry and 
internal medicine but how such an analogy or distinction can 
contribute to establishing a more constructive method for the 
formulation and understanding of the concept of mental illness from 
both a professional and a moral perspective.
The RFD model has been developed in the hope that it might 
add a moral dimension to the current concepts of mental illness.
It has been suggested that future researchers must address 
themselves to the moral and ethical problems of defining individuals 
as mentally ill.
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In this thesis, we have established the need to promote 
the patient’s role in a shared interpretative agreement with the 
psychiatrists where both parties come to a mutual acceptance of what 
should be defined as a psychiatric condition. Furthermore, we have 
emphasized the role of the patient’s personal report about his 
suffering as a possible indication for his functional failure and 
the need to be highly cautious towards ’third party’ claims.
The basic justification of the RFD model is that 
it affirms the patient’s right to autonomy and self-determination.
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